ARESERVEhastwoobjectswhichareverydistinctfromeachother,namely,first,theprolongationandrenewalofthecombat,andsecondly,foruseincaseofunforeseenevents.Thefirstobjectimpliestheutilityofasuccessiveapplicationofforces,andonthataccountcannotoccurinStrategy.Casesinwhichacorpsissenttosuccourapointwhichissupposedtobeabouttofallareplainlytobeplacedinthecategoryofthesecondobject,astheresistancewhichhastobeofferedherecouldnothavebeensufficientlyforeseen.Butacorpswhichisdestinedexpresslytoprolongthecombat,andwiththatobjectinviewisplacedinrear,wouldbeonlyacorpsplacedoutofreachoffire,butunderthecommandandatthedispositionoftheGeneralCommandingintheaction,andaccordinglywouldbeatacticalandnotastrategicreserve.
ButthenecessityforaforcereadyforunforeseeneventsmayalsotakeplaceinStrategy,andconsequentlytheremayalsobeastrategicreserve,butonlywhereunforeseeneventsareimaginable.Intactics,wheretheenemy'smeasuresaregenerallyfirstascertainedbydirectsight,andwheretheymaybeconcealedbyeverywood,everyfoldofundulatingground,wemustnaturallyalwaysbealive,moreorless,tothepossibilityofunforeseenevents,inordertostrengthen,subsequently,thosepointswhichappeartooweak,and,infact,tomodifygenerallythedispositionofourtroops,soastomakeitcorrespondbettertothatoftheenemy.
SuchcasesmustalsohappeninStrategy,becausethestrategicactisdirectlylinkedtothetactical.InStrategyalsomanyameasureisfirstadoptedinconsequenceofwhatisactuallyseen,orinconsequenceofuncertainreportsarrivingfromdaytoday,orevenfromhourtohour,andlastly,fromtheactualresultsofthecombatsitis,therefore,anessentialconditionofstrategiccommandthat,accordingtothedegreeofuncertainty,forcesmustbekeptinreserveagainstfuturecontingencies.
Inthedefensivegenerally,butparticularlyinthedefenceofcertainobstaclesofground,likerivers,hills,&c.,suchcontingencies,asiswellknown,happenconstantly.
Butthisuncertaintydiminishesinproportionasthestrategicactivityhaslessofthetacticalcharacter,andceasesalmostaltogetherinthoseregionswhereitbordersonpolitics.
Thedirectioninwhichtheenemyleadshiscolumnstothecombatcanbeperceivedbyactualsightonly;whereheintendstopassariverislearntfromafewpreparationswhicharemadeshortlybefore;thelinebywhichheproposestoinvadeourcountryisusuallyannouncedbyallthenewspapersbeforeapistolshothasbeenfired.Thegreaterthenatureofthemeasurethelessitwilltaketheenemybysurprise.Timeandspacearesoconsiderable,thecircumstancesoutofwhichtheactionproceedssopublicandlittlesusceptibleofalteration,thatthecomingeventiseithermadeknowningoodtime,orcanbediscoveredwithreasonablecertainty.
OntheotherhandtheuseofareserveinthisprovinceofStrategy,evenifonewereavailable,willalwaysbelessefficaciousthemorethemeasurehasatendencytowardsbeingoneofageneralnature.
Wehaveseenthatthedecisionofapartialcombatisnothinginitself,butthatallpartialcombatsonlyfindtheircompletesolutioninthedecisionofthetotalcombat.
Buteventhisdecisionofthetotalcombathasonlyarelativemeaningofmanydifferentgradations,accordingastheforceoverwhichthevictoryhasbeengainedformsamoreorlessgreatandimportantpartofthewhole.ThelostbattleofacorpsmayberepairedbythevictoryoftheArmy.EventhelostbattleofanArmymaynotonlybecounterbalancedbythegainofamoreimportantone,butconvertedintoafortunateevent(thetwodaysofKulm,August29and30,1813).Noonecandoubtthis;butitisjustasclearthattheweightofeachvictory(thesuccessfulissueofeachtotalcombat)issomuchthemoresubstantialthemoreimportantthepartconquered,andthatthereforethepossibilityofrepairingthelossbysubsequenteventsdiminishesinthesameproportion.Inanotherplaceweshallhavetoexaminethismoreindetail;itsufficesforthepresenttohavedrawnattentiontotheindubitableexistenceofthisprogression.
