BOOK IV THE COMBAT（5）

　　CHAPTER12STRATEGICMEANSOFUTILISINGVICTORY

　　THEmoredifficultpart,viz.,thatofperfectlypreparingthevictory,isasilentserviceofwhichthemeritbelongstoStrategyandyetforwhichitishardlysufficientlycommended.Itappears

　　illiantandfullofrenownbyturningtogoodaccountavictorygained.

　　Whatmaybethespecialobjectofabattle,howitisconnectedwiththewholesystemofaWar,whitherthecareerofvictorymayleadaccordingtothenatureofcircumstances,whereitsculminating-pointlies—allthesearethingswhichweshallnotenteruponuntilhereafter.Butunderanyconceivablecircumstancesthefactholdsgood,thatwithoutapursuitnovictorycanhaveagreateffect,andthat,howevershortthecareerofvictorymaybe,itmustalwaysleadbeyondthefirststepsinpursuit;andinordertoavoidthefrequentrepetitionofthis,weshallnowdwellforamomentonthisnecessarysupplementofvictoryingeneral.

　　ThepursuitofabeatenArmycommencesatthemomentthatArmy,givingupthecombat,leavesitsposition;allpreviousmovementsinonedirectionandanotherbelongnottothatbuttotheprogressofthebattleitself.Usuallyvictoryatthemomentheredescribed,evenifitiscertain,isstillasyetsmallandweakinitsproportions,andwouldnotrankasaneventofanygreatpositiveadvantageifnotcompletedbyapursuitonthefirstday.Thenitismostly,aswehavebeforesaid,thatthetrophieswhichgivesubstancetothevictorybegintobegatheredup.Ofthispursuitweshallspeakinthenextplace.

　　Usuallybothsidescomeintoactionwiththeirphysicalpowersconsiderablydeteriorated,forthemovementsimmediatelyprecedinghavegenerallythecharacterofveryurgentcircumstances.Theeffortswhichtheforgingoutofagreatcombatcosts,completetheexhaustion;fromthisitfollowsthatthevictoriouspartyisverylittlelessdisorganisedandoutofhisoriginalformationthanthevanquished,andthereforerequirestimetoreform,tocollectstragglers,andissuefreshammunitiontothosewhoarewithout.Allthesethingsplacetheconquerorhimselfinthestateofcrisisofwhichwehavealreadyspoken.Ifnowthedefeatedforceisonlyadetachedportionoftheenemy'sArmy,orifithasotherwisetoexpectaconsiderablereinforcement,thentheconquerormayeasilyrunintotheobviousdangerofhavingtopaydearforhisvictory,andthisconsideration,insuchacase,verysoonputsanendtopursuit,oratleastrestrictsitmaterially.Evenwhenastrongaccessionofforcebytheenemyisnottobefeared,theconquerorfindsintheabovecircumstancesapowerfulchecktothevivacityofhispursuit.Thereisnoreasontofearthatthevictorywillbesnatchedaway,butadversecombatsarestillpossible,andmaydiminishtheadvantageswhichuptothepresenthavebeengained.Moreover,atthismomentthewholeweightofallthatissensuousinanArmy,itswantsandweaknesses,aredependentonthewilloftheCommander.Allthethousandsunderhiscommandrequirerestandrefreshment,andlongtoseeastopputtotoilanddangerforthepresent;onlyafew,forminganexception,canseeandfeelbeyondthepresentmoment,itisonlyamongstthislittlenumberthatthereissufficientmentalvigourtothink,afterwhatisabsolutelynecessaryatthemomenthasbeendone,uponthoseresultswhichatsuchamomentonlyappeartotherestasmereembellishmentsofvictory—asaluxuryoftriumph.ButallthesethousandshaveavoiceinthecounciloftheGeneral,forthroughthevariousstepsofthemilitaryhierarchytheseinterestsofthesensuouscreaturehavetheirsureconductorintotheheartoftheCommander.Hehimself,throughmentalandbodilyfatigue,ismoreorlessweakenedinhisnaturalactivity,andthusithappensthenthat,mostlyfromthesecauses,purelyincidentaltohumannature,lessisdonethanmighthavebeendone,andthatgenerallywhatisdoneistobeascribedentirelytotheTHIRSTFORGLORY,theenergy,indeedalsotheHARD-HEARTEDNESSoftheGeneral-in-Chief.ItisonlythuswecanexplainthehesitatingmannerinwhichmanyGeneralsfollowupavictorywhichsuperiornumbershavegiventhem.Thefirstpursuitoftheenemywelimitingeneraltotheextentofthefirstday,includingthenightfollowingthevictory.Attheendofthatperiodthenecessityofrestourselvesprescribesahaltinanycase.

　　Thisfirstpursuithasdifferentnaturaldegrees.

　　Thefirstis,ifcavalryaloneareemployed;inthatcaseitamountsusuallymoretoalarmingandwatchingthantopressingtheenemyinreality,becausethesmallestobstacleofgroundisgenerallysufficienttocheckthepursuit.Usefulascavalrymaybeagainstsinglebodiesof

　　okendemoralisedtroops,stillwhenopposedtothebulkofthebeatenArmyitbecomesagainonlytheauxiliaryarm,becausethetroopsinretreatcanemployfreshreservestocoverthemovement,and,therefore,atthenexttriflingobstacleofground,bycombiningallarmstheycanmakeastandwithsuccess.Theonlyexceptiontothisisinthecaseofanarmyinactualflightinacompletestateofdissolution.

