THEreaderexpectstohearofanglesandlines,andfinds,insteadofthesecitizensofthescientificworld,onlypeopleoutofcommonlife,suchashemeetswitheverydayinthestreet.Andyettheauthorcannotmakeuphismindtobecomeahair's
eadthmoremathematicalthanthesubjectseemstohimtorequire,andheisnotalarmedatthesurprisewhichthereadermayshow.
InWarmorethananywhereelseintheworldthingshappendifferentlytowhatwehadexpected,andlookdifferentlywhennear,towhattheydidatadistance.Withwhatserenitythearchitectcanwatchhisworkgraduallyrisingandgrowingintohisplan.Thedoctoralthoughmuchmoreatthemercyofmysteriousagenciesandchancesthanthearchitect,stillknowsenoughoftheformsandeffectsofhismeans.InWar,ontheotherhand,theCommanderofanimmensewholefindshimselfinaconstantwhirlpooloffalseandtrueinformation,ofmistakescommittedthroughfear,throughnegligence,throughprecipitation,ofcontraventionsofhisauthority,eitherfrommistakenorcorrectmotives,fromillwill,trueorfalsesenseofduty,indolenceorexhaustion,ofaccidentswhichnomortalcouldhaveforeseen.Inshort,heisthevictimofahundredthousandimpressions,ofwhichthemosthaveanintimidating,thefewestanencouragingtendency.BylongexperienceinWar,thetactisacquiredofreadilyappreciatingthevalueoftheseincidents;highcourageandstabilityofcharacterstandproofagainstthem,astherockresiststhebeatingofthewaves.Hewhowouldyieldtotheseimpressionswouldnevercarryoutanundertaking,andonthataccountPERSEVERANCEintheproposedobject,aslongasthereisnodecidedreasonagainstit,isamostnecessarycounterpoise.Further,thereishardlyanycele
atedenterpriseinWarwhichwasnotachievedbyendlessexertion,pains,andprivations;andasheretheweaknessofthephysicalandmoralmaniseverdisposedtoyield,onlyanimmenseforceofwill,whichmanifestsitselfinperseveranceadmiredbypresentandfuturegenerations,canconducttoourgoal.
CHAPTER8SUPERIORITYOFNUMBERS
THISisintactics,aswellasinStrategy,themostgeneralprincipleofvictory,andshallbeexaminedbyusfirstinitsgenerality,forwhichwemaybepermittedthefollowingexposition:
Strategyfixesthepointwhere,thetimewhen,andthenumericalforcewithwhichthebattleistobefought.Bythistripledeterminationithasthereforeaveryessentialinfluenceontheissueofthecombat.Iftacticshasfoughtthebattle,iftheresultisover,letitbevictoryordefeat,StrategymakessuchuseofitascanbemadeinaccordancewiththegreatobjectoftheWar.Thisobjectisnaturallyoftenaverydistantone,seldomdoesitliequitecloseathand.Aseriesofotherobjectssubordinatethemselvestoitasmeans.Theseobjects,whichareatthesametimemeanstoahigherpurpose,maybepracticallyofvariouskinds;eventheultimateaimofthewholeWarmaybeadifferentoneineverycase.Weshallmakeourselvesacquaintedwiththesethingsaccordingaswecometoknowtheseparateobjectswhichtheycome,incontactwith;anditisnotourintentionheretoem
acethewholesubjectbyacompleteenumerationofthem,evenifthatwerepossible.Wethereforelettheemploymentofthebattlestandoverforthepresent.
EventhosethingsthroughwhichStrategyhasaninfluenceontheissueofthecombat,inasmuchasitestablishesthesame,toacertainextentdecreesthem,arenotsosimplethattheycanbeem
acedinonesingleview.ForasStrategyappointstime,placeandforce,itcandosoinpracticeinmanyways,eachofwhichinfluencesinadifferentmannertheresultofthecombataswellasitsconsequences.Thereforeweshallonlygetacquaintedwiththisalsobydegrees,thatis,throughthesubjectswhichmorecloselydeterminetheapplication.
Ifwestripthecombatofallmodificationswhichitmayundergoaccordingtoitsimmediatepurposeandthecircumstancesfromwhichitproceeds,lastlyifwesetasidethevalourofthetroops,becausethatisagivenquantity,thenthereremainsonlythebareconceptionofthecombat,thatisacombatwithoutform,inwhichwedistinguishnothingbutthenumberofthecombatants.
Thisnumberwillthereforedeterminevictory.Nowfromthenumberofthingsabovedeductedtogettothispoint,itisshownthatthesuperiorityinnumbersinabattleisonlyoneofthefactorsemployedtoproducevictorythatthereforesofarfromhavingwiththesuperiorityinnumberobtainedall,orevenonlytheprincipalthing,wehaveperhapsgotverylittlebyit,accordingastheothercircumstanceswhichcooperatehappentovary.
Butthissuperiorityhasdegrees,itmaybeimaginedastwofold,threefoldorfourfold,andeveryonesees,thatbyincreasinginthisway,itmust(atlast)overpowereverythingelse.
Insuchanaspectwegrant,thatthesuperiorityinnumbersisthemostimportantfactorintheresultofacombat,onlyitmustbesufficientlygreattobeacounterpoisetoalltheotherco-operatingcircumstances.Thedirectresultofthisis,thatthegreatestpossiblenumberoftroopsshouldbe
oughtintoactionatthedecisivepoint.
Whetherthetroopsthus
oughtaresufficientornot,wehavethendoneinthisrespectallthatourmeansallowed.ThisisthefirstprincipleinStrategy,thereforeingeneralasnowstated,itisjustaswellsuitedforGreeksandPersians,orforEnglishmenandMahrattas,asforFrenchandGermans.ButweshalltakeaglanceatourrelationsinEurope,asrespectsWar,inordertoarriveatsomemoredefiniteideaonthissubject.
HerewefindArmiesmuchmorealikeinequipment,organisation,andpracticalskillofeverykind.ThereonlyremainsadifferenceinthemilitaryvirtueofArmies,andinthetalentofGeneralswhichmayfluctuatewithtimefromsidetoside.IfwegothroughthemilitaryhistoryofmodernEurope,wefindnoexampleofaMarathon.