Ifwenowaddlastlytothesetwoconsiderationsthethird,whichis,thatifthepersistentuseofforcesintacticsalwaysshiftsthegreatresulttotheendofthewholeact,lawofthesimultaneoususeoftheforcesinStrategy,onthecontrary,letstheprincipalresult(whichneednotbethefinalone)takeplacealmostalwaysatthecommencementofthegreat(orwhole)act,theninthesethreeresultswehavegroundssufficienttofindstrategicreservesalwaysmoresuperfluous,alwaysmoreuseless,alwaysmoredangerous,themoregeneraltheirdestination.
Thepointwheretheideaofastrategicreservebeginstobecomeinconsistentisnotdifficulttodetermine:itliesintheSUPREMEDECISION.Employmentmustbegiventoalltheforceswithinthespaceofthesupremedecision,andeveryreserve(activeforceavailable)whichisonlyintendedforuseafterthatdecisionisopposedtocommonsense.
If,therefore,tacticshasinitsreservesthemeansofnotonlymeetingunforeseendispositionsonthepartoftheenemy,butalsoofrepairingthatwhichnevercanbeforeseen,theresultofthecombat,shouldthatbeunfortunate;Strategyontheotherhandmust,atleastasfarasrelatestothecapitalresult,renouncetheuseofthesemeans.AsArule,itcanonlyrepairthelossessustainedatonepointbyadvantagesgainedatanother,inafewcasesbymovingtroopsfromonepointtoanother;theideaofpreparingforsuchreversesbyplacingforcesinreservebeforehand,canneverbeentertainedinStrategy.
Wehavepointedoutasanabsurditytheideaofastrategicreservewhichisnottoco-operateinthecapitalresult,andasitissobeyondadoubt,weshouldnothavebeenledintosuchananalysisaswehavemadeinthesetwochapters,wereitnotthat,inthedisguiseofotherideas,itlookslikesomethingbetter,andfrequentlymakesitsappearance.Onepersonseesinittheacmeofstrategicsagacityandforesight;anotherrejectsit,andwithittheideaofanyreserve,consequentlyevenofatacticalone.Thisconfusionofideasistransferredtoreallife,andifwewouldseeamemorableinstanceofitwehaveonlytocalltomindthatPrussiain1806leftareserveof20,000mencantonedintheMark,underPrinceEugeneofWurtemberg,whichcouldnotpossiblyreachtheSaaleintimetobeofanyuse,andthatanotherforceOf25,000menbelongingtothispowerremainedinEastandSouthPrussia,destinedonlytobeputonawarfootingafterwardsasareserve.
Aftertheseexampleswecannotbeaccusedofhavingbeenfightingwithwindmills.
CHAPTER14ECONOMYOFFORCES
THEroadofreason,aswehavesaid,seldomallowsitselftobereducedtoamathematicallinebyprinciplesandopinions.Thereremainsalwaysacertainmargin.Butitisthesameinallthepracticalartsoflife.Forthelinesofbeautytherearenoabscissaeandordinates;circlesandellipsesarenotdescribedbymeansoftheiralge
aicalformulae.TheactorinWarthereforesoonfindshemusttrusthimselftothedelicatetactofjudgmentwhich,foundedonnaturalquicknessofperception,andeducatedbyreflection,almostunconsciouslyseizesupontheright;hesoonfindsthatatonetimehemustsimplifythelaw(byreducingit)tosomeprominentcharacteristicpointswhichformhisrules;thatatanothertheadoptedmethodmustbecomethestaffonwhichheleans.
Asoneofthesesimplifiedcharacteristicpointsasamentalappliance,welookupontheprincipleofwatchingcontinuallyovertheco-operationofallforces,orinotherwords,ofkeepingconstantlyinviewthatnopartofthemshouldeverbeidle.Whoeverhasforceswheretheenemydoesnotgivethemsufficientemployment,whoeverhaspartofhisforcesonthemarch—thatis,allowsthemtoliedead—whiletheenemy'sarefighting,heisabadmanagerofhisforces.Inthissensethereisawasteofforces,whichisevenworsethantheiremploymenttonopurpose.Iftheremustbeaction,thenthefirstpointisthatallpartsact,becausethemostpurposelessactivitystillkeepsemployedanddestroysaportionoftheenemy'sforce,whilsttroopscompletelyinactiveareforthemomentquiteneutralised.Unmistakablythisideaisboundupwiththeprinciplescontainedinthelastthreechapters,itisthesametruth,butseenfromasomewhatmorecomprehensivepointofviewandcondensedintoasingleconception.