　　Theseconddegreeis,ifthepursuitismadebyastrongadvance-guardcomposedofallarms,thegreaterpartconsistingnaturallyofcavalry.Suchapursuitgenerallydrivestheenemyasfarastheneareststrongpositionforhisrear-guard,orthenextpositionaffordingspaceforhisArmy.Neithercanusuallybefoundatonce,and,therefore,thepursuitcanbecarriedfurther;generally,however,itdoesnotextendbeyondthedistanceofoneoratmostacoupleofleagues,becauseotherwisetheadvanceguardwouldnotfeelitselfsufficientlysupported.ThethirdandmostvigorousdegreeiswhenthevictoriousArmyitselfcontinuestoadvanceasfarasitsphysicalpowerscanendure.InthiscasethebeatenArmywillgenerallyquitsuchordinarypositionsasacountryusuallyoffersonthemereshowofanattack,orofanintentiontoturnitsflank;andtherear-guardwillbestilllesslikelytoengageinanobstinateresistance.

　　Inallthreecasesthenight,ifitsetsinbeforetheconclusionofthewholeact,usuallyputsanendtoit,andthefewinstancesinwhichthishasnottakenplace,andthepursuithasbeencontinuedthroughoutthenight,mustberegardedaspursuitsinanexceptionallyvigorousform.

　　Ifwereflectthatinfightingbynighteverythingmustbe,moreorless,abandonedtochance,andthatattheconclusionofabattletheregularcohesionandorderofthingsinanarmymustinevitablybedisturbed,wemayeasilyconceivethereluctanceofbothGeneralstocarryingontheirbusinessundersuchdisadvantageousconditions.IfacompletedissolutionofthevanquishedArmy,orararesuperiorityofthevictoriousArmyinmilitaryvirtuedoesnotensuresuccess,everythingwouldinamannerbegivenuptofate,whichcanneverbefortheinterestofanyone,evenofthemostfool-hardyGeneral.Asarule,therefore,nightputsanendtopursuit,evenwhenthebattlehasonlybeendecidedshortlybeforedarknesssetsin.Thisallowstheconqueredeithertimeforrestandtorallyimmediately,or,ifheretreatsduringthenightitgiveshimamarchinadvance.Afterthis

　　eaktheconqueredisdecidedlyinabettercondition;muchofthatwhichhadbeenthrownintoconfusionhasbeen

　　oughtagainintoorder,ammunitionhasbeenrenewed,thewholehasbeenputintoafreshformation.Whateverfurtherencounternowtakesplacewiththeenemyisanewbattlenotacontinuationoftheold,andalthoughitmaybefarfrompromisingabsolutesuccess,stillitisafreshcombat,andnotmerelyagatheringupofthede

　　isbythevictor.

　　When,therefore,theconquerorcancontinuethepursuititselfthroughoutthenight,ifonlywithastrongadvance-guardcomposedofallarmsoftheservice,theeffectofthevictoryisimmenselyincreased,ofthisthebattlesofLeuthenandLaBelleAllianceareexamples.

　　Thewholeactionofthispursuitismainlytactical,andweonlydwelluponithereinordertomakeplainthedifferencewhichthroughitmaybeproducedintheeffectofavictory.

　　Thisfirstpursuit,asfarastheneareststoppingpoint,belongsasarighttoeveryconqueror,andishardlyinanywayconnectedwithhisfurtherplansandcombinations.ThesemayconsiderablydiminishthepositiveresultsofavictorygainedwiththemainbodyoftheArmy,buttheycannotmakethisfirstuseofitimpossible;atleastcasesofthatkind,ifconceivableatall,mustbesouncommonthattheyshouldhavenoappreciableinfluenceontheory.AndherecertainlywemustsaythattheexampleaffordedbymodernWarsopensupquiteanewfieldforenergy.InprecedingWars,restingonanarrowerbasis,andaltogethermorecircumscribedintheirscope,thereweremanyunnecessaryconventionalrestrictionsinvariousways,butparticularlyinthispoint.THECONCEPTION,HONOUROFVICTORYseemedtoGeneralssomuchbyfarthechiefthingthattheythoughtthelessofthecompletedestructionoftheenemy'smilitaryforce,asinpointoffactthatdestructionofforceappearedtothemonlyasoneofthemanymeansinWar,notbyanymeansastheprincipal,muchlessastheonlymeans;sothattheythemorereadilyputtheswordinitssheaththemomenttheenemyhadloweredhis.Nothingseemedmorenaturaltothemthantostopthecombatassoonasthedecisionwasobtained,andtoregardallfurthercarnageasunnecessarycruelty.Evenifthisfalsephilosophydidnotdeterminetheirresolutionsentirely,stillitwasapointofviewbywhichrepresentationsoftheexhaustionofallpowers,andphysicalimpossibilityofcontinuingthestruggle,obtainedreadierevidenceandgreaterweight.Certainlythesparingone'sowninstrumentofvictoryisavitalquestionifweonlypossessthisone,andforeseethatsoonthetimemayarrivewhenitwillnotbesufficientforallthatremainstobedone,foreverycontinuationoftheoffensivemustleadultimatelytocompleteexhaustion.Butthiscalculationwasstillsofarfalse,asthefurtherlossofforcesbyacontinuanceofthepursuitcouldbearnoproportiontothatwhichtheenemymustsuffer.Thatview,therefore,againcouldonlyexistbecausethemilitaryforceswerenotconsideredthevitalfactor.AndsowefindthatinformerWarsrealheroesonly—suchasCharlesXII.,Marlborough,Eugene,FredericktheGreat—addedavigorouspursuittotheirvictorieswhentheyweredecisiveenough,andthatotherGeneralsusuallycontentedthemselveswiththepossessionofthefieldofbattle.InmoderntimesthegreaterenergyinfusedintotheconductofWarsthroughthegreaterimportanceofthecircumstancesfromwhichtheyhaveproceededhasthrowndowntheseconventionalbarriers;thepursuithasbecomeanall-importantbusinessfortheconqueror;trophieshaveonthataccountmultipliedinextent,andiftherearecasesalsoinmodernWarfareinwhichthishasnotbeenthecase,stilltheybelongtothelistofexceptions,andaretobeaccountedforbypeculiarcircumstances.

