ACCORDINGtothepointfromwhichourviewistaken,wemayfeelasmuchastonishedattheextraordinaryresultsofsomegreatbattlesasatthewantofresultsinothers.Weshalldwellforamomentonthenatureoftheeffectofagreatvictory.
Threethingsmayeasilybedistinguishedhere:theeffectupontheinstrumentitself,thatis,upontheGeneralsandtheirArmies;theeffectupontheStatesinterestedintheWar;andtheparticularresultoftheseeffectsasmanifestedinthesubsequentcourseofthecampaign.
Ifweonlythinkofthetriflingdifferencewhichthereusuallyisbetweenvictorandvanquishedinkilled,wounded,prisoners,andartillerylostonthefieldofbattleitself,theconsequenceswhicharedevelopedoutofthisinsignificantpointseemoftenquiteincomprehensible,andyet,usually,everythingonlyhappensquitenaturally.
Wehavealreadysaidintheseventhchapterthatthemagnitudeofavictoryincreasesnotmerelyinthesamemeasureasthevanquishedforcesincreaseinnumber,butinahigherratio.Themoraleffectsresultingfromtheissueofagreatbattlearegreateronthesideoftheconqueredthanonthatoftheconqueror:theyleadtogreaterlossesinphysicalforce,whichtheninturnreactonthemoralelement,andsotheygoonmutuallysupportingandintensifyingeachother.Onthismoraleffectwemustthereforelayspecialweight.Ittakesanoppositedirectionontheonesidefromthatontheother;asitunderminestheenergiesoftheconqueredsoitelevatesthepowersandenergyoftheconqueror.Butitschiefeffectisuponthevanquished,becausehereitisthedirectcauseoffreshlosses,andbesidesitishomogeneousinnaturewithdanger,withthefatigues,thehardships,andgenerallywithallthoseembarrassingcircumstancesbywhichWarissurrounded,thereforeentersintoleaguewiththemandincreasesbytheirhelp,whilstwiththeconquerorallthesethingsarelikeweightswhichgiveahigherswingtohiscourage.Itisthereforefound,thatthevanquishedsinksmuchfurtherbelowtheoriginallineofequili
iumthantheconquerorraiseshimselfaboveit;onthisaccount,ifwespeakoftheeffectsofvictorywealludemoreparticularlytothosewhichmanifestthemselvesinthearmy.Ifthiseffectismorepowerfulinanimportantcombatthaninasmallerone,soagainitismuchmorepowerfulinagreatbattlethaninaminorone.Thegreatbattletakesplaceforthesakeofitself,forthesakeofthevictorywhichitistogive,andwhichissoughtforwiththeutmosteffort.Hereonthisspot,inthisveryhour,toconquertheenemyisthepurposeinwhichtheplanoftheWarwithallitsthreadsconverges,inwhichalldistanthopes,alldimglimmeringsofthefuturemeet,fatestepsinbeforeustogiveananswertotheboldquestion.—ThisisthestateofmentaltensionnotonlyoftheCommanderbutofhiswholeArmydowntothelowestwaggon-driver,nodoubtindecreasingstrengthbutalsoindecreasingimportance.
Accordingtothenatureofthething,agreatbattlehasneveratanytimebeenanunprepared,unexpected,blindroutineservice,butagrandact,which,partlyofitselfandpartlyfromtheaimoftheCommander,standsoutfromamongstthemassofordinaryefforts,sufficientlytoraisethetensionofallmindstoahigherdegree.Butthehigherthistensionwithrespecttotheissue,themorepowerfulmustbetheeffectofthatissue.
Again,themoraleffectofvictoryinourbattlesisgreaterthanitwasintheearlieronesofmodernmilitaryhistory.Iftheformerareaswehavedepictedthem,arealstruggleofforcestotheutmost,thenthesumtotalofalltheseforces,ofthephysicalaswellasthemoral,mustdecidemorethancertainspecialdispositionsormerechance.