CHAPTER15GEOMETRICALELEMENT
THElengthtowhichthegeometricalelementorforminthedispositionofmilitaryforceinWarcanbecomeapredominantprinciple,weseeintheartoffortification,wheregeometrylooksafterthegreatandthelittle.Alsointacticsitplaysagreatpart.Itisthebasisofelementarytactics,orofthetheoryofmovingtroops;butinfieldfortification,aswellasinthetheoryofpositions,andoftheirattack,itsanglesandlinesrulelikelawgiverswhohavetodecidethecontest.Manythingsherewereatonetimemisapplied,andothersweremerefribbles;still,however,inthetacticsofthepresentday,inwhichineverycombattheaimistosurroundtheenemy,thegeometricalelementhasattainedanewagreatimportanceinaverysimple,butconstantlyrecurringapplication.Nevertheless,intactics,whereallismoremovable,wherethemoralforces,individualtraits,andchancearemoreinfluentialthaninawarofsieges,thegeometricalelementcanneverattaintothesamedegreeofsupremacyasinthelatter.ButlessstillisitsinfluenceinStrategy;certainlyhere,also,forminthedispositionoftroops,theshapeofcountriesandstatesisofgreatimportance;butthegeometricalelementisnotdecisive,asinfortification,andnotnearlysoimportantasintactics.—Themannerinwhichthisinfluenceexhibitsitself,canonlybeshownbydegreesatthoseplaceswhereitmakesitsappearance,anddeservesnotice.HerewewishmoretodirectattentiontothedifferencewhichthereisbetweentacticsandStrategyinrelationtoit.
Intacticstimeandspacequicklydwindletotheirabsoluteminimum.Ifabodyoftroopsisattackedinflankandrearbytheenemy,itsoongetstoapointwhereretreatnolongerremains;suchapositionisveryclosetoanabsoluteimpossibilityofcontinuingthefight;itmustthereforeextricateitselffromit,oravoidgettingintoit.Thisgivestoallcombinationsaimingatthisfromthefirstcommencementagreatefficiency,whichchieflyconsistsinthedisquietudewhichitcausestheenemyastoconsequences.Thisiswhythegeometricaldispositionoftheforcesissuchanimportantfactorinthetacticalproduct.
InStrategythisisonlyfaintlyreflected,onaccountofthegreaterspaceandtime.Wedonotfirefromonetheatreofwaruponanother;andoftenweeksandmonthsmustpassbeforeastrategicmovementdesignedtosurroundtheenemycanbeexecuted.Further,thedistancesaresogreatthattheprobabilityofhittingtherightpointatlast,evenwiththebestarrangements,isbutsmall.
InStrategythereforethescopeforsuchcombinations,thatisforthoserestingonthegeometricalelement,ismuchsmaller,andforthesamereasontheeffectofanadvantageonceactuallygainedatanypointismuchgreater.Suchadvantagehastimeto
ingallitseffectstomaturitybeforeitisdisturbed,orquiteneutralisedtherein,byanycounteractingapprehensions.Wethereforedonothesitatetoregardasanestablishedtruth,thatinStrategymoredependsonthenumberandthemagnitudeofthevictoriouscombats,thanontheformofthegreatlinesbywhichtheyareconnected.
Aviewjustthereversehasbeenafavouritethemeofmoderntheory,becauseagreaterimportancewassupposedtobethusgiventoStrategy,and,asthehigherfunctionsofthemindwereseeninStrategy,itwasthoughtbythatmeanstoennobleWar,and,asitwassaid—throughanewsubstitutionofideas—tomakeitmorescientific.Weholdittobeoneoftheprincipalusesofacompletetheoryopenlytoexposesuchvagaries,andasthegeometricalelementisthefundamentalideafromwhichtheoryusuallyproceeds,thereforewehaveexpressly
oughtoutthispointinstrongrelief.
CHAPTER16ONTHESUSPENSIONOFTHEACTINWARFARE
IFoneconsidersWarasanactofmutualdestruction,wemustofnecessityimaginebothpartiesasmakingsomeprogress;butatthesametime,asregardstheexistingmoment,wemustalmostasnecessarilysupposetheonepartyinastateofexpectation,andonlytheotheractuallyadvancing,forcircumstancescanneverbeactuallythesameonbothsides,orcontinueso.Intimeachangemustensue,fromwhichitfollowsthatthepresentmomentismorefavourabletoonesidethantheother.Nowifwesupposethatbothcommandershaveafullknowledgeofthiscircumstance,thentheonehasamotiveforaction,whichatthesametimeisamotivefortheothertowait;therefore,accordingtothisitcannotbefortheinterestofbothatthesametimetoadvance,norcanwaitingbefortheinterestofbothatthesametime.Thisoppositionofinterestasregardstheobjectisnotdeducedherefromtheprincipleofgeneralpolarity,andthereforeisnotinoppositiontotheargumentinthefifthchapterofthesecondbook;itdependsonthefactthathereinrealitythesamethingisatonceanincentiveormotivetobothcommanders,namelytheprobabilityofimprovingorimpairingtheirpositionbyfutureaction.