FredericktheGreatbeat80,000AustriansatLeuthenwithabout30,000men,andatRosbachwith25,000some50,000allies;thesearehowevertheonlyinstancesofvictoriesgainedagainstanenemydouble,ormorethandoubleinnumbers.CharlesXII,inthebattleofNarva,wecannotwellquote,fortheRussianswereatthattimehardlytoberegardedasEuropeans,alsotheprincipalcircumstances,evenofthebattle,aretoolittleknown.BuonapartehadatDresden120,000against220,000,thereforenotthedouble.AtKollin,FredericktheGreatdidnotsucceed,with30,000against50,000Austrians,neitherdidBuonaparteinthedesperatebattleofLeipsic,wherehewas160,000strong,against280,000.
Fromthiswemayinfer,thatitisverydifficultinthepresentstateofEurope,forthemosttalentedGeneraltogainavictoryoveranenemydoublehisstrength.NowifweseedoublenumbersprovesuchaweightinthescaleagainstthegreatestGenerals,wemaybesure,thatinordinarycases,insmallaswellasgreatcombats,animportantsuperiorityofnumbers,butwhichneednotbeovertwotoone,willbesufficienttoensurethevictory,howeverdisadvantageousothercircumstancesmaybe.Certainly,wemayimagineadefilewhicheventenfoldwouldnotsufficetoforce,butinsuchacaseitcanbenoquestionofabattleatall.
Wethink,therefore,thatunderourconditions,aswellasinallsimilarones,thesuperiorityatthedecisivepointisamatterofcapitalimportance,andthatthissubject,inthegeneralityofcases,isdecidedlythemostimportantofall.ThestrengthatthedecisivepointdependsontheabsolutestrengthoftheArmy,andonskillinmakinguseofit.
ThefirstruleisthereforetoenterthefieldwithanArmyasstrongaspossible.Thissoundsverylikeacommonplace,butstillitisreallynotso.
Inordertoshowthatforalongtimethestrengthofforceswasbynomeansregardedasachiefpoint,weneedonlyobserve,thatinmost,andeveninthemostdetailedhistoriesoftheWarsintheeighteenthcentury,thestrengthoftheArmiesiseithernotgivenatall,oronlyincidentally,andinnocaseisanyspecialvaluelaiduponit.TempelhofinhishistoryoftheSevenYears'Waristheearliestwriterwhogivesitregularly,butatthesametimehedoesitonlyverysuperficially.
EvenMassenbach,inhismanifoldcriticalobservationsonthePrussiancampaignsof1793-94intheVosges,talksagreatdealabouthillsandvalleys,roadsandfootpaths,butdoesnotsayasyllableaboutmutualstrength.
Anotherproofliesinawonderfulnotionwhichhauntedtheheadsofmanycriticalhistorians,accordingtowhichtherewasacertainsizeofanArmywhichwasthebest,anormalstrength,beyondwhichtheforcesinexcesswereburdensomeratherthanserviceable.
Lastly,thereareanumberofinstancestobefound,inwhichalltheavailableforceswerenotreally
oughtintothebattle,orintotheWar,becausethesuperiorityofnumberswasnotconsideredtohavethatimportancewhichinthenatureofthingsbelongstoit.
Ifwearethoroughlypenetratedwiththeconvictionthatwithaconsiderablesuperiorityofnumberseverythingpossibleistobeeffected,thenitcannotfailthatthisclearconvictionreactsonthepreparationsfortheWar,soastomakeusappearinthefieldwithasmanytroopsaspossible,andeithertogiveusourselvesthesuperiority,oratleasttoguardagainsttheenemyobtainingit.SomuchforwhatconcernstheabsoluteforcewithwhichtheWaristobeconducted.
ThemeasureofthisabsoluteforceisdeterminedbytheGovernment;andalthoughwiththisdeterminationtherealactionofWarcommences,anditformsanessentialpartoftheStrategyoftheWar,stillinmostcasestheGeneralwhoistocommandtheseforcesintheWarmustregardtheirabsolutestrengthasagivenquantity,whetheritbethathehashadnovoiceinfixingit,orthatcircumstancespreventedasufficientexpansionbeinggiventoit.
Thereremainsnothing,therefore,whereanabsolutesuperiorityisnotattainable,buttoproducearelativeoneatthedecisivepoint,bymakingskilfuluseofwhatwehave.
Thecalculationofspaceandtimeappearsasthemostessentialthingtothisend—andthishascausedthatsubjecttoberegardedasonewhichem
acesnearlythewholeartofusingmilitaryforces.Indeed,somehavegonesofarastoascribetogreatstrategistsandtacticiansamentalorganpeculiarlyadaptedtothispoint.
Butthecalculationoftimeandspace,althoughitliesuniversallyatthefoundationofStrategy,andistoacertainextentitsdaily
ead,isstillneitherthemostdifficult,northemostdecisiveone.
Ifwetakeanunprejudicedglanceatmilitaryhistory,weshallfindthattheinstancesinwhichmistakesinsuchacalculationhaveprovedthecauseofseriouslossesareveryrare,atleastinStrategy.ButiftheconceptionofaskilfulcombinationoftimeandspaceisfullytoaccountforeveryinstanceofaresoluteandactiveCommanderbeatingseveralseparateopponentswithoneandthesamearmy(FredericktheGreat,Buonaparte),thenweperplexourselvesunnecessarilywithconventionallanguage.Forthesakeofclearnessandtheprofitableuseofconceptions,itisnecessarythatthingsshouldalwaysbecalledbytheirrightnames.
Therightappreciationoftheiropponents(Daun,Schwartzenberg),theaudacitytoleaveforashortspaceoftimeasmallforceonlybeforethem,energyinforcedmarches,boldnessinsuddenattacks,theintensifiedactivitywhichgreatsoulsacquireinthemomentofdanger,thesearethegroundsofsuchvictories;andwhathavethesetodowiththeabilitytomakeanexactcalculationoftwosuchsimplethingsastimeandspace?
Buteventhisricochettingplayofforces,"whenthevictoriesatRosbachandMontmirailgivetheimpulsetovictoriesatLeuthenandMontereau,"towhichgreatGeneralsonthedefensivehaveoftentrusted,isstill,ifwewouldbeclearandexact,onlyarareoccurrenceinhistory.