　　AtGorschenandBautzennothingbutthesuperiorityofthealliedcavalrypreventedacompleterout,atGrossBeerenandDennewitztheill-willofBernadotte,theCrownPrinceofSweden;atLaontheenfeebledpersonalconditionofBluecher,whowasthenseventyyearsoldandatthemomentconfinedtoadarkroomowingtoaninjurytohiseyes.

　　ButBorodinoisalsoanillustrationtothepointhere,andwecannotresistsayingafewmorewordsaboutit,partlybecausewedonotconsiderthecircumstancesareexplainedsimplybyattachingblametoBuonaparte,partlybecauseitmightappearasifthis,andwithitagreatnumberofsimilarcases,belongedtothatclasswhichwehavedesignatedassoextremelyrare,casesinwhichthegeneralrelationsseizeandfettertheGeneralattheverybeginningofthebattle.Frenchauthorsinparticular,andgreatadmirersofBuonaparte(Vaudancourt,Cham

　　ay,Se'gur),haveblamedhimdecidedlybecausehedidnotdrivetheRussianArmycompletelyoffthefield,andusehislastreservestoscatterit,becausethenwhatwasonlyalostbattlewouldhavebeenacompleterout.WeshouldbeobligedtodivergetoofartodescribecircumstantiallythemutualsituationofthetwoArmies;butthismuchisevident,thatwhenBuonapartepassedtheNiemenwithhisArmythesamecorpswhichafterwardsfoughtatBorodinonumbered300,000men,ofwhomnowonly120,000remained,hemightthereforewellbeapprehensivethathewouldnothaveenoughlefttomarchuponMoscow,thepointonwhicheverythingseemedtodepend.Thevictorywhichhehadjustgainedgavehimnearlyacertaintyoftakingthatcapital,forthattheRussianswouldbeinaconditiontofightasecondbattlewithineightdaysseemedinthehighestdegreeimprobable;andinMoscowhehopedtofindpeace.NodoubtthecompletedispersionoftheRussianArmywouldhavemadethispeacemuchmorecertain;butstillthefirstconsiderationwastogettoMoscow,thatis,togettherewithaforcewithwhichheshouldappeardictatoroverthecapital,andthroughthatovertheEmpireandtheGovernment.Theforcewhichhe

　　oughtwithhimtoMoscowwasnolongersufficientforthat,asshowninthesequel,butitwouldhavebeenstilllesssoif,inscatteringtheRussianArmy,hehadscatteredhisownatthesametime.Buonapartewasthoroughlyalivetoallthis,andinoureyeshestandscompletelyjustified.Butonthataccountthiscaseisstillnottobereckonedamongstthoseinwhich,throughthegeneralrelations,theGeneralisinterdictedfromfollowinguphisvictory,forthereneverwasinhiscaseanyquestionofmerepursuit.Thevictorywasdecidedatfouro'clockintheafternoon,buttheRussiansstilloccupiedthegreaterpartofthefieldofbattle;theywerenotyetdisposedtogiveuptheground,andiftheattackhadbeenrenewed,theywouldstillhaveofferedamostdeterminedresistance,whichwouldhaveundoubtedlyendedintheircompletedefeat,butwouldhavecosttheconquerormuchfurtherbloodshed.WemustthereforereckontheBattleofBorodinoasamongstbattles,likeBautzen,leftunfinished.AtBautzenthevanquishedpreferredtoquitthefieldsooner;atBorodinotheconquerorpreferredtocontenthimselfwithahalfvictory,notbecausethedecisionappeareddoubtful,butbecausehewasnotrichenoughtopayforthewhole.

　　Returningnowtooursubject,thedeductionfromourreflectionsinrelationtothefirststageofpursuitis,thattheenergythrownintoitchieflydeterminesthevalueofthevictory;thatthispursuitisasecondactofthevictory,inmanycasesmoreimportantalsothanthefirst,andthatstrategy,whilsthereapproachingtacticstoreceivefromittheharvestofsuccess,exercisesthefirstactofherauthoritybydemandingthiscompletionofthevictory.

　　Butfurther,theeffectsofvictoryareveryseldomfoundtostopwiththisfirstpursuit;nowfirstbeginstherealcareertowhichvictorylentvelocity.Thiscourseisconditionedaswehavealreadysaid,byotherrelationsofwhichitisnotyettimetospeak.Butwemustheremention,whatthereisofageneralcharacterinthepursuitinordertoavoidrepetitionwhenthesubjectoccursagain.

　　Inthefurtherstagesofpursuit,again,wecandistinguishthreedegrees:thesimplepursuit,ahardpursuit,andaparallelmarchtointercept.

　　ThesimpleFOLLOWINGorPURSUINGcausestheenemytocontinuehisretreat,untilhethinkshecanriskanotherbattle.Itwillthereforeinitseffectsufficetoexhausttheadvantagesgained,andbesidesthat,allthattheenemycannotcarrywithhim,sick,wounded,anddisabledfromfatigue,quantitiesofbaggage,andcarriagesofallkinds,willfallintoourhands,butthismerefollowingdoesnottendtoheightenthedisorderintheenemy'sArmy,aneffectwhichisproducedbythetwofollowingcauses.