Asinglefaultcommittedmayberepairednexttime;fromgoodfortuneandchancewecanhopeformorefavouronanotheroccasion;butthesumtotalofmoralandphysicalpowerscannotbesoquicklyaltered,and,therefore,whattheawardofavictoryhasdecidedappearsofmuchgreaterimportanceforallfuturity.Veryprobably,ofallconcernedinbattles,whetherinoroutoftheArmy,veryfewhavegivenathoughttothisdifference,butthecourseofthebattleitselfimpressesonthemindsofallpresentinitsuchaconviction,andtherelationofthiscourseinpublicdocuments,howevermuchitmaybecolouredbytwistingparticularcircumstances,showsalso,moreorless,totheworldatlargethatthecausesweremoreofageneralthanofaparticularnature.
Hewhohasnotbeenpresentatthelossofagreatbattlewillhavedifficultyinformingforhimselfalivingorquitetrueideaofit,andtheabstractnotionsofthisorthatsmalluntowardaffairwillnevercomeuptotheperfectconceptionofalostbattle.Letusstopamomentatthepicture.
Thefirstthingwhichoverpowerstheimagination—andwemayindeedsay,alsotheunderstanding—isthediminutionofthemasses;thenthelossofground,whichtakesplacealways,moreorless,and,therefore,onthesideoftheassailantalso,ifheisnotfortunate;thentheruptureoftheoriginalformation,thejumblingtogetheroftroops,therisksofretreat,which,withfewexceptionsmayalwaysbeseensometimesinalesssometimesinagreaterdegree;nexttheretreat,themostpartofwhichcommencesatnight,or,atleast,goesonthroughoutthenight.Onthisfirstmarchwemustatonceleavebehind,anumberofmencompletelywornoutandscatteredabout,oftenjustthe
avest,whohavebeenforemostinthefightwhoheldoutthelongest:thefeelingofbeingconquered,whichonlyseizedthesuperiorofficersonthebattlefield,nowspreadsthroughallranks,evendowntothecommonsoldiers,aggravatedbythehorribleideaofbeingobligedtoleaveintheenemy'shandssomany
avecomrades,whobutamomentsincewereofsuchvaluetousinthebattle,andaggravatedbyarisingdistrustofthechief,towhom,moreorless,everysubordinateattributesasafaultthefruitlesseffortshehasmade;andthisfeelingofbeingconqueredisnoidealpictureoverwhichonemightbecomemaster;itisanevidenttruththattheenemyissuperiortous;atruthofwhichthecausesmighthavebeensolatentbeforethattheywerenottobediscovered,butwhich,intheissue,comesoutclearandpalpable,orwhichwasalso,perhaps,beforesuspected,butwhichinthewantofanycertainty,wehadtoopposebythehopeofchance,relianceongoodfortune,Providenceoraboldattitude.Now,allthishasprovedinsufficient,andthebittertruthmeetsusharshandimperious.
Allthesefeelingsarewidelydifferentfromapanic,whichinanarmyfortifiedbymilitaryvirtuenever,andinanyother,onlyexceptionally,followsthelossofabattle.TheymustariseeveninthebestofArmies,andalthoughlonghabituationtoWarandvictorytogetherwithgreatconfidenceinaCommandermaymodifythemalittlehereandthere,theyareneverentirelywantinginthefirstmoment.Theyarenotthepureconsequencesoflosttrophies;theseareusuallylostatalaterperiod,andthelossofthemdoesnotbecomegenerallyknownsoquickly;theywillthereforenotfailtoappearevenwhenthescaleturnsintheslowestandmostgradualmanner,andtheyconstitutethateffectofavictoryuponwhichwecanalwayscountineverycase.