Muchmorefrequentlytherelativesuperiority—thatis,theskilfulassemblageofsuperiorforcesatthedecisivepoint—hasitsfoundationintherightappreciationofthosepoints,inthejudiciousdirectionwhichbythatmeanshasbeengiventotheforcesfromtheveryfirst,andintheresolutionrequiredtosacrificetheunimportanttotheadvantageoftheimportant—thatis,tokeeptheforcesconcentratedinanoverpoweringmass.Inthis,FredericktheGreatandBuonaparteareparticularlycharacteristic.
Wethinkwehavenowallottedtothesuperiorityinnumberstheimportancewhichbelongstoit;itistoberegardedasthefundamentalidea,alwaystobeaimedatbeforeallandasfaraspossible.
Buttoregarditonthisaccountasanecessaryconditionofvictorywouldbeacompletemisconceptionofourexposition;intheconclusiontobedrawnfromitthereliesnothingmorethanthevaluewhichshouldattachtonumericalstrengthinthecombat.Ifthatstrengthismadeasgreataspossible,thenthemaximissatisfied;areviewofthetotalrelationsmustthendecidewhetherornotthecombatistobeavoidedforwantofsufficientforce.
CHAPTER9THESURPRISE
FROMthesubjectoftheforegoingchapter,thegeneralendeavourtoattainarelativesuperiority,therefollowsanotherendeavourwhichmustconsequentlybejustasgeneralinitsnature:thisistheSURPRISEoftheenemy.Itliesmoreorlessatthefoundationofallundertakings,forwithoutitthepreponderanceatthedecisivepointisnotproperlyconceivable.
Thesurpriseis,therefore,notonlythemeanstotheattainmentofnumericalsuperiority;butitisalsotoberegardedasasubstantiveprincipleinitself,onaccountofitsmoraleffect.Whenitissuccessfulinahighdegree,confusionand
okencourageintheenemy'sranksaretheconsequences;andofthedegreetowhichthesemultiplyasuccess,thereareexamplesenough,greatandsmall.Wearenotnowspeakingoftheparticularsurprisewhichbelongstotheattack,butoftheendeavourbymeasuresgenerally,andespeciallybythedistributionofforces,tosurprisetheenemy,whichcanbeimaginedjustaswellinthedefensive,andwhichinthetacticaldefenceparticularlyisachiefpoint.
Wesay,surpriseliesatthefoundationofallundertakingswithoutexception,onlyinverydifferentdegreesaccordingtothenatureoftheundertakingandothercircumstances.
Thisdifference,indeed,originatesinthepropertiesorpeculiaritiesoftheArmyanditsCommander,inthoseevenoftheGovernment.
SecrecyandrapidityarethetwofactorsinthisproductandthesesupposeintheGovernmentandtheCommander-in-Chiefgreatenergy,andonthepartoftheArmyahighsenseofmilitaryduty.Witheffeminacyandlooseprinciplesitisinvaintocalculateuponasurprise.Butsogeneral,indeedsoindispensable,asisthisendeavour,andtrueasitisthatitisneverwhollyunproductiveofeffect,stillitisnotthelesstruethatitseldomsucceedstoaREMARKABLEdegree,andthisfollowsfromthenatureoftheideaitself.WeshouldformanerroneousconceptionifwebelievedthatbythismeanschieflythereismuchtobeattainedinWar.Inideaitpromisesagreatdeal;intheexecutionitgenerallysticksfastbythefrictionofthewholemachine.
Intacticsthesurpriseismuchmoreathome,fortheverynaturalreasonthatalltimesandspacesareonasmallerscale.Itwill,therefore,inStrategybethemorefeasibleinproportionasthemeasureslienearertotheprovinceoftactics,andmoredifficultthehigheruptheylietowardstheprovinceofpolicy.
ThepreparationsforaWarusuallyoccupyseveralmonths;theassemblyofanArmyatitsprincipalpositionsrequiresgenerallytheformationofdep?tsandmagazines,andlongmarches,theobjectofwhichcanbeguessedsoonenough.
ItthereforerarelyhappensthatoneStatesurprisesanotherbyaWar,orbythedirectionwhichitgivesthemassofitsforces.Intheseventeenthandeighteenthcenturies,whenWarturnedverymuchuponsieges,itwasafrequentaim,andquiteapeculiarandimportantchapterintheArtofWar,toinvestastrongplaceunexpectedly,buteventhatonlyrarelysucceeded.
Ontheotherhand,withthingswhichcanbedoneinadayortwo,asurpriseismuchmoreconceivable,and,therefore,alsoitisoftennotdifficultthustogainamarchupontheenemy,andtherebyaposition,apointofcountry,aroad,&c.Butitisevidentthatwhatsurprisegainsinthiswayineasyexecution,itlosesintheefficacy,asthegreatertheefficacythegreateralwaysthedifficultyofexecution.Whoeverthinksthatwithsuchsurprisesonasmallscale,hemayconnectgreatresults—as,forexample,thegainofabattle,thecaptureofanimportantmagazine—believesinsomethingwhichitiscertainlyverypossibletoimagine,butforwhichthereisnowarrantinhistory;forthereareuponthewholeveryfewinstanceswhereanythinggreathasresultedfromsuchsurprises;fromwhichwemayjustlyconcludethatinherentdifficultieslieinthewayoftheirsuccess.
Certainly,whoeverwouldconsulthistoryonsuchpointsmustnotdependonsundrybattlesteedsofhistoricalcritics,ontheirwisedictaandselfcomplacentterminology,butlookatfactswithhisowneyes.Thereis,forinstance,acertaindayinthecampaigninSilesia,1761,which,inthisrespect,hasattainedakindofnotoriety.Itisthe22ndJuly,onwhichFredericktheGreatgainedonLaudonthemarchtoNossen,nearNeisse,bywhich,asissaid,thejunctionoftheAustrianandRussianarmiesinUpperSilesiabecameimpossible,and,therefore,aperiodoffourweekswasgainedbytheKing.Whoeverreadsoverthisoccurrencecarefullyintheprincipalhistories,andconsidersitimpartially,will,inthemarchofthe22ndJuly,neverfindthisimportance;andgenerallyinthewholeofthefashionablelogiconthissubject,hewillseenothingbutcontradictions;butintheproceedingsofLaudon,inthisrenownedperiodofmanoeuvres,muchthatisunaccountable.Howcouldone,withathirstfortruth,andclearconviction,acceptsuchhistoricalevidence?
