NObattlecantakeplaceunlessbymutualconsent;andinthisidea,whichconstitutesthewholebasisofaduel,istherootofacertainphraseologyusedbyhistoricalwriters,whichleadstomanyindefiniteandfalseconceptions.
Accordingtotheviewofthewriterstowhomwerefer,ithasfrequentlyhappenedthatoneCommanderhasofferedbattletotheother,andthelatterhasnotacceptedit.
Butthebattleisaverymodifiedduel,anditsfoundationisnotmerelyinthemutualwishtofight,thatisinconsent,butintheobjectswhichareboundupwiththebattle:thesebelongalwaystoagreaterwhole,andthatsomuchthemore,aseventhewholewarconsideredasa"combat-unit"haspoliticalobjectsandconditionswhichbelongtoahigherstandpoint.Themeredesiretoconquereachotherthereforefallsintoquiteasubordinaterelation,orratheritceasescompletelytobeanythingofitself,andonlybecomesthenervewhichconveystheimpulseofactionfromthehigherwill.
Amongsttheancients,andthenagainduringtheearlyperiodofstandingArmies,theexpressionthatwehadofferedbattletotheenemyinvain,hadmoresenseinitthanithasnow.Bytheancientseverythingwasconstitutedwithaviewtomeasuringeachother'sstrengthintheopenfieldfreefromanythinginthenatureofahindrance,andthewholeArtofWarconsistedintheorganisation,andformationoftheArmy,thatisintheorderofbattle.
NowastheirArmiesregularlyentrenchedthemselvesintheircamps,thereforethepositioninacampwasregardedassomethingunassailable,andabattledidnotbecomepossibleuntiltheenemylefthiscamp,andplacedhimselfinapracticablecountry,asitwereenteredthelists.
IfthereforewehearaboutHannibalhavingofferedbattletoFabiusinvain,thattellsusnothingmoreasregardsthelatterthanthatabattlewasnotpartofhisplan,andinitselfneitherprovesthephysicalnormoralsuperiorityofHannibal;butwithrespecttohimtheexpressionisstillcorrectenoughinthesensethatHannibalreallywishedabattle.
IntheearlyperiodofmodernArmies,therelationsweresimilaringreatcombatsandbattles.Thatistosay,greatmasseswere
oughtintoaction,andmanagedthroughoutitbymeansofanorderofbattle,whichlikeagreathelplesswholerequiredamoreorlesslevelplainandwasneithersuitedtoattack,noryettodefenceina
oken,closeorevenmountainouscountry.Thedefenderthereforehadherealsotosomeextentthemeansofavoidingbattle.Theserelationsalthoughgraduallybecomingmodified,continueduntilthefirstSilesianWar,anditwasnotuntiltheSevenYears'Warthatattacksonanenemypostedinadifficultcountrygraduallybecamefeasible,andofordinaryoccurrence:grounddidnotcertainlyceasetobeaprincipleofstrengthtothosemakinguseofitsaid,butitwasnolongeracharmedcircle,whichshutoutthenaturalforcesofWar.
DuringthepastthirtyyearsWarhasperfecteditselfmuchmoreinthisrespect,andthereisnolongeranythingwhichstandsinthewayofaGeneralwhoisinearnestaboutadecisionbymeansofbattle;hecanseekouthisenemy,andattackhim:ifhedoesnotdosohecannottakecreditforhavingwishedtofight,andtheexpressionheofferedabattlewhichhisopponentdidnotaccept,thereforenowmeansnothingmorethanthathedidnotfindcircumstancesadvantageousenoughforabattle,anadmissionwhichtheaboveexpressiondoesnotsuit,butwhichitonlystrivestothrowaveilover.
Itistruethedefensivesidecannolongerrefuseabattle,yethemaystillavoiditbygivinguphisposition,andtherolewithwhichthatpositionwasconnected:thisishoweverhalfavictoryfortheoffensiveside,andanacknowledgmentofhissuperiorityforthepresent.