Wehavealreadysaidthatthenumberoftrophiesintensifiesthiseffect.www.xiumb.com
ItisevidentthatanArmyinthiscondition,lookedatasaninstrument,isweakened!Howcanweexpectthatwhenreducedtosuchadegreethat,aswesaidbefore,itfindsnewenemiesinalltheordinarydifficultiesofmakingWar,itwillbeabletorecoverbyfresheffortswhathasbeenlost!Beforethebattletherewasarealorassumedequili
iumbetweenthetwosides;thisislost,and,therefore,someexternalassistanceisrequisitetorestoreit;everyneweffortwithoutsuchexternalsupportcanonlyleadtofreshlosses.
Thus,therefore,themostmoderatevictoryofthechiefArmymusttendtocauseaconstantsinkingofthescaleontheopponent'sside,untilnewexternalcircumstances
ingaboutachange.Ifthesearenotnear,iftheconquerorisaneageropponent,who,thirstingforglory,pursuesgreataims,thenafirst-rateCommander,andinthebeatenArmyatruemilitaryspirit,hardenedbymanycampaignsarerequired,inordertostoptheswollenstreamofprosperityfromburstingallbounds,andtomoderateitscoursebysmallbutreiteratedactsofresistance,untiltheforceofvictoryhasspentitselfatthegoalofitscareer.
AndnowastotheeffectofdefeatbeyondtheArmy,upontheNationandGovernment!Itisthesuddencollapseofhopesstretchedtotheutmost,thedownfallofallself-reliance.Inplaceoftheseextinctforces,fear,withitsdestructivepropertiesofexpansion,rushesintothevacuumleft,andcompletestheprostration.Itisarealshockuponthenerves,whichoneofthetwoathletesreceivesfromtheelectricsparkofvictory.Andthateffect,howeverdifferentinitsdegrees,isnevercompletelywanting.Insteadofeveryonehasteningwithaspiritofdeterminationtoaidinrepairingthedisaster,everyonefearsthathiseffortswillonlybeinvain,andstops,hesitatingwithhimself,whenheshouldrushforward;orindespondencyheletshisarmdrop,leavingeverythingtofate.
Theconsequencewhichthiseffectofvictory
ingsforthinthecourseoftheWaritselfdependinpartonthecharacterandtalentofthevictoriousGeneral,butmoreonthecircumstancesfromwhichthevictoryproceeds,andtowhichitleads.Withoutboldnessandanenterprisingspiritonthepartoftheleader,themost
illiantvictorywillleadtonogreatsuccess,anditsforceexhaustsitselfallthesooneroncircumstances,iftheseofferastrongandstubbornoppositiontoit.HowverydifferentlyfromDaun,FredericktheGreatwouldhaveusedthevictoryatKollin;andwhatdifferentconsequencesFrance,inplaceofPrussia,mighthavegivenabattleofLeuthen!
Theconditionswhichallowustoexpectgreatresultsfromagreatvictoryweshalllearnwhenwecometothesubjectswithwhichtheyareconnected;thenitwillbepossibletoexplainthedisproportionwhichappearsatfirstsightbetweenthemagnitudeofavictoryanditsresults,andwhichisonlytooreadilyattributedtoawantofenergyonthepartoftheconqueror.Here,wherewehavetodowiththegreatbattleinitself,weshallmerelysaythattheeffectsnowdepictedneverfailtoattendavictory,thattheymountupwiththeintensivestrengthofthevictory—mountupmorethemorethewholestrengthoftheArmyhasbeenconcentratedinit,themorethewholemilitarypoweroftheNationiscontainedinthatArmy,andtheStateinthatmilitarypower.
Butthenthequestionmaybeasked,Cantheoryacceptthiseffectofvictoryasabsolutelynecessary?—mustitnotratherendeavourtofindoutcounteractingmeanscapableofneutralisingtheseeffects?Itseemsquitenaturaltoanswerthisquestionintheaffirmative;butheavendefendusfromtakingthatwrongcourseofmosttheories,outofwhichisbegottenamutuallydevouringProetContra.