Whenwepromiseourselvesgreateffectsinacampaignfromtheprincipleofsurprising,wethinkupongreatactivity,rapidresolutions,andforcedmarches,asthemeansofproducingthem;butthatthesethings,evenwhenforthcominginaveryhighdegree,willnotalwaysproducethedesiredeffect,weseeinexamplesgivenbyGenerals,whomaybeallowedtohavehadthegreatesttalentintheuseofthesemeans,FredericktheGreatandBuonaparte.ThefirstwhenheleftDresdensosuddenlyinJuly1760,andfallinguponLascy,thenturnedagainstDresden,gainednothingbythewholeofthatintermezzo,butratherplacedhisaffairsinaconditionnotablyworse,asthefortressGlatzfellinthemeantime.
In1813,BuonaparteturnedsuddenlyfromDresdentwiceagainstBluecher,tosaynothingofhisincursionintoBohemiafromUpperLusatia,andbothtimeswithoutintheleastattaininghisobject.Theywereblowsintheairwhichonlycosthimtimeandforce,andmighthaveplacedhiminadangerouspositioninDresden.
Therefore,eveninthisfield,asurprisedoesnotnecessarilymeetwithgreatsuccessthroughthemereactivity,energy,andresolutionoftheCommander;itmustbefavouredbyothercircumstances.Butwebynomeansdenythattherecanbesuccess;weonlyconnectwithitanecessityoffavourablecircumstances,which,certainlydonotoccurveryfrequently,andwhichtheCommandercanseldom
ingabouthimself.
JustthosetwoGeneralsaffordeachastrikingillustrationofthis.WetakefirstBuonaparteinhisfamousenterpriseagainstBluecher'sArmyinFe
uary1814,whenitwasseparatedfromtheGrandArmy,anddescendingtheMarne.Itwouldnotbeeasytofindatwodays'marchtosurprisetheenemyproductiveofgreaterresultsthanthis;Bluecher'sArmy,extendedoveradistanceofthreedays'march,wasbeatenindetail,andsufferedalossnearlyequaltothatofdefeatinagreatbattle.Thiswascompletelytheeffectofasurprise,forifBluecherhadthoughtofsuchanearpossibilityofanattackfromBuonapartehewouldhaveorganisedhismarchquitedifferently.TothismistakeofBluecher'stheresultistobeattributed.Buonapartedidnotknowallthesecircumstances,andsotherewasapieceofgoodfortunethatmixeditselfupinhisfavour.
ItisthesamewiththebattleofLiegnitz,1760.FredericktheGreatgainedthisfinevictorythroughalteringduringthenightapositionwhichhehadjustbeforetakenup.Laudonwasthroughthiscompletelysurprised,andlost70piecesofartilleryand10,000men.AlthoughFredericktheGreathadatthistimeadoptedtheprincipleofmovingbackwardsandforwardsinordertomakeabattleimpossible,oratleasttodisconcerttheenemy'splans,stillthealterationofpositiononthenightofthe14-15wasnotmadeexactlywiththatintention,butastheKinghimselfsays,becausethepositionofthe14thdidnotpleasehim.Here,therefore,alsochancewashardatwork;withoutthishappyconjunctionoftheattackandthechangeofpositioninthenight,andthedifficultnatureofthecountry,theresultwouldnothavebeenthesame.
AlsointhehigherandhighestprovinceofStrategytherearesomeinstancesofsurprisesfruitfulinresults.Weshallonlycitethe
illiantmarchesoftheGreatElectoragainsttheSwedesfromFranconiatoPomeraniaandfromtheMark(
andenburg)tothePregelin1757,andthecele
atedpassageoftheAlpsbyBuonaparte,1800.InthelattercaseanArmygaveupitswholetheatreofwarbyacapitulation,andin1757anotherArmywasveryneargivingupitstheatreofwaranditselfaswell.Lastly,asaninstanceofaWarwhollyunexpected,wemay
ingforwardtheinvasionofSilesiabyFredericktheGreat.Greatandpowerfulareheretheresultseverywhere,butsucheventsarenotcommoninhistoryifwedonotconfusewiththemcasesinwhichaState,forwantofactivityandenergy(Saxony1756,andRussia,1812),hasnotcompleteditspreparationsintime.
Nowtherestillremainsanobservationwhichconcernstheessenceofthething.Asurprisecanonlybeeffectedbythatpartywhichgivesthelawtotheother;andhewhoisintherightgivesthelaw.Ifwesurprisetheadversarybyawrongmeasure,theninsteadofreapinggoodresults,wemayhavetobearasoundblowinreturn;inanycasetheadversaryneednottroublehimselfmuchaboutoursurprise,hehasinourmistakethemeansofturningofftheevil.Astheoffensiveincludesinitselfmuchmorepositiveactionthanthedefensive,sothesurpriseiscertainlymoreinitsplacewiththeassailant,butbynomeansinvariably,asweshallhereaftersee.Mutualsurprisesbytheoffensiveanddefensivemaythereforemeet,andthenthatonewillhavetheadvantagewhohashitthenailontheheadthebest.
Soshoulditbe,butpracticallifedoesnotkeeptothislinesoexactly,andthatforaverysimplereason.Themoraleffectswhichattendasurpriseoftenconverttheworstcaseintoagoodoneforthesidetheyfavour,anddonotallowtheothertomakeanyregulardetermination.WehavehereinviewmorethananywhereelsenotonlythechiefCommander,buteachsingleone,becauseasurprisehastheeffectinparticularofgreatlylooseningunity,sothattheindividualityofeachseparateleadereasilycomestolight.
Muchdependshereonthegeneralrelationinwhichthetwopartiesstandtoeachother.Iftheonesidethroughageneralmoralsuperioritycanintimidateandoutdotheother,thenhecanmakeuseofthesurprisewithmoresuccess,andevenreapgoodfruitwhereproperlyheshouldcometoruin.