　　If,forinstance,insteadofcontentingourselveswithtakingupeverydaythecamptheenemyhasjustvacated,occupyingjustasmuchofthecountryashechoosestoabandon,wemakeourarrangementssoaseverydaytoencroachfurther,andaccordinglywithouradvance-guardorganisedforthepurpose,attackhisrear-guardeverytimeitattemptstohalt,thensuchacoursewillhastenhisretreat,andconsequentlytendtoincreasehisdisorganisation.—Thisitwillprincipallyeffectbythecharacterofcontinuousflight,whichhisretreatwillthusassume.Nothinghassuchadepressinginfluenceonthesoldier,asthesoundoftheenemy'scannonafreshatthemomentwhen,afteraforcedmarchheseekssomerest;ifthisexcitementiscontinuedfromdaytodayforsometime,itmayleadtoacompleterout.Thereliesinitaconstantadmissionofbeingobligedtoobeythelawoftheenemy,andofbeingunfitforanyresistance,andtheconsciousnessofthiscannotdootherwisethanweakenthemoralofanArmyinahighdegree.Theeffectofpressingtheenemyinthiswayattainsamaximumwhenitdrivestheenemytomakenightmarches.IftheconquerorscaresawaythediscomfitedopponentatsunsetfromacampwhichhasjustbeentakenupeitherforthemainbodyoftheArmy,orfortherear-guard,theconqueredmusteithermakeanightmarch,oralterhispositioninthenight,retiringfurtheraway,whichismuchthesamething;thevictoriouspartycanontheotherhandpassthenightinquiet.

　　Thearrangementofmarches,andthechoiceofpositionsdependinthiscasealsouponsomanyotherthings,especiallyonthesupplyoftheArmy,onstrongnaturalobstaclesinthecountry,onlargetowns,&c.&c.,thatitwouldberidiculouspedantrytoattempttoshowbyageometricalanalysishowthepursuer,beingabletoimposehislawsontheretreatingenemy,cancompelhimtomarchatnightwhilehetakeshisrest.Butneverthelessitistrueandpracticablethatmarchesinpursuitmaybesoplannedastohavethistendency,andthattheefficacyofthepursuitisverymuchenchancedthereby.Ifthisisseldomattendedtointheexecution,itisbecausesuchaprocedureismoredifficultforthepursuingArmy,thanaregularadherencetoordinarymarchesinthedaytime.Tostartingoodtimeinthemorning,toencampatmid-day,tooccupytherestofthedayinprovidingfortheordinarywantsoftheArmy,andtousethenightforrepose,isamuchmoreconvenientmethodthantoregulateone'smovementsexactlyaccordingtothoseoftheenemy,thereforetodeterminenothingtillthelastmoment,tostartonthemarch,sometimesinthemorning,sometimesintheevening,tobealwaysforseveralhoursinthepresenceoftheenemy,andexchangingcannonshotswithhim,andkeepingupskirmishingfire,toplanmanoeuvrestoturnhim,inshort,tomakethewholeoutlayoftacticalmeanswhichsuchacourserendersnecessary.AllthatnaturallybearswithaheavyweightonthepursuingArmy,andinWar,wheretherearesomanyburdenstobeborne,menarealwaysinclinedtostripoffthosewhichdonotseemabsolutelynecessary.Theseobservationsaretrue,whetherappliedtoawholeArmyorasinthemoreusualcase,toastrongadvance-guard.Forthereasonsjustmentioned,thissecondmethodofpursuit,thiscontinuedpressingoftheenemypursuedisratherarareoccurrence;evenBuonaparteinhisRussiancampaign,1812,practiseditbutlittle,forthereasonshereapparent,thatthedifficultiesandhardshipsofthiscampaign,alreadythreatenedhisArmywithdestructionbeforeitcouldreachitsobject;ontheotherhand,theFrenchintheirothercampaignshavedistinguishedthemselvesbytheirenergyinthispointalso.

　　Lastly,thethirdandmosteffectualformofpursuitis,theparallelmarchtotheimmediateobjectoftheretreat.

　　EverydefeatedArmywillnaturallyhavebehindit,atagreaterorlessdistance,somepoint,theattainmentofwhichisthefirstpurposeinview,whetheritbethatfailinginthisitsfurtherretreatmightbecompromised,asinthecaseofadefile,orthatitisimportantforthepointitselftoreachitbeforetheenemy,asinthecaseofagreatcity,magazines,&c.,or,lastly,thattheArmyatthispointwillgainnewpowersofdefence,suchasastrongposition,orjunctionwithothercorps.

　　Nowiftheconquerordirectshismarchonthispointbyalateralroad,itisevidenthowthatmayquickentheretreatofthebeatenArmyinadestructivemanner,convertitintohurry,perhapsintoflight.Theconqueredhasonlythreewaystocounteractthis:thefirstistothrowhimselfinfrontoftheenemy,inorderbyanunexpectedattacktogainthatprobabilityofsuccesswhichislosttohimingeneralfromhisposition;thisplainlysupposesanenterprisingboldGeneral,andanexcellentArmy,beatenbutnotutterlydefeated;therefore,itcanonlybeemployedbyabeatenArmyinveryfewcases.

　　Thesecondwayishasteningtheretreat;butthisisjustwhattheconquerorwants,anditeasilyleadstoimmoderateeffortsonthepartofthetroops,bywhichenormouslossesaresustained,instragglers,

　　okenguns,andcarriagesofallkinds.