Butevenifwesupposethepossibilityofaperfectequalityofcircumstancesinthisrespect,orifwetakeintoaccountthatthroughimperfectknowledgeoftheirmutualpositionsuchanequalitymayappeartothetwoCommanderstosubsist,stillthedifferenceofpoliticalobjectsdoesawaywiththispossibilityofsuspension.Oneofthepartiesmustofnecessitybeassumedpoliticallytobetheaggressor,becausenoWarcouldtakeplacefromdefensiveintentionsonbothsides.Buttheaggressorhasthepositiveobject,thedefendermerelyanegativeone.Tothefirstthenbelongsthepositiveaction,foritisonlybythatmeansthathecanattainthepositiveobject;therefore,incaseswherebothpartiesareinpreciselysimilarcircumstances,theaggressoriscalledupontoactbyvirtueofhispositiveobject.
Therefore,fromthispointofview,asuspensionintheactofWarfare,strictlyspeaking,isincontradictionwiththenatureofthething;becausetwoArmies,beingtwoincompatibleelements,shoulddestroyoneanotherunremittingly,justasfireandwatercanneverputthemselvesinequili
ium,butactandreactupononeanother,untilonequitedisappears.Whatwouldbesaidoftwowrestlerswhoremainedclaspedroundeachotherforhourswithoutmakingamovement.ActioninWar,therefore,likethatofaclockwhichiswoundup,shouldgoonrunningdowninregularmotion.—ButwildasisthenatureofWaritstillwearsthechainsofhumanweakness,andthecontradictionweseehere,viz.,thatmanseeksandcreatesdangerswhichhefearsatthesametimewillastonishnoone.
Ifwecastaglanceatmilitaryhistoryingeneral,wefindsomuchtheoppositeofanincessantadvancetowardstheaim,thatSTANDINGSTILLandDOINGNOTHINGisquiteplainlytheNORMALCONDITIONofanArmyinthemidstofWar,ACTING,theEXCEPTION.Thismustalmostraiseadoubtastothecorrectnessofourconception.Butifmilitaryhistoryleadstothisconclusionwhenviewedinthemassthelatestseriesofcampaignsredeemsourposition.TheWaroftheFrenchRevolutionshowstooplainlyitsreality,andonlyprovestooclearlyitsnecessity.Intheseoperations,andespeciallyinthecampaignsofBuonaparte,theconductofWarattainedtothatunlimiteddegreeofenergywhichwehaverepresentedasthenaturallawoftheelement.Thisdegreeisthereforepossible,andifitispossiblethenitisnecessary.
HowcouldanyoneinfactjustifyintheeyesofreasontheexpenditureofforcesinWar,ifactingwasnottheobject?Thebakeronlyheatshisovenifhehas
eadtoputintoit;thehorseisonlyyokedtothecarriageifwemeantodrive;whythenmaketheenormouseffortofaWarifwelookfornothingelsebyitbutlikeeffortsonthepartoftheenemy?
Somuchinjustificationofthegeneralprinciple;nowastoitsmodifications,asfarastheylieinthenatureofthethingandareindependentofspecialcases.
Therearethreecausestobenoticedhere,whichappearasinnatecounterpoisesandpreventtheoverrapidoruncontrollablemovementofthewheel-work.
Thefirst,whichproducesaconstanttendencytodelay,andistherebyaretardingprinciple,isthenaturaltimidityandwantofresolutioninthehumanmind,akindofinertiainthemoralworld,butwhichisproducednotbyattractive,butbyrepellentforces,thatistosay,bydreadofdangerandresponsibility.
IntheburningelementofWar,ordinarynaturesappeartobecomeheavier;theimpulsiongivenmustthereforebestrongerandmorefrequentlyrepeatedifthemotionistobeacontinuousone.Themereideaoftheobjectforwhicharmshavebeentakenupisseldomsufficienttoovercomethisresistantforce,andifawarlikeenterprisingspiritisnotatthehead,whofeelshimselfinWarinhisnaturalelement,asmuchasafishintheocean,orifthereisnotthepressurefromaboveofsomegreatresponsibility,thenstandingstillwillbetheorderoftheday,andprogresswillbetheexception.