Certainlythateffectisperfectlynecessary,forithasitsfoundationinthenatureofthings,anditexists,evenifwefindmeanstostruggleagainstit;justasthemotionofacannonballisalwaysinthedirectionoftheterrestrial,althoughwhenfiredfromeasttowestpartofthegeneralvelocityisdestroyedbythisoppositemotion.
AllWarsupposeshumanweakness,andagainstthatitisdirected.
Therefore,ifhereafterinanotherplaceweexaminewhatistobedoneafterthelossofagreatbattle,ifwe
ingunderreviewtheresourceswhichstillremain,eveninthemostdesperatecases,ifweshouldexpressabeliefinthepossibilityofretrievingall,eveninsuchacase;itmustnotbesupposedwemeantherebythattheeffectsofsuchadefeatcanbydegreesbecompletelywipedout,fortheforcesandmeansusedtorepairthedisastermighthavebeenappliedtotherealisationofsomepositiveobject;andthisappliesbothtothemoralandphysicalforces.
Anotherquestionis,whether,throughthelossofagreatbattle,forcesarenotperhapsrousedintoexistence,whichotherwisewouldneverhavecometolife.Thiscaseiscertainlyconceivable,anditiswhathasactuallyoccurredwithmanyNations.Buttoproducethisintensifiedreactionisbeyondtheprovinceofmilitaryart,whichcanonlytakeaccountofitwhereitmightbeassumedasapossibility.
Iftherearecasesinwhichthefruitsofavictoryappearratherofadestructivenatureinconsequenceofthereactionoftheforceswhichithadtheeffectofrousingintoactivity—caseswhichcertainlyareveryexceptional—thenitmustthemoresurelybegranted,thatthereisadifferenceintheeffectswhichoneandthesamevictorymayproduceaccordingtothecharacterofthepeopleorstate,whichhasbeenconquered.
CHAPTER11THEUSEOFTHEBATTLE(continued)
WHATEVERformtheconductofWarmaytakeinparticularcases,andwhateverwemayhavetoadmitinthesequelasnecessaryrespectingit:wehaveonlytorefertotheconceptionofWartobeconvincedofwhatfollows:
1.Thedestructionoftheenemy'smilitaryforce,istheleadingprincipleofWar,andforthewholechapterofpositiveactionthedirectwaytotheobject.
2.Thisdestructionoftheenemy'sforce,mustbeprincipallyeffectedbymeansofbattle.
3.Onlygreatandgeneralbattlescanproducegreatresults.
4.Theresultswillbegreatestwhencombatsunitethemselvesinonegreatbattle.
5.ItisonlyinagreatbattlethattheGeneral-in-Chiefcommandsinperson,anditisinthenatureofthings,thatheshouldplacemoreconfidenceinhimselfthaninhissubordinates.
Fromthesetruthsadoublelawfollows,thepartsofwhichmutuallysupporteachother;namely,thatthedestructionoftheenemy'smilitaryforceistobesoughtforprincipallybygreatbattles,andtheirresults;andthatthechiefobjectofgreatbattlesmustbethedestructionoftheenemy'smilitaryforce.
Nodoubttheannihilation-principleistobefoundmoreorlessinothermeans—grantedthereareinstancesinwhichthroughfavourablecircumstancesinaminorcombat,thedestructionoftheenemy'sforceshasbeendisproportionatelygreat(Maxen),andontheotherhandinabattle,thetakingorholdingasinglepostmaybepredominantinimportanceasanobject—butasageneralruleitremainsaparamounttruth,thatbattlesareonlyfoughtwithaviewtothedestructionoftheenemy'sArmy,andthatthisdestructioncanonlybeeffectedbytheirmeans.
ThebattlemaythereforeberegardedasWarconcentrated,asthecentreofeffortofthewholeWarorcampaign.Asthesun'sraysuniteinthefocusoftheconcavemirrorinaperfectimage,andinthefulnessoftheirheat;totheforcesandcircumstancesofWar,uniteinafocusinthegreatbattleforoneconcentratedutmosteffort.