　　Thethirdwayistomakeadetour,andgetroundthenearestpointofinterception,tomarchwithmoreeaseatagreaterdistancefromtheenemy,andthustorenderthehasterequiredlessdamaging.Thislastwayistheworstofall,itgenerallyturnsoutlikeanewdebtcontractedbyaninsolventdebtor,andleadstogreaterembarrassment.Therearecasesinwhichthiscourseisadvisable;otherswherethereisnothingelseleft;alsoinstancesinwhichithasbeensuccessful;butuponthewholeitiscertainlytruethatitsadoptionisusuallyinfluencedlessbyaclearpersuasionofitsbeingthesurestwayofattainingtheaimthanbyanotherinadmissiblemotive—thismotiveisthedreadofencounteringtheenemy.WoetotheCommanderwhogivesintothis!HowevermuchthemoralofhisArmymayhavedeteriorated,andhoweverwellfoundedmaybehisapprehensionsofbeingatadisadvantageinanyconflictwiththeenemy,theevilwillonlybemadeworsebytooanxiouslyavoidingeverypossibleriskofcollision.Buonapartein1813wouldneverhave

　　oughtovertheRhinewithhimthe30,000or40,000menwhoremainedafterthebattleofHanau,ifhehadavoidedthatbattleandtriedtopasstheRhineatMannheimorCoblenz.Itisjustbymeansofsmallcombatscarefullypreparedandexecuted,andinwhichthedefeatedarmybeingonthedefensive,hasalwaystheassistanceoftheground—itisjustbythesethatthemoralstrengthoftheArmycanfirstberesuscitated.

　　Thebeneficialeffectofthesmallestsuccessesisincredible;butwithmostGeneralstheadoptionofthisplanimpliesgreatself-command.Theotherway,thatofevadingallencounter,appearsatfirstsomucheasier,thatthereisanaturalpreferenceforitsadoption.Itisthereforeusuallyjustthissystemofevasionwhichbest,promotestheviewofthepursuer,andoftenendswiththecompletedownfallofthepursued;wemust,however,recollectherethatwearespeakingofawholeArmy,notofasingleDivision,which,havingbeencutoff,isseekingtojointhemainArmybymakingade'tour;insuchacasecircumstancesaredifferent,andsuccessisnotuncommon.ButthereisoneconditionrequisitetothesuccessofthisraceoftwoCorpsforanobject,whichisthataDivisionofthepursuingarmyshouldfollowbythesameroadwhichthepursuedhastaken,inordertopickupstragglers,andkeepuptheimpressionwhichthepresenceoftheenemyneverfailstomake.Bluecherneglectedthisinhis,inotherrespectsunexceptionable,pursuitafterLaBelleAlliance.

　　Suchmarchestelluponthepursueraswellasthepursued,andtheyarenotadvisableiftheenemy'sArmyralliesitselfuponanotherconsiderableone;ifithasadistinguishedGeneralatitshead,andifitsdestructionisnotalreadywellprepared.Butwhenthismeanscanbeadopted,itactsalsolikeagreatmechanicalpower.ThelossesofthebeatenArmyfromsicknessandfatigueareonsuchadisproportionatescale,thespiritoftheArmyissoweakenedandloweredbytheconstantsolicitudeaboutimpendingruin,thatatlastanythinglikeawellorganisedstandisoutofthequestion;everydaythousandsofprisonersfallintotheenemy'shandswithoutstrikingablow.Insuchaseasonofcompletegoodfortune,theconquerorneednothesitateaboutdividinghisforcesinordertodrawintothevortexofdestructioneverythingwithinreachofhisArmy,tocutoffdetachments,totakefortressesunpreparedfordefence,tooccupylargetowns,&c.&c.Hemaydoanythinguntilanewstateofthingsarises,andthemoreheventuresinthiswaythelongerwillitbebeforethatchangewilltakeplace.Thereisnowantofexamplesof

　　illiantresultsfromgranddecisivevictories,andofgreatandvigorouspursuitsinthewarsofBuonaparte.WeneedonlyquoteJena1806,Ratisbonne1809,Leipsic1813,andBelle-Alliance1815.

　　CHAPTER13RETREATAFTERALOSTBATTLE

　　INalostbattlethepowerofanArmyis

　　oken,themoraltoagreaterdegreethanthephysical.Asecondbattleunlessfreshfavourablecircumstancescomeintoplay,wouldleadtoacompletedefeat,perhaps,todestruction.Thisisamilitaryaxiom.Accordingtotheusualcoursetheretreatiscontinueduptothatpointwheretheequili

　　iumofforcesisrestored,eitherbyreinforcements,orbytheprotectionofstrongfortresses,orbygreatdefensivepositionsaffordedbythecountry,orbyaseparationoftheenemy'sforce.Themagnitudeofthelossessustained,theextentofthedefeat,butstillmorethecharacteroftheenemy,will

　　ingnearerorputofftheinstantofthisequili

　　ium.HowmanyinstancesmaybefoundofabeatenArmyralliedagainatashortdistance,withoutitscircumstanceshavingalteredinanywaysincethebattle.Thecauseofthismaybetracedtothemoralweaknessoftheadversary,ortothepreponderancegainedinthebattlenothavingbeensufficienttomakelastingimpression.

　　Toprofitbythisweaknessormistakeoftheenemy,nottoyieldoneinch

　　eadthmorethanthepressureofcircumstancesdemands,butaboveallthings,inordertokeepupthemoralforcestoasadvantageousapointaspossible,aslowretreat,offeringincessantresistance,andboldcourageouscounterstrokes,whenevertheenemyseekstogainanyexcessiveadvantages,areabsolutelynecessary.RetreatsofgreatGeneralsandofArmiesinuredtoWarhavealwaysresembledtheretreatofawoundedlion,suchis,undoubtedly,alsothebesttheory.

　　Itistruethatatthemomentofquittingadangerouspositionwehaveoftenseentriflingformalitiesobservedwhichcausedawasteoftime,andwere,therefore,attendedwithdanger,whilstinsuchcaseseverythingdependsongettingoutoftheplacespeedily.PractisedGeneralsreckonthismaximaveryimportantone.Butsuchcasesmustnotbeconfoundedwithageneralretreatafteralostbattle.Whoeverthenthinksbyafewrapidmarchestogainastart,andmoreeasilytorecoverafirmstanding,commitsagreaterror.Thefirstmovementsshouldbeassmallaspossible,anditisamaximingeneralnottosufferourselvestobedictatedtobytheenemy.Thismaximcannotbefollowedwithoutbloodyfightingwiththeenemyatourheels,butthegainisworththesacrifice;withoutitwegetintoanacceleratedpacewhichsoonturnsintoaheadlongrush,andcostsmerelyinstragglersmorementhanrear-guardcombats,andbesidesthatextinguishesthelastremnantsofthespiritofresistance.