Thisideainconnectionwiththecartelofdefiancecanthereforenolongerbemadeuseofinorderbysuchrhodomontadetoqualifytheinactionofhimwhosepartitistoadvance,thatis,theoffensive.Thedefenderwhoaslongashedoesnotgiveway,musthavethecreditofwillingthebattle,maycertainlysay,hehasoffereditifheisnotattacked,ifthatisnotunderstoodofitself.
Butontheotherhand,hewhonowwishesto,andcanretreatcannoteasilybeforcedtogivebattle.Nowastheadvantagestotheaggressorfromthisretreatareoftennotsufficient,andasubstantialvictoryisamatterofurgentnecessityforhim,inthatwaythefewmeanswhichtherearetocompelsuchanopponentalsotogivebattleareoftensoughtforandappliedwithparticularskill.
Theprincipalmeansforthisare—firstSURROUNDINGtheenemysoastomakehisretreatimpossible,oratleastsodifficultthatitisbetterforhimtoacceptbattle;and,secondly,SURPRISINGhim.Thislastway,forwhichtherewasamotiveformerlyintheextremedifficultyofallmovements,hasbecomeinmoderntimesveryinefficacious.
Fromthepliabilityandmanoeuvringcapabilitiesoftroopsinthepresentday,onedoesnothesitatetocommencearetreateveninsightoftheenemy,andonlysomespecialobstaclesinthenatureofthecountrycancauseseriousdifficultiesintheoperation.
AsanexampleofthiskindthebattleofNeresheimmaybegiven,foughtbytheArchdukeCharleswithMoreauintheRauheAlp,August11,1796,merelywithaviewtofacilitatehisretreat,althoughwefreelyconfesswehaveneverbeenablequitetounderstandtheargumentoftherenownedgeneralandauthorhimselfinthiscase.
ThebattleofRosbachisanotherexample,ifwesupposethecommanderofthealliedarmyhadnotreallytheintentionofattackingFredericktheGreat.
OfthebattleofSoor,theKinghimselfsaysthatitwasonlyfoughtbecausearetreatinthepresenceoftheenemyappearedtohimacriticaloperation;atthesametimetheKinghasalsogivenotherreasonsforthebattle.
Onthewhole,regularnightsurprisesexcepted,suchcaseswillalwaysbeofrareoccurrence,andthoseinwhichanenemyiscompelledtofightbybeingpracticallysurrounded,willhappenmostlytosinglecorpsonly,likeMortier'satDurrenstein1809,andVandammeatKulm,1813.
CHAPTER9THEBATTLE
ITSDECISION
WHATisabattle?Aconflictofthemainbody,butnotanunimportantoneaboutasecondaryobject,notamereattemptwhichisgivenupwhenweseebetimesthatourobjectishardlywithinourreach:itisaconflictwagedwithallourforcesfortheattainmentofadecisivevictory.
Minorobjectsmayalsobemixedupwiththeprincipalobject,anditwilltakemanydifferenttonesofcolourfromthecircumstancesoutofwhichitoriginates,forabattlebelongsalsotoagreaterwholeofwhichitisonlyapart,butbecausetheessenceofWarisconflict,andthebattleistheconflictofthemainArmies,itisalwaystoberegardedastherealcentreofgravityoftheWar,andthereforeitsdistinguishingcharacteris,thatunlikeallotherencounters,itisarrangedfor,andundertakenwiththesolepurposeofobtainingadecisivevictory.
ThishasaninfluenceontheMANNEROFITSDECISION,ontheEFFECTOFTHEVICTORYCONTAINEDINIT,anddeterminesTHEVALUEWHICHTHEORYISTOASSIGNTOITASAMEANSTOANEND.
Onthataccountwemakeitthesubjectofourspecialconsideration,andatthisstagebeforeweenteruponthespecialendswhichmaybeboundupwithit,butwhichdonotessentiallyalteritscharacterifitreallydeservestobetermedabattle.
Ifabattletakesplaceprincipallyonitsownaccount,theelementsofitsdecisionmustbecontainedinitself;inotherwords,victorymustbestrivenforaslongasapossibilityorhoperemains.Itmustnot,therefore,begivenuponaccountofsecondarycircumstances,butonlyandaloneintheeventoftheforcesappearingcompletelyinsufficient.