Thesecondcauseistheimperfectionofhumanperceptionandjudgment,whichisgreaterinWarthananywhere,becauseapersonhardlyknowsexactlyhisownpositionfromonemomenttoanother,andcanonlyconjectureonslightgroundsthatoftheenemy,whichispurposelyconcealed;thisoftengivesrisetothecaseofbothpartieslookingupononeandthesameobjectasadvantageousforthem,whileinrealitytheinterestofonemustpreponderate;thustheneachmaythinkheactswiselybywaitinganothermoment,aswehavealreadysaidinthefifthchapterofthesecondbook.
Thethirdcausewhichcatcheshold,likearatchetwheelinmachinery,fromtimetotimeproducingacompletestandstill,isthegreaterstrengthofthedefensiveform.AmayfeeltooweaktoattackB,fromwhichitdoesnotfollowthatBisstrongenoughforanattackonA.Theadditionofstrength,whichthedefensivegivesisnotmerelylostbyassumingtheoffensive,butalsopassestotheenemyjustas,figurativelyexpressed,thedifferenceofa+banda-bisequalto2b.Thereforeitmaysohappenthatbothparties,atoneandthesametime,notonlyfeelthemselvestooweaktoattack,butalsoaresoinreality.
ThuseveninthemidstoftheactofWaritself,anxioussagacityandtheapprehensionoftoogreatdangerfindvantageground,bymeansofwhichtheycanexerttheirpower,andtametheelementaryimpetuosityofWar.
However,atthesametimethesecauseswithoutanexaggerationoftheireffect,wouldhardlyexplainthelongstatesofinactivitywhichtookplaceinmilitaryoperations,informertimes,inWarsundertakenaboutinterestsofnogreatimportance,andinwhichinactivityconsumednine-tenthsofthetimethatthetroopsremainedunderarms.ThisfeatureintheseWars,istobetracedprincipallytotheinfluencewhichthedemandsoftheoneparty,andthecondition,andfeelingoftheother,exercisedovertheconductoftheoperations,ashasbeenalreadyobservedinthechapterontheessenceandobjectofWar.
ThesethingsmayobtainsuchapreponderatinginfluenceastomakeofWarahalf-and-halfaffair.AWarisoftennothingmorethananarmedneutrality,oramenacingattitudetosupportnegotiationsoranattempttogainsomesmalladvantagebysmallexertions,andthentowaitthetideofcircumstances,oradisagreeabletreatyobligation,whichisfulfilledinthemostniggardlywaypossible.
Inallthesecasesinwhichtheimpulsegivenbyinterestisslight,andtheprincipleofhostilityfeeble,inwhichthereisnodesiretodomuch,andalsonotmuchtodreadfromtheenemy;inshort,wherenopowerfulmotivespressanddrive,cabinetswillnotriskmuchinthegame;hencethistamemodeofcarryingonWar,inwhichthehostilespiritofrealWarislaidinirons.
ThemoreWarbecomesinthismannerdevitalisedsomuchthemoreitstheorybecomesdestituteofthenecessaryfirmpivotsandbuttressesforitsreasoning;thenecessaryisconstantlydiminishing,theaccidentalconstantlyincreasing.
NeverthelessinthiskindofWarfare,thereisalsoacertainshrewdness,indeed,itsactionisperhapsmorediversified,andmoreextensivethanintheother.Hazardplayedwithrealeauxofgoldseemschangedintoagameofcommercewithgroschen.Andonthisfield,wheretheconductofWarspinsoutthetimewithanumberofsmallflourishes,withskirmishesatoutposts,halfinearnesthalfinjest,withlongdispositionswhichendinnothingwithpositionsandmarches,whichafterwardsaredesignatedasskilfulonlybecausetheirinfinitesimallysmallcausesarelost,andcommonsensecanmakenothingofthem,hereonthisveryfieldmanytheoristsfindtherealArtofWarathome:inthesefeints,parades,halfandquarterthrustsofformerWars,theyfindtheaimofalltheory,thesupremacyofmindovermatter,andmodernWarsappeartothemmeresavagefisticuffs,fromwhichnothingistobelearnt,andwhichmustberegardedasmereretrogradestepstowardsbarbarism.Thisopinionisasfrivolousastheobjectstowhichitrelates.Wheregreatforcesandgreatpassionsarewanting,itiscertainlyeasierforapractiseddexteritytoshowitsgame;butisthenthecommandofgreatforces,notinitselfahigherexerciseoftheintelligentfaculties?IsthenthatkindofconventionalswordexercisenotcomprisedinandbelongingtotheothermodeofconductingWar?Doesitnotbearthesamerelationtoitasthemotionsuponashiptothemotionoftheshipitself?Trulyitcantakeplaceonlyunderthetacitconditionthattheadversarydoesnobetter.Andcanwetell,howlonghemaychoosetorespectthoseconditions?HasnotthentheFrenchRevolutionfallenuponusinthemidstofthefanciedsecurityofouroldsystemofWar,anddrivenusfromChalonstoMoscow?AnddidnotFredericktheGreatinlikemannersurprisetheAustriansreposingintheirancienthabitsofWar,andmaketheirmonarchytremble?Woetothecabinetwhich,withashilly-shallypolicy,andaroutine-riddenmilitarysystem,meetswithanadversarywho,liketherudeelement,knowsnootherlawthanthatofhisintrinsicforce.Everydeficiencyinenergyandexertionisthenaweightinthescalesinfavouroftheenemy;itisnotsoeasythentochangefromthefencingpostureintothatofanathlete,andaslightblowisoftensufficienttoknockdownthewhole.