Theveryassemblageofforcesinonegreatwhole,whichtakesplacemoreorlessinallWars,indicatesanintentiontostrikeadecisiveblowwiththiswhole,eithervoluntarilyasassailant,orconstrainedbytheoppositepartyasdefender.Whenthisgreatblowdoesnotfollow,thensomemodifying,andretardingmotiveshaveattachedthemselvestotheoriginalmotiveofhostility,andhaveweakened,alteredorcompletelycheckedthemovement.Butalso,eveninthisconditionofmutualinactionwhichhasbeenthekey-noteinsomanyWars,theideaofapossiblebattleservesalwaysforbothpartiesasapointofdirection,adistantfocusintheconstructionoftheirplans.ThemoreWarisWarinearnest,themoreitisaventingofanimosityandhostility,amutualstruggletooverpower,somuchthemorewillallactivitiesjoindeadlycontest,andalsothemoreprominentinimportancebecomesthebattle.
Ingeneral,whentheobjectaimedatisofagreatandpositivenature,onethereforeinwhichtheinterestsoftheenemyaredeeplyconcerned,thebattleoffersitselfasthemostnaturalmeans;itis,therefore,alsothebestasweshallshowmoreplainlyhereafter:and,asarule,whenitisevadedfromaversiontothegreatdecision,punishmentfollows.
Thepositiveobjectbelongtotheoffensive,andthereforethebattleisalsomoreparticularlyhismeans.Butwithoutexaminingtheconceptionofoffensiveanddefensivemoreminutelyhere,wemuststillobservethat,evenforthedefenderinmostcases,thereisnoothereffectualmeanswithwhichtomeettheexigenciesofhissituation,tosolvetheproblempresentedtohim.
Thebattleisthebloodiestwayofsolution.True,itisnotmerelyreciprocalslaughter,anditseffectismoreakillingoftheenemy'scouragethanoftheenemy'ssoldiers,asweshallseemoreplainlyinthenextchapter—butstillbloodisalwaysitsprice,andslaughteritscharacteraswellasname;fromthisthehumanityintheGeneral'smindrecoilswithhorror.
Butthesoulofthemantremblesstillmoreatthethoughtofthedecisiontobegivenwithonesingleblow.INONEPOINTofspaceandtimeallactionisherepressedtogether,andatsuchamomentthereisstirredupwithinusadimfeelingasifinthisnarrowspaceallourforcescouldnotdevelopthemselvesandcomeintoactivity,asifwehadalreadygainedmuchbymeretime,althoughthistimeowesusnothingatall.Thisisallmereillusion,butevenasillusionitissomething,andthesameweaknesswhichseizesuponthemanineveryothermomentousdecisionmaywellbefeltmorepowerfullybytheGeneral,whenhemuststakeinterestsofsuchenormousweightupononeventure.
Thus,then,StatesmenandGeneralshaveatalltimesendeavouredtoavoidthedecisivebattle,seekingeithertoattaintheiraimwithoutit,ordroppingthataimunperceived.Writersonhistoryandtheoryhavethenbusiedthemselvestodiscoverinsomeotherfeatureinthesecampaignsnotonlyanequivalentforthedecisionbybattlewhichhasbeenavoided,butevenahigherart.Inthisway,inthepresentage,itcameveryneartothis,thatabattleintheeconomyofWarwaslookeduponasanevil,renderednecessarythroughsomeerrorcommitted,amorbidparoxysmtowhicharegularprudentsystemofWarwouldneverlead:onlythoseGeneralsweretodeservelaurelswhoknewhowtocarryonWarwithoutspillingblood,andthetheoryofWar—arealbusinessfor
ahmins—wastobespeciallydirectedtoteachingthis.