Nowhowisthatprecisemomenttobedescribed?
IfacertainartificialformationandcohesionofanArmyistheprincipalconditionunderwhichthe
averyofthetroopscangainavictory,aswasthecaseduringagreatpartoftheperiodofthemodernArtofWar,THENTHE
EAKINGUPOFTHISFORMATIONisthedecision.Abeatenwingwhichisputoutofjointdecidesthefateofallthatwasconnectedwithit.IfaswasthecaseatanothertimetheessenceofthedefenceconsistsinanintimateallianceoftheArmywiththegroundonwhichitfightsanditsobstacles,sothatArmyandpositionareonlyone,thentheCONQUESTofANESSENTIALPOINTinthispositionisthedecision.Itissaidthekeyofthepositionislost,itcannotthereforebedefendedanyfurther;thebattlecannotbecontinued.InbothcasesthebeatenArmiesareverymuchlikethe
okenstringsofaninstrumentwhichcannotdotheirwork.
ThatgeometricalaswellasthisgeographicalprinciplewhichhadatendencytoplaceanArmyinastateofcrystallisingtensionwhichdidnotallowoftheavailablepowersbeingmadeuseofuptothelastman,haveatleastsofarlosttheirinfluencethattheynolongerpredominate.Armiesarestillledintobattleinacertainorder,butthatorderisnolongerofdecisiveimportance;obstaclesofgroundarealsostillturnedtoaccounttostrengthenaposition,buttheyarenolongertheonlysupport.
Weattemptedinthesecondchapterofthisbooktotakeageneralviewofthenatureofthemodernbattle.Accordingtoourconceptionofit,theorderofbattleisonlyadispositionoftheforcessuitabletotheconvenientuseofthem,andthecourseofthebattleamutualslowwearingawayoftheseforcesupononeanother,toseewhichwillhavesoonestexhaustedhisadversary.
Theresolutionthereforetogiveupthefightarises,inabattlemorethaninanyothercombat,fromtherelationofthefreshreservesremainingavailable;foronlythesestillretainalltheirmoralvigour,andthecindersofthebattered,knocked-aboutbattalions,alreadyburntoutinthedestroyingelement,mustnotbeplacedonalevelwiththem;alsolostgroundaswehaveelsewheresaid,isastandardoflostmoralforce;itthereforecomesalsointoaccount,butmoreasasignoflosssufferedthanforthelossitself,andthenumberoffreshreservesisalwaysthechiefpointtobelookedatbybothCommanders.
Ingeneral,anactioninclinesinonedirectionfromtheverycommencement,butinamannerlittleobservable.Thisdirectionisalsofrequentlygiveninaverydecidedmannerbythearrangementswhichhavebeenmadepreviously,andthenitshowsawantofdiscernmentinthatGeneralwhocommencesbattleundertheseunfavourablecircumstanceswithoutbeingawareofthem.Evenwhenthisdoesnotoccuritliesinthenatureofthingsthatthecourseofabattleresemblesratheraslowdisturbanceofequili
iumwhichcommencessoon,butaswehavesaidalmostimperceptiblyatfirst,andthenwitheachmomentoftimebecomesstrongerandmorevisible,thananoscillatingtoandfro,asthosewhoaremisledbymendaciousdescriptionsusuallysuppose.
Butwhetherithappensthatthebalanceisforalongtimelittledisturbed,orthatevenafterithasbeenlostononesideitrightsitselfagain,andisthenlostontheotherside,itiscertainatalleventsthatinmostinstancesthedefeatedGeneralforeseeshisfatelongbeforeheretreats,andthatcasesinwhichsomecriticaleventactswithunexpectedforceuponthecourseofthewholehavetheirexistencemostlyinthecolouringwithwhicheveryonedepictshislostbattle.