CHAPTER10STRATAGEM
STRATAGEMimpliesaconcealedintention,andthereforeisopposedtostraightforwarddealing,inthesamewayaswitistheoppositeofdirectproof.Ithasthereforenothingincommonwithmeansofpersuasion,ofself-interest,offorce,butagreatdealtodowithdeceit,becausethatlikewiseconcealsitsobject.Itisitselfadeceitaswellwhenitisdone,butstillitdiffersfromwhatiscommonlycalleddeceit,inthisrespectthatthereisnodirect
eachofword.Thedeceiverbystratagemleavesittothepersonhimselfwhomheisdeceivingtocommittheerrorsofunderstandingwhichatlast,flowingintoONEresult,suddenlychangethenatureofthingsinhiseyes.Wemaythereforesay,asnitisasleightofhandwithideasandconceptions,sostratagemisasleightofhandwithactions.
AtfirstsightitappearsasifStrategyhadnotimproperlyderiveditsnamefromstratagem;andthat,withalltherealandapparentchangeswhichthewholecharacterofWarhasundergonesincethetimeoftheGreeks,thistermstillpointstoitsrealnature.
Ifweleavetotacticstheactualdeliveryoftheblow,thebattleitself,andlookuponStrategyastheartofusingthismeanswithskill,thenbesidestheforcesofthecharacter,suchasburningambitionwhichalwayspresseslikeaspring,astrongwillwhichhardlybends&c.&c.,thereseemsnosubjectivequalitysosuitedtoguideandinspirestrategicactivityasstratagem.Thegeneraltendencytosurprise,treatedofintheforegoingchapter,pointstothisconclusion,forthereisadegreeofstratagem,beiteversosmall,whichliesatthefoundationofeveryattempttosurprise.
ButhowevermuchwefeeladesiretoseetheactorsinWaroutdoeachotherinhiddenactivity,readiness,andstratagem,stillwemustadmitthatthesequalitiesshowthemselvesbutlittleinhistory,andhaverarelybeenabletoworktheirwaytothesurfacefromamongstthemassofrelationsandcircumstances.
Theexplanationofthisisobvious,anditisalmostidenticalwiththesubjectmatteroftheprecedingchapter.
Strategyknowsnootheractivitythantheregulatingofcombatwiththemeasureswhichrelatetoit.Ithasnoconcern,likeordinarylife,withtransactionswhichconsistmerelyofwords—thatis,inexpressions,declarations,&c.Butthese,whichareveryinexpensive,arechieflythemeanswithwhichthewilyonetakesinthosehepractisesupon.
ThatwhichthereislikeitinWar,plansandordersgivenmerelyasmake-believers,falsereportssentonpurposetotheenemy—isusuallyofsolittleeffectinthestrategicfieldthatitisonlyresortedtoinparticularcaseswhichofferofthemselves,thereforecannotberegardedasspontaneousactionwhichemanatesfromtheleader.
Butsuchmeasuresascarryingoutthearrangementsforabattle,sofarastoimposeupontheenemy,requireaconsiderableexpenditureoftimeandpower;ofcourse,thegreatertheimpressiontobemade,thegreatertheexpenditureintheserespects.Andasthisisusuallynotgivenforthepurpose,veryfewdemonstrations,so-called,inStrategy,effecttheobjectforwhichtheyaredesigned.Infact,itisdangeroustodetachlargeforcesforanylengthoftimemerelyforatrick,becausethereisalwaystheriskofitsbeingdoneinvain,andthentheseforcesarewantedatthedecisivepoint.
ThechiefactorinWarisalwaysthoroughlysensibleofthissobertruth,andthereforehehasnodesiretoplayattricksofagility.Thebitterearnestnessofnecessitypressessofullyintodirectactionthatthereisnoroomforthatgame.Inaword,thepiecesonthestrategicalchess-boardwantthatmobilitywhichistheelementofstratagemandsubtility.
Theconclusionwhichwedraw,isthatacorrectandpenetratingeyeisamorenecessaryandmoreusefulqualityforaGeneralthancraftiness,althoughthatalsodoesnoharmifitdoesnotexistattheexpenseofnecessaryqualitiesoftheheart,whichisonlytoooftenthecase.
ButtheweakertheforcesbecomewhichareunderthecommandofStrategy,somuchthemoretheybecomeadaptedforstratagem,sothattothequitefeebleandlittle,forwhomnoprudence,nosagacityisanylongersufficientatthepointwhereallartseemstoforsakehim,stratagemoffersitselfasalastresource.Themorehelplesshissituation,themoreeverythingpressestowardsonesingle,desperateblow,themorereadilystratagemcomestotheaidofhisboldness.Letloosefromallfurthercalculations,freedfromallconcernforthefuture,boldnessandstratagemintensifyeachother,andthuscollectatonepointaninfinitesimalglimmeringofhopeintoasingleray,whichmaylikewiseservetokindleaflame.
CHAPTER11ASSEMBLYOFFORCESINSPACE
THEbestStrategyisALWAYSTOBEVERYSTRONG,firstgenerallythenatthedecisivepoint.Therefore,apartfromtheenergywhichcreatestheArmy,aworkwhichisnotalwaysdonebytheGeneral,thereisnomoreimperativeandnosimplerlawforStrategythantoKEEPTHEFORCESCONCENTRATED.—Noportionistobeseparatedfromthemainbodyunlesscalledawaybysomeurgentnecessity.Onthismaximwestandfirm,andlookuponitasaguidetobedependedupon.Whatarethereasonablegroundsonwhichadetachmentofforcesmaybemadeweshalllearnbydegrees.ThenweshallalsoseethatthisprinciplecannothavethesamegeneraleffectsineveryWar,butthatthesearedifferentaccordingtothemeansandend.
Itseemsincredible,andyetithashappenedahundredtimes,thattroopshavebeendividedandseparatedmerelythroughamysteriousfeelingofconventionalmanner,withoutanyclearperceptionofthereason.
Iftheconcentrationofthewholeforceisacknowledgedasthenorm,andeverydivisionandseparationasanexceptionwhichmustbejustified,thennotonlywillthatfollybecompletelyavoided,butalsomanyanerroneousgroundforseparatingtroopswillbebarredadmission.