　　Astrongrear-guardcomposedofpickedtroops,commandedbythe

　　avestGeneral,andsupportedbythewholeArmyatcriticalmoments,acarefulutilisationofground,strongambuscadeswherevertheboldnessoftheenemy'sadvance-guard,andtheground,affordopportunity;inshort,thepreparationandthesystemofregularsmallbattles,—thesearethemeansoffollowingthisprinciple.

　　Thedifficultiesofaretreatarenaturallygreaterorlessaccordingasthebattlehasbeenfoughtundermoreorlessfavourablecircumstances,andaccordingasithasbeenmoreorlessobstinatelycontested.ThebattleofJenaandLaBelle-Allianceshowhowimpossibleanythinglikearegularretreatmaybecome,ifthelastmanisusedupagainstapowerfulenemy.

　　Nowandagainithasbeensuggestedtodivideforthepurposeofretreating,thereforetoretreatinseparatedivisionsoreveneccentrically.Suchaseparationasismademerelyforconvenience,andalongwithwhichconcentratedactioncontinuespossibleandiskeptinview,isnotwhatwenowreferto;anyotherkindisextremelydangerous,contrarytothenatureofthething,andthereforeagreaterror.Everylostbattleisaprincipleofweaknessanddisorganisation;andthefirstandimmediatedesideratumistoconcentrate,andinconcentrationtorecoverorder,courage,andconfidence.Theideaofharassingtheenemybyseparatecorpsonbothflanksatthemomentwhenheisfollowinguphisvictory,isaperfectanomaly;afaint-heartedpedantmightbeoverawedbyhisenemyinthatmanner,andforsuchacaseitmayanswer;butwherewearenotsureofthisfailinginouropponentitisbetterletalone.Ifthestrategicrelationsafterabattlerequirethatweshouldcoverourselvesrightandleftbydetachments,somuchmustbedone,asfromcircumstancesisunavoidable,butthisfractioningmustalwaysberegardedasanevil,andweareseldominastatetocommenceitthedayafterthebattleitself.

　　IfFredericktheGreatafterthebattleofKollin,andtheraisingofthesiegeofPragueretreatedinthreecolumnsthatwasdonenotoutofchoice,butbecausethepositionofhisforces,andthenecessityofcoveringSaxony,lefthimnoalternative,Buonaparteafterthebattleof

　　ienne,sentMarmontbacktotheAube,whilsthehimselfpassedtheSeine,andturnedtowardsTroyes;butthatthisdidnotendindisaster,wassolelyowingtothecircumstancethattheAllies,insteadofpursuingdividedtheirforcesinlikemanner,turningwiththeonepart(Bluecher)towardstheMarne,whilewiththeother(Schwartzenberg),fromfearofbeingtooweak,theyadvancedwithexaggeratedcaution.

　　CHAPTER14NIGHTFIGHTING

　　THEmannerofconductingacombatatnight,andwhatconcernsthedetailsofitscourse,isatacticalsubject;weonlyexamineitheresofarasinitstotalityitappearsasaspecialstrategicmeans.

　　Fundamentallyeverynightattackisonlyamorevehementformofsurprise.Nowatthefirstlookofthethingsuchanattackappearsquitepre-eminentlyadvantageous,forwesupposetheenemytobetakenbysurprise,theassailantnaturallytobepreparedforeverythingwhichcanhappen.Whataninequality!Imaginationpaintstoitselfapictureofthemostcompleteconfusionontheoneside,andontheothersidetheassailantonlyoccupiedinreapingthefruitsofhisadvantage.Hencetheconstantcreationofschemesfornightattacksbythosewhohavenottoleadthem,andhavenoresponsibility,whilsttheseattacksseldomtakeplaceinreality.

　　Theseidealschemesareallbasedonthehypothesisthattheassailantknowsthearrangementsofthedefenderbecausetheyhavebeenmadeandannouncedbeforehand,andcouldnotescapenoticeinhisreconnaissances,andinquiries;thatontheotherhand,themeasuresoftheassailant,beingonlytakenatthemomentofexecution,cannotbeknowntotheenemy.Butthelastoftheseisnotalwaysquitethecase,andstilllessisthefirst.Ifwearenotsoneartheenemyastohavehimcompletelyunderoureye,astheAustrianshadFredericktheGreatbeforethebattleofHochkirch(1758),thenallthatweknowofhispositionmustalwaysbeimperfect,asitisobtainedbyreconnaissances,patrols,informationfromprisoners,andspies,sourcesonwhichnofirmreliancecanbeplacedbecauseintelligencethusobtainedisalwaysmoreorlessofanolddate,andthepositionoftheenemymayhavebeenalteredinthemeantime.Moreover,withthetacticsandmodeofencampmentofformertimesitwasmucheasierthanitisnowtoexaminethepositionoftheenemy.Alineoftentsismucheasiertodistinguishthanalineofhutsorabivouac;andanencampmentonalineoffront,fullyandregularlydrawnout,alsoeasierthanoneofDivisionsformedincolumns,themodeoftenusedatpresent.WemayhavethegroundonwhichaDivisionbivouacsinthatmannercompletelyunderoureye,andyetnotbeabletoarriveatanyaccurateidea.xiumb.com

　　Butthepositionagainisnotallthatwewanttoknowthemeasureswhichthedefendermaytakeinthecourseofthecombatarejustasimportant,anddonotbyanymeansconsistinmererandomshots.ThesemeasuresalsomakenightattacksmoredifficultinmodernWarsthanformerly,becausetheyhaveinthesecampaignsanadvantageoverthosealreadytaken.Inourcombatsthepositionofthedefenderismoretemporarythandefinitive,andonthataccountthedefenderisbetterabletosurprisehisadversarywithunexpectedblows,thanhecouldformerly.