Theresultofallthecausesnowadducedis,thatthehostileactionofacampaigndoesnotprogressbyacontinuous,butbyanintermittentmovement,andthat,therefore,betweentheseparatebloodyacts,thereisaperiodofwatching,duringwhichbothpartiesfallintothedefensive,andalsothatusuallyahigherobjectcausestheprincipleofaggressiontopredominateononeside,andthusleavesitingeneralinanadvancingposition,bywhichthenitsproceedingsbecomemodifiedinsomedegree.
CHAPTER17ONTHECHARACTEROFMODERNWAR
THEattentionwhichmustbepaidtothecharacterofWarasitisnowmade,hasagreatinfluenceuponallplans,especiallyonstrategicones.m.χＩùmЬ.ＣǒＭ
SinceallmethodsformerlyusualwereupsetbyBuonaparte'sluckandboldness,andfirst-ratePowersalmostwipedoutatablow;sincetheSpaniardsbytheirstubbornresistancehaveshownwhatthegeneralarmingofanationandinsurgentmeasuresonagreatscalecaneffect,inspiteofweaknessandporousnessofindividualparts;sinceRussia,bythecampaignof1812hastaughtus,first,thatanEmpireofgreatdimensionsisnottobeconquered(whichmighthavebeeneasilyknownbefore),secondly,thattheprobabilityoffinalsuccessdoesnotinallcasesdiminishinthesamemeasureasbattles,capitals,andprovincesarelost(whichwasformerlyanincontrovertibleprinciplewithalldiplomatists,andthereforemadethemalwaysreadytoenteratonceintosomebadtemporarypeace),butthatanationisoftenstrongestintheheartofitscountry,iftheenemy'soffensivepowerhasexhausteditself,andwithwhatenormousforcethedefensivethenspringsovertotheoffensive;further,sincePrussia(1813)hasshownthatsuddeneffortsmayaddtoanArmysixfoldbymeansofthemilitia,andthatthismilitiaisjustasfitforservicea
oadasinitsowncountry;—sincealltheseeventshaveshownwhatanenormousfactortheheartandsentimentsofaNationmaybeintheproductofitspoliticalandmilitarystrength,infine,sincegovernmentshavefoundoutalltheseadditionalaids,itisnottobeexpectedthattheywillletthemlieidleinfutureWars,whetheritbethatdangerthreatenstheirownexistence,orthatrestlessambitiondrivesthemon.
ThataWarwhichiswagedwiththewholeweightofthenationalpoweroneachsidemustbeorganiseddifferentlyinprincipletothosewhereeverythingiscalculatedaccordingtotherelationsofstandingArmiestoeachother,itiseasytoperceive.StandingArmiesonceresembledfleets,thelandforcetheseaforceintheirrelationstotheremainderoftheState,andfromthattheArtofWaronshorehadinitsomethingofnavaltactics,whichithasnowquitelost.
CHAPTER18TENSIONANDREST
TheDynamicLawofWar
WEhaveseeninthesixteenthchapterofthisbook,how,inmostcampaigns,muchmoretimeusedtobespentinstandingstillandinactionthaninactivity.
Now,although,asobservedintheprecedingchapterweseequiteadifferentcharacterinthepresentformofWar,stillitiscertainthatrealactionwillalwaysbeinterruptedmoreorlessbylongpauses;andthisleadstothenecessityofourexaminingmorecloselythenatureofthesetwophasesofWar.