CHAPTER12ASSEMBLYOFFORCESINTIME
WEhaveheretodealwithaconceptionwhichinreallifediffusesmanykindsofillusorylight.Acleardefinitionanddevelopmentoftheideaisthereforenecessary,andwehopetobeallowedashortanalysis.
Waristheshockoftwoopposingforcesincollisionwitheachother,fromwhichitfollowsasamatterofcoursethatthestrongernotonlydestroystheother,butcarriesitforwardwithitinitsmovement.Thisfundamentallyadmitsofnosuccessiveactionofpowers,butmakesthesimultaneousapplicationofallforcesintendedfortheshockappearasaprimordiallawofWar.
Soitisinreality,butonlysofarasthestruggleresemblesalsoinpracticeamechanicalshock,butwhenitconsistsinalasting,mutualactionofdestructiveforces,thenwecancertainlyimagineasuccessiveactionofforces.Thisisthecaseintactics,principallybecausefirearmsformthebasisofalltactics,butalsoforotherreasonsaswell.Ifinafirecombat1000menareopposedto500,thenthegrosslossiscalculatedfromtheamountoftheenemy'sforceandourown;1000menfiretwiceasmanyshotsas500,butmoreshotswilltakeeffectonthe1000thanonthe500becauseitisassumedthattheystandincloserorderthantheother.Ifweweretosupposethenumberofhitstobedouble,thenthelossesoneachsidewouldbeequal.Fromthe500therewouldbeforexample200disabled,andoutofthebodyof1000likewisethesame;nowifthe500hadkeptanotherbodyofequalnumberquiteoutoffire,thenbothsideswouldhave800effectivemen;butofthese,ontheonesidetherewouldbe500menquitefresh,fullysuppliedwithammunition,andintheirfullvigour;ontheothersideonly800allalikeshakenintheirorder,inwantofsufficientammunitionandweakenedinphysicalforce.Theassumptionthatthe1000menmerelyonaccountoftheirgreaternumberwouldlosetwiceasmanyas500wouldhavelostintheirplace,iscertainlynotcorrect;thereforethegreaterlosswhichthesidesuffersthathasplacedthehalfofitsforceinreserve,mustberegardedasadisadvantageinthatoriginalformation;furtheritmustbeadmitted,thatinthegeneralityofcasesthe1000menwouldhavetheadvantageatthefirstcommencementofbeingabletodrivetheiropponentoutofhispositionandforcehimtoaretrogrademovement;now,whetherthesetwoadvantagesareacounterpoisetothedisadvantageoffindingourselveswith800mentoacertainextentdisorganisedbythecombat,opposedtoanenemywhoisnotmateriallyweakerinnumbersandwhohas500quitefreshtroops,isonethatcannotbedecidedbypursuingananalysisfurther,wemusthererelyuponexperience,andtherewillscarcelybeanofficerexperiencedinWarwhowillnotinthegeneralityofcasesassigntheadvantagetothatsidewhichhasthefreshtroops.
Inthiswayitbecomesevidenthowtheemploymentoftoomanyforcesincombatmaybedisadvantageous;forwhateveradvantagesthesuperioritymaygiveinthefirstmoment,wemayhavetopaydearlyforinthenext.
Butthisdangeronlyenduresaslongasthedisorder,thestateofconfusionandweaknesslasts,inaword,uptothecrisiswhicheverycombat
ingswithitevenfortheconqueror.Withinthedurationofthisrelaxedstateofexhaustion,theappearanceofaproportionatenumberoffreshtroopsisdecisive.
Butwhenthisdisorderingeffectofvictorystops,andthereforeonlythemoralsuperiorityremainswhicheveryvictorygives,thenitisnolongerpossibleforfreshtroopstorestorethecombat,theywouldonlybecarriedalonginthegeneralmovement;abeatenArmycannotbe
oughtbacktovictoryadayafterbymeansofastrongreserve.Herewefindourselvesatthesourceofahighlymaterialdifferencebetweentacticsandstrategy.
Thetacticalresults,theresultswithinthefourcornersofthebattle,andbeforeitsclose,lieforthemostpartwithinthelimitsofthatperiodofdisorderandweakness.Butthestrategicresult,thatistosay,theresultofthetotalcombat,ofthevictoriesrealised,letthembesmallorgreat,liescompletely(beyond)outsideofthatperiod.Itisonlywhentheresultsofpartialcombatshaveboundthemselvestogetherintoanindependentwhole,thatthestrategicresultappears,butthen,thestateofcrisisisover,theforceshaveresumedtheiroriginalform,andarenowonlyweakenedtotheextentofthoseactuallydestroyed(placedhorsdecombat).
Theconsequenceofthisdifferenceis,thattacticscanmakeacontinueduseofforces,Strategyonlyasimultaneousone.
IfIcannot,intactics,decideallbythefirstsuccess,ifIhavetofearthenextmoment,itfollowsofitselfthatIemployonlysomuchofmyforceforthesuccessofthefirstmomentasappearssufficientforthatobject,andkeeptherestbeyondthereachoffireorconflictofanykind,inordertobeabletoopposefreshtroopstofresh,orwithsuchtoovercomethosethatareexhausted.ButitisnotsoinStrategy.Partly,aswehavejustshown,ithasnotsomuchreasontofearareactionafterasuccessrealised,becausewiththatsuccessthecrisisstops;partlyalltheforcesstrategicallyemployedarenotnecessarilyweakened.Onlysomuchofthemashavebeentacticallyinconflictwiththeenemy'sforce,thatis,engagedinpartialcombat,areweakenedbyit;consequently,onlysomuchaswasunavoidablynecessary,butbynomeansallwhichwasstrategicallyinconflictwiththeenemy,unlesstacticshasexpendedthemunnecessarily.Corpswhich,onaccountofthegeneralsuperiorityinnumbers,haveeitherbeenlittleornotatallengaged,whosepresencealonehasassistedintheresult,areafterthedecisionthesameastheywerebefore,andfornewenterprisesasefficientasiftheyhadbeenentirelyinactive.Howgreatlysuchcorpswhichthusconstituteourexcessmaycontributetothetotalsuccessisevidentinitself;indeed,itisnotdifficulttoseehowtheymayevendiminishconsiderablythelossoftheforcesengagedintactical,conflictonourside.