　　Thereforewhattheassailantknowsofthedefensiveprevioustoanightattack,isseldomorneversufficienttosupplythewantofdirectobservation.

　　Butthedefenderhasonhissideanothersmalladvantageaswell,whichisthatheismoreathomethantheassailant,onthegroundwhichformshisposition,andtherefore,liketheinhabitantofaroom,willfindhiswayaboutitinthedarkwithmoreeasethanastranger.Heknowsbetterwheretofindeachpartofhisforce,andthereforecanmorereadilygetatitthanisthecasewithhisadversary.

　　Fromthisitfollows,thattheassailantinacombatatnightfeelsthewantofhiseyesjustasmuchasthedefender,andthattherefore,onlyparticularreasonscanmakeanightattackadvisable.

　　NowthesereasonsarisemostlyinconnectionwithsubordinatepartsofanArmy,rarelywiththeArmyitself;itfollowsthatanightattackalsoasarulecanonlytakeplacewithsecondarycombats,andseldomwithgreatbattles.

　　Wemayattackaportionoftheenemy'sArmywithaverysuperiorforce,consequentlyenvelopingitwithavieweithertotakethewhole,ortoinflictveryseverelossonitbyanunequalcombat,providedthatothercircumstancesareinourfavour.Butsuchaschemecanneversucceedexceptbyagreatsurprise,becausenofractionalpartoftheenemy'sArmywouldengageinsuchanunequalcombat,butwouldretireinstead.Butasurpriseonanimportantscaleexceptinrareinstancesinaveryclosecountry,canonlybeeffectedatnight.Ifthereforewewishtogainsuchanadvantageasthisfromthefaultydispositionofaportionoftheenemy'sArmy,thenwemustmakeuseofthenight,atallevents,tofinishthepreliminarypartevenifthecombatitselfshouldnotopentilltowardsday

　　eak.Thisisthereforewhattakesplaceinallthelittleenterprisesbynightagainstoutposts,andothersmallbodies,themainpointbeinginvariablythroughsuperiornumbers,andgettingroundhisposition,toentanglehimunexpectedlyinsuchadisadvantageouscombat,thathecannotdisengagehimselfwithoutgreatloss.

　　Thelargerthebodyattackedthemoredifficulttheundertaking,becauseastrongforcehasgreaterresourceswithinitselftomaintainthefightlongenoughforhelptoarrive.

　　Onthataccountthewholeoftheenemy'sArmycanneverinordinarycasesbetheobjectofsuchanattackforalthoughithasnoassistancetoexpectfromanyquarteroutsideitself,still,itcontainswithinitselfsufficientmeansofrepellingattacksfromseveralsidesparticularlyinourday,wheneveryonefromthecommencementispreparedforthisveryusualformofattack.Whethertheenemycanattackusonseveralsideswithsuccessdependsgenerallyonconditionsquitedifferentfromthatofitsbeingdoneunexpectedly;withoutenteringhereintothenatureoftheseconditions,weconfineourselvestoobserving,thatwithturninganenemy,greatresults,aswellasgreatdangersareconnected;thattherefore,ifwesetasidespecialcircumstances,nothingjustifiesitbutagreatsuperiority,justsuchasweshoulduseagainstafractionalpartoftheenemy'sArmy.

　　Buttheturningandsurroundingasmallfractionoftheenemy,andparticularlyinthedarknessofnight,isalsomorepracticableforthisreason,thatwhateverwestakeuponit,andhoweversuperiortheforceusedmaybe,stillprobablyitconstitutesonlyalimitedportionofourArmy,andwecansoonerstakethatthanthewholeontheriskofagreatventure.Besides,thegreaterpartorperhapsthewholeservesasasupportandrallying-pointfortheportionrisked,whichagainverymuchdiminishesthedangeroftheenterprise.

　　Notonlytherisk,butthedifficultyofexecutionaswellconfinesnightenterprisestosmallbodies.Assurpriseistherealessenceofthemsoalsostealthyapproachisthechiefconditionofexecution:butthisismoreeasilydonewithsmallbodiesthanwithlarge,andforthecolumnsofawholeArmyisseldompracticable.Forthisreasonsuchenterprisesareingeneralonlydirectedagainstsingleoutposts,andcanonlybefeasibleagainstgreaterbodiesiftheyarewithoutsufficientoutposts,likeFredericktheGreatatHochkirch.ThiswillhappenseldomerinfuturetoArmiesthemselvesthantominordivisions.

　　Inrecenttimes,whenWarhasbeencarriedonwithsomuchmorerapidityandvigour,ithasinconsequenceoftenhappenedthatArmieshaveencampedveryclosetoeachother,withouthavingaverystrongsystemofoutposts,becausethosecircumstanceshavegenerallyoccurredjustatthecrisiswhichprecedesagreatdecision.

　　Butthenatsuchtimesthereadinessforbattleonbothsidesisalsomoreperfect;ontheotherhand,informerWarsitwasafrequentpracticeforarmiestotakeupcampsinsightofeachother,whentheyhadnootherobjectbutthatofmutuallyholdingeachotherincheck,consequentlyforalongerperiod.HowoftenFredericktheGreatstoodforweekssoneartotheAustrians,thatthetwomighthaveexchangedcannonshotswitheachother.