Contemporaryhistoryhasdestroyedthisillusion,(*)butnoonecanguaranteethatitwillnotsoonerorlaterreproduceitself,andleadthoseattheheadofaffairstoperversitieswhichpleaseman'sweakness,andthereforehavethegreateraffinityforhisnature.Perhaps,by-and-by,Buonaparte'scampaignsandbattleswillbelookeduponasmereactsofbarbarismandstupidity,andweshalloncemoreturnwithsatisfactionandconfidencetothedress-swordofobsoleteandmustyinstitutionsandforms.Iftheorygivesacautionagainstthis,thenitrendersarealservicetothosewholistentoitswarningvoice.MAYWESUCCEEDINLENDINGAHANDTOTHOSEWHOINOURDEARNATIVELANDARECALLEDUPONTOSPEAKWITHAUTHORITYONTHESEMATTERS,THATWEMAYBETHEIRGUIDEINTOTHISFIELDOFINQUIRY,ANDEXCITETHEMTOMAKEACANDIDEXAMINATIONOFTHESUBJECT.
NotonlytheconceptionofWarbutexperiencealsoleadsustolookforagreatdecisiononlyinagreatbattle.Fromtimeimmemorial,onlygreatvictorieshaveledtogreatsuccessesontheoffensivesideintheabsoluteform,onthedefensivesideinamannermoreorlesssatisfactory.EvenBuonapartewouldnothaveseenthedayofUlm,uniqueinitskind,ifhehadshrunkfromsheddingblood;itisrathertoberegardedasonlyasecondcropfromthevictoriouseventsinhisprecedingcampaigns.Itisnotonlybold,rash,andpresumptuousGeneralswhohavesoughttocompletetheirworkbythegreatventureofadecisivebattle,butalsofortunateonesaswell;andwemayrestsatisfiedwiththeanswerwhichtheyhavethusgiventothisvastquestion.
LetusnothearofGeneralswhoconquerwithoutbloodshed.Ifabloodyslaughterisahorriblesight,thenthatisagroundforpayingmorerespecttoWar,butnotformakingtheswordwewearblunterandblunterbydegreesfromfeelingsofhumanity,untilsomeonestepsinwithonethatissharpandlopsoffthearmfromourbody.
Welookuponagreatbattleasaprincipaldecision,butcertainlynotastheonlyonenecessaryforaWaroracampaign.Instancesofagreatbattledecidingawholecampaign,havebeenfrequentonlyinmoderntimes,thosewhichhavedecidedawholeWar,belongtotheclassofrareexceptions.
Adecisionwhichis
oughtaboutbyagreatbattledependsnaturallynotonthebattleitself,thatisonthemassofcombatantsengagedinit,andontheintensityofthevictory,butalsoonanumberofotherrelationsbetweenthemilitaryforcesopposedtoeachother,andbetweentheStatestowhichtheseforcesbelong.Butatthesametimethattheprincipalmassoftheforceavailableis
oughttothegreatduel,agreatdecisionisalso
oughton,theextentofwhichmayperhapsbeforeseeninmanyrespects,thoughnotinall,andwhichalthoughnottheonlyone,stillistheFIRSTdecision,andassuch,hasaninfluenceonthosewhichsucceed.Thereforeadeliberatelyplannedgreatbattle,accordingtoitsrelations,ismoreorless,butalwaysinsomedegree,toberegardedastheleadingmeansandcentralpointofthewholesystem.ThemoreaGeneraltakesthefieldinthetruespiritofWaraswellasofeverycontest,withthefeelingandtheidea,thatistheconviction,thathemustandwillconquer,themorehewillstrivetothroweveryweightintothescaleinthefirstbattle,hopeandstrivetowineverythingbyit.BuonapartehardlyeverentereduponaWarwithoutthinkingofconqueringhisenemyatonceinthefirstbattle,andFredericktheGreat,althoughinamorelimitedsphere,andwithinterestsoflessmagnitudeatstake,thoughtthesamewhen,attheheadofasmallArmy,hesoughttodisengagehisrearfromtheRussiansortheFederalImperialArmy.