If,therefore,inStrategythelossdoesnotincreasewiththenumberofthetroopsemployed,butisoftendiminishedbyit,andif,asanaturalconsequence,thedecisioninourfavoris,bythatmeans,themorecertain,thenitfollowsnaturallythatinStrategywecanneveremploytoomanyforces,andconsequentlyalsothattheymustbeappliedsimultaneouslytotheimmediatepurpose.
Butwemustvindicatethispropositionuponanotherground.Wehavehithertoonlyspokenofthecombatitself;itistherealactivityinWar,butmen,time,andspace,whichappearastheelementsofthisactivity,must,atthesametime,bekeptinview,andtheresultsoftheirinfluence
oughtintoconsiderationalso.
Fatigue,exertion,andprivationconstituteinWaraspecialprincipleofdestruction,notessentiallybelongingtocontest,butmoreorlessinseparablyboundupwithit,andcertainlyonewhichespeciallybelongstoStrategy.Theynodoubtexistintacticsaswell,andperhapsthereinthehighestdegree;butasthedurationofthetacticalactsisshorter,thereforethesmalleffectsofexertionandprivationonthemcancomebutlittleintoconsideration.ButinStrategyontheotherhand,wheretimeandspace,areonalargerscale,theirinfluenceisnotonlyalwaysveryconsiderable,butoftenquitedecisive.ItisnotatalluncommonforavictoriousArmytolosemanymorebysicknessthanonthefieldofbattle.wＷＷ.ΧìǔΜЬ.ＣǒΜ
If,therefore,welookatthissphereofdestructioninStrategyinthesamemanneraswehaveconsideredthatoffireandclosecombatintactics,thenwemaywellimaginethateverythingwhichcomeswithinitsvortexwill,attheendofthecampaignorofanyotherstrategicperiod,bereducedtoastateofweakness,whichmakesthearrivalofafreshforcedecisive.Wemightthereforeconcludethatthereisamotiveintheonecaseaswellastheothertostriveforthefirstsuccesswithasfewforcesaspossible,inordertokeepupthisfreshforceforthelast.
Inordertoestimateexactlythisconclusion,which,inmanycasesinpractice,willhaveagreatappearanceoftruth,wemustdirectourattentiontotheseparateideaswhichitcontains.Inthefirstplace,wemustnotconfusethenotionofreinforcementwiththatoffreshunusedtroops.Therearefewcampaignsattheendofwhichanincreaseofforceisnotearnestlydesiredbytheconqueroraswellastheconquered,andindeedshouldappeardecisive;butthatisnotthepointhere,forthatincreaseofforcecouldnotbenecessaryiftheforcehadbeensomuchlargeratthefirst.ButitwouldbecontrarytoallexperiencetosupposethatanArmycomingfreshintothefieldistobeesteemedhigherinpointofmoralvaluethananArmyalreadyinthefield,justasatacticalreserveismoretobeesteemedthanabodyoftroopswhichhasbeenalreadyseverelyhandledinthefight.JustasmuchasanunfortunatecampaignlowersthecourageandmoralpowersofanArmy,asuccessfuloneraisestheseelementsintheirvalue.Inthegeneralityofcases,therefore,theseinfluencesarecompensated,andthenthereremainsoverandaboveascleargainthehabituationtoWar.Weshouldbesideslookmoreheretosuccessfulthantounsuccessfulcampaigns,becausewhenthegreaterprobabilityofthelattermaybeseenbeforehand,withoutdoubtforcesarewanted,and,therefore,thereservingaportionforfutureuseisoutofthequestion.
Thispointbeingsettled,thenthequestionis,Dothelosseswhichaforcesustainsthroughfatiguesandprivationsincreaseinproportiontothesizeoftheforce,asisthecaseinacombat?Andtothatweanswer"No."
ThefatiguesofWarresultinagreatmeasurefromthedangerswithwhicheverymomentoftheactofWarismoreorlessimpregnated.Toencounterthesedangersatallpoints,toproceedonwardswithsecurityintheexecutionofone'splans,givesemploymenttoamultitudeofagencieswhichmakeupthetacticalandstrategicserviceoftheArmy.ThisserviceismoredifficulttheweakeranArmyis,andeasierasitsnumericalsuperiorityoverthatoftheenemyincreases.Whocandoubtthis?Acampaignagainstamuchweakerenemywillthereforecostsmallereffortsthanagainstonejustasstrongorstronger.
Somuchforthefatigues.Itissomewhatdifferentwiththeprivations;theyconsistchieflyoftwothings,thewantoffood,andthewantofshelterforthetroops,eitherinquartersorinsuitablecamps.Boththesewantswillnodoubtbegreaterinproportionasthenumberofmenononespotisgreater.Butdoesnotthesuperiorityinforceaffordalsothebestmeansofspreadingoutandfindingmoreroom,andthereforemoremeansofsubsistenceandshelter?
IfBuonaparte,inhisinvasionofRussiain1812,concentratedhisArmyingreatmassesupononesingleroadinamannerneverheardofbefore,andthuscausedprivationsequallyunparalleled,wemustascribeittohismaximTHATITISIMPOSSIBLETOBETOOSTRONGATTHEDECISIVEPOINT.Whetherinthisinstancehedidnotstraintheprincipletoofarisaquestionwhichwouldbeoutofplacehere;butitiscertainthat,ifhehadmadeapointofavoidingthedistresswhichwasbythatmeans
oughtabout,hehadonlytoadvanceonagreater
eadthoffront.RoomwasnotwantedforthepurposeinRussia,andinveryfewcasescanitbewanted.Therefore,fromthisnogroundcanbededucedtoprovethatthesimultaneousemploymentofverysuperiorforcesmustproducegreaterweakening.Butnow,supposingthatinspiteofthegeneralreliefaffordedbysettingapartaportionoftheArmy,windandweatherandthetoilsofWarhadproducedadiminutionevenonthepartwhichasaspareforcehadbeenreservedforlateruse,stillwemusttakeacomprehensivegeneralviewofthewhole,andthereforeask,Willthisdiminutionofforcesufficetocounterbalancethegaininforces,whichwe,throughoursuperiorityinnumbers,maybeabletomakeinmorewaysthanone?