　　Butthesepractices,certainlymorefavourabletonightattacks,havebeendiscontinuedinlaterdays;andarmiesbeingnownolongerinregardtosubsistenceandrequirementsforencampment,suchindependentbodiescompleteinthemselves,finditnecessarytokeepusuallyaday'smarchbetweenthemselvesandtheenemy.Ifwenowkeepinviewespeciallythenightattackofanarmy,itfollowsthatsufficientmotivesforitcanseldomoccur,andthattheyfallunderoneorotherofthefollowingclasses.

　　1.Anunusualdegreeofcarelessnessoraudacitywhichveryrarelyoccurs,andwhenitdoesiscompensatedforbyagreatsuperiorityinmoralforce.

　　2.Apanicintheenemy'sarmy,orgenerallysuchadegreeofsuperiorityinmoralforceonourside,thatthisissufficienttosupplytheplaceofguidanceinaction.

　　3.Cuttingthroughanenemy'sarmyofsuperiorforce,whichkeepsusenveloped,becauseinthisalldependsonsurprise,andtheobjectofmerelymakingapassagebyforce,allowsamuchgreaterconcentrationofforces.

　　4.Finally,indesperatecases,whenourforceshavesuchadisproportiontotheenemy's,thatweseenopossibilityofsuccess,exceptthroughextraordinarydaring.

　　Butinallthesecasesthereisstilltheconditionthattheenemy'sarmyisunderoureyes,andprotectedbynoadvance-guard.

　　Asfortherest,mostnightcombatsaresoconductedastoendwithdaylight,sothatonlytheapproachandthefirstattackaremadeundercoverofdarkness,becausetheassailantinthatmannercanbetterprofitbytheconsequencesofthestateofconfusionintowhichhethrowshisadversary;andcombatsofthisdescriptionwhichdonotcommenceuntilday

　　eak,inwhichthenightthereforeisonlymadeuseoftoapproach,arenottobecountedasnightcombats.

　　TheEnd 蓝星，夏国。

　　肿瘤科病房，弥漫着医院独有的消毒水味道。病房是单人间，设施俱全，温馨舒适。

　

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　可对于孑然一身的路遥来讲，却是无人问津的等死之地。

　　他是癌症晚期，靠着意志力撑到现在，但也只是多受几天罪罢了。

　　此刻，路遥躺在病床上，怔怔望着床头柜上的水杯，想喝口水。

　　可他拼尽全力却无法让身体离开病床。剧痛和衰弱，让这原本无比简单的事情成了奢望。

　　这时，一道幸灾乐祸的声音响起：“表哥~你真是狼狈呢。连喝口水都得指望别人施舍。”

　　一位英俊的年轻男子悠闲坐在病床前，翘着二郎腿，眼睛笑成一道缝。

　　“你求求我，我给你喝口水如何？”

　　路遥面无表情，一言不发。自从失去了自理能力，一帮亲戚的嘴脸已经见多了，不差这一个。

　　男子起身，将水杯拿在手里递过来，“表哥别生气，我开玩笑的，你对我这么好，喂你口水还是能办到的。”

　　说完话，他将水杯里的水，缓缓倒在路遥苍白消瘦的脸上。

　　被呛到，路遥无力的咳嗽几声，好在少量的水流过嗓子，让他有了几丝说话的力气：

　

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　“张鑫，为什么？我从未得罪过你。你去星盟国留学，还是我资助的！”

　　张鑫将水杯放下，不紧不慢的说：“谁让你这么古板呢，只是运点感冒药罢了，又不犯法，你非得千方百计的拦着。”

　　路遥脸上闪过一丝了然之色，道：“张鑫你这垃圾，狗改不了吃屎。将感冒药运到国外提炼毒品……咳咳……”

　　张鑫理了下领带，笑道：“你别血口喷人啊，我可是国际知名企业家。这次回国，‘省招商引资局’还打电话欢迎我呢~”

　　路遥叹了口气，现在的自己什么都做不了，索性闭上眼睛不再说话，安静等待死亡的到来。

　　但张鑫却不想让眼前饱受病痛折磨、即将离世的表兄走好。他附身靠近，悄悄说道：琇書蛧

　　“表哥啊~其实呢，我这次回国主要就是见你一面，告诉你一声——你的癌，是我弄出来的~”

　　路遥陡然挣开眼，“你说什么！”

　　张鑫笑眯眯的掏出个铅盒打开，里面是件古怪的三角形饰物，仅有巴掌大小，中间是只眼睛似的图案，一看就很有年代感。

　　“眼熟吧？这是我亲手送你的，货真价实的古董。我在里面掺了点放射性物质，长期接触就会变成你现在这副鬼样子。”

　　路遥马上认出来，这是自己很喜欢的一件古物，天天摆在书桌上，时不时的把玩，没想到却是要人命的东西！

　　他伸出枯枝似的手臂，死死的抓住眼前人的胳膊！“你……”

　　“别激动~表哥，我西装很贵的。”张鑫轻松拿掉路遥的手，小心的捏起铅盒，将放射性饰物塞进他怀里。

　　“我赶飞机，得先走一步。你好好留着这个当做纪念吧，有机会再去你的坟头蹦迪~”

　　说完话，张鑫从容起身离开。临走前，还回头俏皮的眨眨眼。他原本就男生女相，此时的神态动作居然有些娇媚。

　　保镖很有眼力劲，赶紧打开病房门。同时用无线耳麦联络同事，提前发动汽车。

　　~~~~~~~~

　　路遥只能无力的瘫在床上，浑身皆是钻心剜骨般的剧痛，还有无穷悔恨、不甘。

　

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　但很快，剧痛渐渐消失，只剩麻木，路遥隐约听到过世的双亲在喊他。

　　就在路遥的身体越来越飘，即将失去意识时，胸口突然阵阵发烫，将他惊醒。

　　从怀中摸出那三角形饰物，发现这玩意变得滚烫无比，还在缓缓发光！

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