Thedecisionwhichisgivenbythegreatbattle,depends,wehavesaid,partlyonthebattleitself,thatisonthenumberoftroopsengaged,andpartlyonthemagnitudeofthesuccess.
HowtheGeneralmayincreaseitsimportanceinrespecttothefirstpointisevidentinitselfandweshallmerelyobservethataccordingtotheimportanceofthegreatbattle,thenumberofcaseswhicharedecidedalongwithitincreases,andthatthereforeGeneralswho,confidentinthemselveshavebeenloversofgreatdecisions,havealwaysmanagedtomakeuseofthegreaterpartoftheirtroopsinitwithoutneglectingonthataccountessentialpointselsewhere.
Asregardstheconsequencesorspeakingmorecorrectlytheeffectivenessofavictory,thatdependschieflyonfourpoints:
1.Onthetacticalformadoptedastheorderofbattle.
2.Onthenatureofthecountry.
3.Ontherelativeproportionsofthethreearms.
4.OntherelativestrengthofthetwoArmies.
AbattlewithparallelfrontsandwithoutanyactionagainstaflankwillseldomyieldasgreatsuccessasoneinwhichthedefeatedArmyhasbeenturned,orcompelledtochangefrontmoreorless.Ina
okenorhillycountrythesuccessesarelikewisesmaller,becausethepoweroftheblowiseverywhereless.
Ifthecavalryofthevanquishedisequalorsuperiortothatofthevictor,thentheeffectsofthepursuitarediminished,andbythatgreatpartoftheresultsofvictoryarelost.
Finallyitiseasytounderstandthatifsuperiornumbersareonthesideoftheconqueror,andheuseshisadvantageinthatrespecttoturntheflankofhisadversary,orcompelhimtochangefront,greaterresultswillfollowthaniftheconquerorhadbeenweakerinnumbersthanthevanquished.ThebattleofLeuthenmaycertainlybequotedasapracticalrefutationofthisprinciple,butwebegpermissionforoncetosaywhatweotherwisedonotlike,NORULEWITHOUTANEXCEPTION.
Inalltheseways,therefore,theCommanderhasthemeansofgivinghisbattleadecisivecharacter;certainlyhethusexposeshimselftoanincreasedamountofdanger,buthiswholelineofactionissubjecttothatdynamiclawofthemoralworld.
ThereisthennothinginWarwhichcanbeputincomparisonwiththegreatbattleinpointofimportance,ANDTHEACMEOFSTRATEGICABILITYISDISPLAYEDINTHEPROVISIONOFMEANSFORTHISGREATEVENT,INTHESKILFULDETERMINATIONOFPLACEANDTIME,ANDDIRECTIONOFTROOPS,ANDITSTHEGOODUSEMADEOFSUCCESS.
Butitdoesnotfollowfromtheimportanceofthesethingsthattheymustbeofaverycomplicatedandreconditenature;allishererathersimple,theartofcombinationbynomeansgreat;butthereisgreatneedofquicknessinjudgingofcircumstances,needofenergy,steadyresolution,ayouthfulspiritofenterprise—heroicqualities,towhichweshalloftenhavetorefer.Thereis,therefore,butlittlewantedhereofthatwhichcanbetaughtbybooksandthereismuchthat,ifitcanbetaughtatall,mustcometotheGeneralthroughsomeothermediumthanprinter'stype.
Theimpulsetowardsagreatbattle,thevoluntary,sureprogresstoit,mustproceedfromafeelingofinnatepowerandaclearsenseofthenecessity;inotherwords,itmustproceedfrominborncourageandfromperceptionssharpenedbycontactwiththehigherinterestsoflife.