IfthereisasuspensionofactioninWar,thatis,ifneitherpartywillssomethingpositive,thereisrest,andconsequentlyequili
ium,butcertainlyanequili
iuminthelargestsignification,inwhichnotonlythemoralandphysicalwar-forces,butallrelationsandinterests,comeintocalculation.Assoonaseveroneofthetwopartiesproposestohimselfanewpositiveobject,andcommencesactivestepstowardsit,evenifitisonlybypreparations,andassoonastheadversaryopposesthis,thereisatensionofpowers;thislastsuntilthedecisiontakesplace—thatis,untilonepartyeithergivesuphisobjectortheotherhasconcededittohim.
Thisdecision—thefoundationofwhichliesalwaysinthecombat—combinationswhicharemadeoneachside—isfollowedbyamovementinoneorotherdirection.
Whenthismovementhasexhausteditself,eitherinthedifficultieswhichhadtobemastered,inovercomingitsowninternalfriction,orthroughnewresistantforcespreparedbytheactsoftheenemy,theneitherastateofresttakesplaceoranewtensionwithadecision,andthenanewmovement,inmostcasesintheoppositedirection.
Thisspeculativedistinctionbetweenequili
ium,tension,andmotionismoreessentialforpracticalactionthanmayatfirstsightappear.
Inastateofrestandofequili
iumavariedkindofactivitymayprevailononesidethatresultsfromopportunity,anddoesnotaimatagreatalteration.Suchanactivitymaycontainimportantcombats—evenpitchedbattles—butyetitisstillofquiteadifferentnature,andonthataccountgenerallydifferentinitseffects.
Ifastateoftensionexists,theeffectsofthedecisionarealwaysgreaterpartlybecauseagreaterforceofwillandagreaterpressureofcircumstancesmanifestthemselvestherein;partlybecauseeverythinghasbeenpreparedandarrangedforagreatmovement.Thedecisioninsuchcasesresemblestheeffectofaminewellclosedandtamped,whilstaneventinitselfperhapsjustasgreat,inastateofrest,ismoreorlesslikeamassofpowderpuffedawayintheopenair.
Atthesametime,asamatterofcourse,thestateoftensionmustbeimaginedindifferentdegreesofintensity,anditmaythereforeapproachgraduallybymanystepstowardsthestateofrest,sothatatthelastthereisaveryslightdifferencebetweenthem.
Nowtherealusewhichwederivefromthesereflectionsistheconclusionthateverymeasurewhichistakenduringastateoftensionismoreimportantandmoreprolificinresultsthanthesamemeasurecouldbeinastateofequili
ium,andthatthisimportanceincreasesimmenselyinthehighestdegreesoftension.
ThecannonadeofValmy,September20,1792,decidedmorethanthebattleofHochkirch,October14,1758.
Inatractofcountrywhichtheenemyabandonstousbecausehecannotdefendit,wecansettleourselvesdifferentlyfromwhatweshoulddoiftheretreatoftheenemywasonlymadewiththeviewtoadecisionundermorefavourablecircumstances.Again,astrategicattackincourseofexecution,afaultyposition,asinglefalsemarch,maybedecisiveinitsconsequence;whilstinastateofequili
iumsucherrorsmustbeofaveryglaringkind,eventoexcitetheactivityoftheenemyinageneralway.
MostbygoneWars,aswehavealreadysaid,consisted,sofarasregardsthegreaterpartofthetime,inthisstateofequili
ium,oratleastinsuchshorttensionswithlongintervalsbetweenthem,andweakintheireffects,thattheeventstowhichtheygaverisewereseldomgreatsuccesses,oftentheyweretheatricalexhibitions,gotupinhonourofaroyalbirthday(Hochkirch),oftenameresatisfyingofthehonourofthearms(Kunersdorf),orthepersonalvanityofthecommander(Freiberg).
ThataCommandershouldthoroughlyunderstandthesestates,thatheshouldhavethetacttoactinthespiritofthem,weholdtobeagreatrequisite,andwehavehadexperienceinthecampaignof1806howfaritissometimeswanting.Inthattremendoustension,wheneverythingpressedontowardsasupremedecision,andthatalonewithallitsconsequencesshouldhaveoccupiedthewholesouloftheCommander,measureswereproposedandevenpartlycarriedout(suchasthereconnaissancetowardsFranconia),whichatthemostmighthavegivenakindofgentleplayofoscillationwithinastateofequili
ium.Overtheseblunderingschemesandviews,absorbingtheactivityoftheArmy,thereallynecessarymeans,whichcouldalonesave,werelostsightof.