Wecanonlyhereappealtothedecisionofunprejudicedmenofexperience,whowill,wearesure,assenttowhatwehavesaid,andanswerforustosuchofourreadersasdonotknowWarfromtheirownexperience.Todevelopthenecessityofthiscoursefromthenatureofthethingwouldleadustoofarintotheprovinceoftactics,towhichthis
anchofthesubjectbelongs;wearehereonlyconcernedwithitsresults.
IfwesaythatthedefeatedGeneralforeseestheunfavourableresultusuallysometimebeforehemakesuphismindtogiveupthebattle,weadmitthattherearealsoinstancestothecontrary,becauseotherwiseweshouldmaintainapropositioncontradictoryinitself.Ifatthemomentofeachdecisivetendencyofabattleitshouldbeconsideredaslost,thenalsonofurtherforcesshouldbeusedtogiveitaturn,andconsequentlythisdecisivetendencycouldnotprecedetheretreatbyanylengthoftime.Certainlythereareinstancesofbattleswhichafterhavingtakenadecidedturntoonesidehavestillendedinfavouroftheother;buttheyarerare,notusual;theseexceptionalcases,however,arereckoneduponbyeveryGeneralagainstwhomfortunedeclaresitself,andhemustreckonuponthemaslongasthereremainsapossibilityofaturnoffortune.Hehopesbystrongerefforts,byraisingtheremainingmoralforces,bysurpassinghimself,oralsobysomefortunatechancethatthenextmomentwill
ingachange,andpursuesthisasfarashiscourageandhisjudgmentcanagree.Weshallhavesomethingmoretosayonthissubject,butbeforethatwemustshowwhatarethesignsofthescalesturning.
Theresultofthewholecombatconsistsinthesumtotaloftheresultsofallpartialcombats;buttheseresultsofseparatecombatsaresettledbydifferentconsiderations.
Firstbythepuremoralpowerinthemindoftheleadingofficers.IfaGeneralofDivisionhasseenhisbattalionsforcedtosuccumb,itwillhaveaninfluenceonhisdemeanourandhisreports,andtheseagainwillhaveaninfluenceonthemeasuresoftheCommanderin-Chief;thereforeeventhoseunsuccessfulpartialcombatswhichtoallappearanceareretrieved,arenotlostintheirresults,andtheimpressionsfromthemsumthemselvesupinthemindoftheCommanderwithoutmuchtrouble,andevenagainsthiswill.
Secondly,bythequickermeltingawayofourtroops,whichcanbeeasilyestimatedintheslowandrelativelylittletumultuarycourseofourbattles.
AllthesethingsservefortheeyeoftheGeneralasacompasstotellthecourseofthebattleinwhichheisembarked.Ifwholebatterieshavebeenlostandnoneoftheenemy'staken;ifbattalionshavebeenoverthrownbytheenemy'scavalry,whilstthoseoftheenemyeverywherepresentimpenetrablemasses;ifthelineoffirefromhisorderofbattlewaversinvoluntarilyfromonepointtoanother;iffruitlesseffortshavebeenmadetogaincertainpoints,andtheassaultingbattalionseach,timebeenscatteredbywelldirectedvolleysofgrapeandcase;—ifourartillerybeginstoreplyfeeblytothatoftheenemy—ifthebattalionsunderfirediminishunusually,fast,becausewiththewoundedcrowdsofunwoundedmengototherear;—ifsingleDivisionshavebeencutoffandmadeprisonersthroughthedisruptionoftheplanofthebattle;—ifthelineofretreatbeginstobeendangered:theCommandermaytellverywellinwhichdirectionheisgoingwithhisbattle.Thelongerthisdirectioncontinues,themoredecideditbecomes,somuchthemoredifficultwillbetheturning,somuchthenearerthemomentwhenhemustgiveupthebattle.Weshallnowmakesomeobservationsonthismoment.