Greatexamplesarethebestteachers,butitiscertainlyamisfortuneifacloudoftheoreticalprejudicescomesbetween,foreventhesunbeamisrefractedandtintedbytheclouds.Todestroysuchprejudices,whichmanyatimeriseandspreadthemselveslikeamiasma,isanimperativedutyoftheory,forthemisbegottenoffspringofhumanreasoncanalsobeinturndestroyedbypurereason. 蓝星，夏国。
肿瘤科病房，弥漫着医院独有的消毒水味道。病房是单人间，设施俱全，温馨舒适。
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可对于孑然一身的路遥来讲，却是无人问津的等死之地。
他是癌症晚期，靠着意志力撑到现在，但也只是多受几天罪罢了。
此刻，路遥躺在病床上，怔怔望着床头柜上的水杯，想喝口水。
可他拼尽全力却无法让身体离开病床。剧痛和衰弱，让这原本无比简单的事情成了奢望。
这时，一道幸灾乐祸的声音响起：“表哥~你真是狼狈呢。连喝口水都得指望别人施舍。”
一位英俊的年轻男子悠闲坐在病床前，翘着二郎腿，眼睛笑成一道缝。
“你求求我，我给你喝口水如何？”
路遥面无表情，一言不发。自从失去了自理能力，一帮亲戚的嘴脸已经见多了，不差这一个。
男子起身，将水杯拿在手里递过来，“表哥别生气，我开玩笑的，你对我这么好，喂你口水还是能办到的。”
说完话，他将水杯里的水，缓缓倒在路遥苍白消瘦的脸上。
被呛到，路遥无力的咳嗽几声，好在少量的水流过嗓子，让他有了几丝说话的力气：
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“张鑫，为什么？我从未得罪过你。你去星盟国留学，还是我资助的！”
张鑫将水杯放下，不紧不慢的说：“谁让你这么古板呢，只是运点感冒药罢了，又不犯法，你非得千方百计的拦着。”
路遥脸上闪过一丝了然之色，道：“张鑫你这垃圾，狗改不了吃屎。将感冒药运到国外提炼毒品……咳咳……”
张鑫理了下领带，笑道：“你别血口喷人啊，我可是国际知名企业家。这次回国，‘省招商引资局’还打电话欢迎我呢~”
路遥叹了口气，现在的自己什么都做不了，索性闭上眼睛不再说话，安静等待死亡的到来。
但张鑫却不想让眼前饱受病痛折磨、即将离世的表兄走好。他附身靠近，悄悄说道：琇書蛧
“表哥啊~其实呢，我这次回国主要就是见你一面，告诉你一声——你的癌，是我弄出来的~”
路遥陡然挣开眼，“你说什么！”
张鑫笑眯眯的掏出个铅盒打开，里面是件古怪的三角形饰物，仅有巴掌大小，中间是只眼睛似的图案，一看就很有年代感。
“眼熟吧？这是我亲手送你的，货真价实的古董。我在里面掺了点放射性物质，长期接触就会变成你现在这副鬼样子。”
路遥马上认出来，这是自己很喜欢的一件古物，天天摆在书桌上，时不时的把玩，没想到却是要人命的东西！
他伸出枯枝似的手臂，死死的抓住眼前人的胳膊！“你……”
“别激动~表哥，我西装很贵的。”张鑫轻松拿掉路遥的手，小心的捏起铅盒，将放射性饰物塞进他怀里。
“我赶飞机，得先走一步。你好好留着这个当做纪念吧，有机会再去你的坟头蹦迪~”
说完话，张鑫从容起身离开。临走前，还回头俏皮的眨眨眼。他原本就男生女相，此时的神态动作居然有些娇媚。
保镖很有眼力劲，赶紧打开病房门。同时用无线耳麦联络同事，提前发动汽车。
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路遥只能无力的瘫在床上，浑身皆是钻心剜骨般的剧痛，还有无穷悔恨、不甘。
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但很快，剧痛渐渐消失，只剩麻木，路遥隐约听到过世的双亲在喊他。
就在路遥的身体越来越飘，即将失去意识时，胸口突然阵阵发烫，将他惊醒。
从怀中摸出那三角形饰物，发现这玩意变得滚烫无比，还在缓缓发光！
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