Butthisspeculativedistinctionwhichwehavemadeisalsonecessaryforourfurtherprogressintheconstructionofourtheory,becauseallthatwehavetosayontherelationofattackanddefence,andonthecompletionofthisdouble-sidedact,concernsthestateofthecrisisinwhichtheforcesareplacedduringthetensionandmotion,andbecausealltheactivitywhichcantakeplaceduringtheconditionofequili
iumcanonlyberegardedandtreatedasacorollary;forthatcrisisistherealWarandthisstateofequili
iumonlyitsreflection. 蓝星，夏国。
肿瘤科病房，弥漫着医院独有的消毒水味道。病房是单人间，设施俱全，温馨舒适。
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可对于孑然一身的路遥来讲，却是无人问津的等死之地。
他是癌症晚期，靠着意志力撑到现在，但也只是多受几天罪罢了。
此刻，路遥躺在病床上，怔怔望着床头柜上的水杯，想喝口水。
可他拼尽全力却无法让身体离开病床。剧痛和衰弱，让这原本无比简单的事情成了奢望。
这时，一道幸灾乐祸的声音响起：“表哥~你真是狼狈呢。连喝口水都得指望别人施舍。”
一位英俊的年轻男子悠闲坐在病床前，翘着二郎腿，眼睛笑成一道缝。
“你求求我，我给你喝口水如何？”
路遥面无表情，一言不发。自从失去了自理能力，一帮亲戚的嘴脸已经见多了，不差这一个。
男子起身，将水杯拿在手里递过来，“表哥别生气，我开玩笑的，你对我这么好，喂你口水还是能办到的。”
说完话，他将水杯里的水，缓缓倒在路遥苍白消瘦的脸上。
被呛到，路遥无力的咳嗽几声，好在少量的水流过嗓子，让他有了几丝说话的力气：
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“张鑫，为什么？我从未得罪过你。你去星盟国留学，还是我资助的！”
张鑫将水杯放下，不紧不慢的说：“谁让你这么古板呢，只是运点感冒药罢了，又不犯法，你非得千方百计的拦着。”
路遥脸上闪过一丝了然之色，道：“张鑫你这垃圾，狗改不了吃屎。将感冒药运到国外提炼毒品……咳咳……”
张鑫理了下领带，笑道：“你别血口喷人啊，我可是国际知名企业家。这次回国，‘省招商引资局’还打电话欢迎我呢~”
路遥叹了口气，现在的自己什么都做不了，索性闭上眼睛不再说话，安静等待死亡的到来。
但张鑫却不想让眼前饱受病痛折磨、即将离世的表兄走好。他附身靠近，悄悄说道：琇書蛧
“表哥啊~其实呢，我这次回国主要就是见你一面，告诉你一声——你的癌，是我弄出来的~”
路遥陡然挣开眼，“你说什么！”
张鑫笑眯眯的掏出个铅盒打开，里面是件古怪的三角形饰物，仅有巴掌大小，中间是只眼睛似的图案，一看就很有年代感。
“眼熟吧？这是我亲手送你的，货真价实的古董。我在里面掺了点放射性物质，长期接触就会变成你现在这副鬼样子。”
路遥马上认出来，这是自己很喜欢的一件古物，天天摆在书桌上，时不时的把玩，没想到却是要人命的东西！
他伸出枯枝似的手臂，死死的抓住眼前人的胳膊！“你……”
“别激动~表哥，我西装很贵的。”张鑫轻松拿掉路遥的手，小心的捏起铅盒，将放射性饰物塞进他怀里。
“我赶飞机，得先走一步。你好好留着这个当做纪念吧，有机会再去你的坟头蹦迪~”
说完话，张鑫从容起身离开。临走前，还回头俏皮的眨眨眼。他原本就男生女相，此时的神态动作居然有些娇媚。
保镖很有眼力劲，赶紧打开病房门。同时用无线耳麦联络同事，提前发动汽车。
~~~~~~~~
路遥只能无力的瘫在床上，浑身皆是钻心剜骨般的剧痛，还有无穷悔恨、不甘。
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但很快，剧痛渐渐消失，只剩麻木，路遥隐约听到过世的双亲在喊他。
就在路遥的身体越来越飘，即将失去意识时，胸口突然阵阵发烫，将他惊醒。
从怀中摸出那三角形饰物，发现这玩意变得滚烫无比，还在缓缓发光！
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