Wehavealreadysaidmorethanoncethatthefinaldecisionisruledmostlybytherelativenumberofthefreshreservesremainingatthelast;thatCommanderwhoseeshisadversaryisdecidedlysuperiortohiminthisrespectmakesuphismindtoretreat.Itisthecharacteristicofmodernbattlesthatallmischancesandlosseswhichtakeplaceinthecourseofthesamecanberetrievedbyfreshforces,becausethearrangementofthemodernorderofbattle,andthewayinwhichtroopsare
oughtintoaction,allowoftheirusealmostgenerally,andineachposition.Solong,therefore,asthatCommanderagainstwhomtheissueseemstodeclareitselfstillretainsasuperiorityinreserveforce,hewillnotgiveuptheday.Butfromthemomentthathisreservesbegintobecomeweakerthanhisenemy's,thedecisionmayberegardedassettled,andwhathenowdoesdependspartlyonspecialcircumstances,partlyonthedegreeofcourageandperseverancewhichhepersonallypossesses,andwhichmaydegenerateintofoolishobstinacy.HowaCommandercanattaintothepowerofestimatingcorrectlythestillremainingreservesonbothsidesisanaffairofskilfulpracticalgenius,whichdoesnotinanywaybelongtothisplace;wekeepourselvestotheresultasitformsitselfinhismind.Butthisconclusionisstillnotthemomentofdecisionproperly,foramotivewhichonlyarisesgraduallydoesnotanswertothat,butisonlyageneralmotivetowardsresolution,andtheresolutionitselfrequiresstillsomespecialimmediatecauses.Ofthesetherearetwochiefoneswhichconstantlyrecur,thatis,thedangerofretreat,andthearrivalofnight.
Iftheretreatwitheverynewstepwhichthebattletakesinitscoursebecomesconstantlyingreaterdanger,andifthereservesaresomuchdiminishedthattheyarenolongeradequatetoget
eathingroom,thenthereisnothingleftbuttosubmittofate,andbyawell-conductedretreattosavewhat,byalongerdelayendinginflightanddisaster,wouldbelost.
Butnightasaruleputsanendtoallbattles,becauseanightcombatholdsoutnohopeofadvantageexceptunderparticularcircumstances;andasnightisbettersuitedforaretreatthantheday,so,therefore,theCommanderwhomustlookattheretreatasathinginevitable,orasmostprobable,willprefertomakeuseofthenightforhispurpose.
Thatthereare,besidestheabovetwousualandchiefcauses,yetmanyothersalso,whicharelessormoreindividualandnottobeoverlooked,isamatterofcourse;forthemoreabattletendstowardsacompleteupsetofequili
iumthemoresensibleistheinfluenceofeachpartialresultinhasteningtheturn.Thusthelossofabattery,asuccessfulchargeofacoupleofregimentsofcavalry,maycallintolifetheresolutiontoretreatalreadyripening.
Asaconclusiontothissubject,wemustdwellforamomentonthepointatwhichthecourageoftheCommanderengagesinasortofconflictwithhisreason.
If,ontheonehandtheoverbearingprideofavictoriousconqueror,iftheinflexiblewillofanaturallyobstinatespirit,ifthestrenuousresistanceofnoblefeelingswillnotyieldthebattlefield,wheretheymustleavetheirhonour,yetontheotherhand,reasoncounselsnottogiveupeverything,nottoriskthelastuponthegame,buttoretainasmuchoverasisnecessaryforanorderlyretreat.HoweverhighlywemustesteemcourageandfirmnessinWar,andhoweverlittleprospectthereisofvictorytohimwhocannotresolvetoseekitbytheexertionofallhispower,stillthereisapointbeyondwhichperseverancecanonlybetermeddesperatefolly,andthereforecanmeetwithnoapprobationfromanycritic.Inthemostcele琇書網
atedofallbattles,thatofBelle-Alliance,Buonaparteusedhislastreserveinanefforttoretrieveabattlewhichwaspastbeingretrieved.Hespenthislastfarthing,andthen,asabeggar,abandonedboththebattle-fieldandhiscrown. 蓝星，夏国。
肿瘤科病房，弥漫着医院独有的消毒水味道。病房是单人间，设施俱全，温馨舒适。
网页版章节内容慢，请下载爱阅小说app阅读最新内容
可对于孑然一身的路遥来讲，却是无人问津的等死之地。
他是癌症晚期，靠着意志力撑到现在，但也只是多受几天罪罢了。
此刻，路遥躺在病床上，怔怔望着床头柜上的水杯，想喝口水。
可他拼尽全力却无法让身体离开病床。剧痛和衰弱，让这原本无比简单的事情成了奢望。
这时，一道幸灾乐祸的声音响起：“表哥~你真是狼狈呢。连喝口水都得指望别人施舍。”
一位英俊的年轻男子悠闲坐在病床前，翘着二郎腿，眼睛笑成一道缝。
“你求求我，我给你喝口水如何？”
路遥面无表情，一言不发。自从失去了自理能力，一帮亲戚的嘴脸已经见多了，不差这一个。
男子起身，将水杯拿在手里递过来，“表哥别生气，我开玩笑的，你对我这么好，喂你口水还是能办到的。”
说完话，他将水杯里的水，缓缓倒在路遥苍白消瘦的脸上。
被呛到，路遥无力的咳嗽几声，好在少量的水流过嗓子，让他有了几丝说话的力气：
网站即将关闭，下载爱阅app免费看最新内容
“张鑫，为什么？我从未得罪过你。你去星盟国留学，还是我资助的！”
张鑫将水杯放下，不紧不慢的说：“谁让你这么古板呢，只是运点感冒药罢了，又不犯法，你非得千方百计的拦着。”
路遥脸上闪过一丝了然之色，道：“张鑫你这垃圾，狗改不了吃屎。将感冒药运到国外提炼毒品……咳咳……”
张鑫理了下领带，笑道：“你别血口喷人啊，我可是国际知名企业家。这次回国，‘省招商引资局’还打电话欢迎我呢~”
路遥叹了口气，现在的自己什么都做不了，索性闭上眼睛不再说话，安静等待死亡的到来。
但张鑫却不想让眼前饱受病痛折磨、即将离世的表兄走好。他附身靠近，悄悄说道：琇書蛧
“表哥啊~其实呢，我这次回国主要就是见你一面，告诉你一声——你的癌，是我弄出来的~”
路遥陡然挣开眼，“你说什么！”
张鑫笑眯眯的掏出个铅盒打开，里面是件古怪的三角形饰物，仅有巴掌大小，中间是只眼睛似的图案，一看就很有年代感。
“眼熟吧？这是我亲手送你的，货真价实的古董。我在里面掺了点放射性物质，长期接触就会变成你现在这副鬼样子。”
路遥马上认出来，这是自己很喜欢的一件古物，天天摆在书桌上，时不时的把玩，没想到却是要人命的东西！
他伸出枯枝似的手臂，死死的抓住眼前人的胳膊！“你……”
“别激动~表哥，我西装很贵的。”张鑫轻松拿掉路遥的手，小心的捏起铅盒，将放射性饰物塞进他怀里。
“我赶飞机，得先走一步。你好好留着这个当做纪念吧，有机会再去你的坟头蹦迪~”
说完话，张鑫从容起身离开。临走前，还回头俏皮的眨眨眼。他原本就男生女相，此时的神态动作居然有些娇媚。
保镖很有眼力劲，赶紧打开病房门。同时用无线耳麦联络同事，提前发动汽车。
~~~~~~~~
路遥只能无力的瘫在床上，浑身皆是钻心剜骨般的剧痛，还有无穷悔恨、不甘。
请退出转码页面，请下载爱阅小说app 阅读最新章节。
但很快，剧痛渐渐消失，只剩麻木，路遥隐约听到过世的双亲在喊他。
就在路遥的身体越来越飘，即将失去意识时，胸口突然阵阵发烫，将他惊醒。
从怀中摸出那三角形饰物，发现这玩意变得滚烫无比，还在缓缓发光！
秀书网为你提供最快的战争论更新，BOOK IV THE COMBAT（3）免费阅读。https://www.xiumb9.com
章节错误,点此报送(免注册),
报送后维护人员会在两分钟内校正章节内容,请耐心等待