Buttherestillremainsamostimportantpointtobenoticed.Inapartialcombat,theforcerequiredtoobtainagreatresultcanbeapproximatelyestimatedwithoutmuchdifficulty,and,consequently,wecanformanideaofwhatissuperfluous.InStrategythismaybesaidtobeimpossible,becausethestrategicresulthasnosuchwell-definedobjectandnosuchcircumscribedlimitsasthetactical.Thuswhatcanbelookeduponintacticsasanexcessofpower,mustberegardedinStrategyasameanstogiveexpansiontosuccess,ifopportunityoffersforit;withthemagnitudeofthesuccessthegaininforceincreasesatthesametime,andinthiswaythesuperiorityofnumbersmaysoonreachapointwhichthemostcarefuleconomyofforcescouldneverhaveattained.
Bymeansofhisenormousnumericalsuperiority,BuonapartewasenabledtoreachMoscowin1812,andtotakethatcentralcapital.HadhebymeansofthissuperioritysucceededincompletelydefeatingtheRussianArmy,hewould,inallprobability,haveconcludedapeaceinMoscowwhichinanyotherwaywasmuchlessattainable.Thisexampleisusedtoexplaintheidea,nottoproveit,whichwouldrequireacircumstantialdemonstration,forwhichthisisnottheplace.
Allthesereflectionsbearmerelyupontheideaofasuccessiveemploymentofforces,andnotupontheconceptionofareserveproperlysocalled,whichthey,nodoubt,comeincontactwiththroughout,butwhich,asweshallseeinthefollowingchapter,isconnectedwithsomeotherconsiderations.
Whatwedesiretoestablishhereis,thatifintacticsthemilitaryforcethroughthemeredurationofactualemploymentsuffersadiminutionofpower,iftime,therefore,appearsasafactorintheresult,thisisnotthecaseinStrategyinamaterialdegree.ThedestructiveeffectswhicharealsoproducedupontheforcesinStrategybytime,arepartlydiminishedthroughtheirmass,partlymadegoodinotherways,and,therefore,inStrategyitcannotbeanobjecttomaketimeanallyonitsownaccountby
ingingtroopssuccessivelyintoaction.
Wesayon"itsownaccount,"fortheinfluencewhichtime,onaccountofothercircumstanceswhichit
ingsaboutbutwhicharedifferentfromitselfcanhave,indeedmustnecessarilyhave,foroneofthetwoparties,isquiteanotherthing,isanythingbutindifferentorunimportant,andwillbethesubjectofconsiderationhereafter.
Therulewhichwehavebeenseekingtosetforthis,therefore,thatallforceswhichareavailableanddestinedforastrategicobjectshouldbeSIMULTANEOUSLYappliedtoit;andthisapplicationwillbesomuchthemorecompletethemoreeverythingiscompressedintooneactandintoonemovement.
ButstillthereisinStrategyarenewalofeffortandapersistentactionwhich,asachiefmeanstowardstheultimatesuccess,ismoreparticularlynottobeoverlooked,itistheCONTINUALDEVELOPMENTOFNEWFORCES.Thisisalsothesubjectofanotherchapter,andweonlyrefertoithereinordertopreventthereaderfromhavingsomethinginviewofwhichwehavenotbeenspeaking.
Wenowturntoasubjectverycloselyconnectedwithourpresentconsiderations,whichmustbesettledbeforefulllightcanbethrownonthewhole,wemeantheSTRATEGICRESERVE. 蓝星，夏国。
肿瘤科病房，弥漫着医院独有的消毒水味道。病房是单人间，设施俱全，温馨舒适。
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可对于孑然一身的路遥来讲，却是无人问津的等死之地。
他是癌症晚期，靠着意志力撑到现在，但也只是多受几天罪罢了。
此刻，路遥躺在病床上，怔怔望着床头柜上的水杯，想喝口水。
可他拼尽全力却无法让身体离开病床。剧痛和衰弱，让这原本无比简单的事情成了奢望。
这时，一道幸灾乐祸的声音响起：“表哥~你真是狼狈呢。连喝口水都得指望别人施舍。”
一位英俊的年轻男子悠闲坐在病床前，翘着二郎腿，眼睛笑成一道缝。
“你求求我，我给你喝口水如何？”
路遥面无表情，一言不发。自从失去了自理能力，一帮亲戚的嘴脸已经见多了，不差这一个。
男子起身，将水杯拿在手里递过来，“表哥别生气，我开玩笑的，你对我这么好，喂你口水还是能办到的。”
说完话，他将水杯里的水，缓缓倒在路遥苍白消瘦的脸上。
被呛到，路遥无力的咳嗽几声，好在少量的水流过嗓子，让他有了几丝说话的力气：
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“张鑫，为什么？我从未得罪过你。你去星盟国留学，还是我资助的！”
张鑫将水杯放下，不紧不慢的说：“谁让你这么古板呢，只是运点感冒药罢了，又不犯法，你非得千方百计的拦着。”
路遥脸上闪过一丝了然之色，道：“张鑫你这垃圾，狗改不了吃屎。将感冒药运到国外提炼毒品……咳咳……”
张鑫理了下领带，笑道：“你别血口喷人啊，我可是国际知名企业家。这次回国，‘省招商引资局’还打电话欢迎我呢~”
路遥叹了口气，现在的自己什么都做不了，索性闭上眼睛不再说话，安静等待死亡的到来。
但张鑫却不想让眼前饱受病痛折磨、即将离世的表兄走好。他附身靠近，悄悄说道：琇書蛧
“表哥啊~其实呢，我这次回国主要就是见你一面，告诉你一声——你的癌，是我弄出来的~”
路遥陡然挣开眼，“你说什么！”
张鑫笑眯眯的掏出个铅盒打开，里面是件古怪的三角形饰物，仅有巴掌大小，中间是只眼睛似的图案，一看就很有年代感。
“眼熟吧？这是我亲手送你的，货真价实的古董。我在里面掺了点放射性物质，长期接触就会变成你现在这副鬼样子。”
路遥马上认出来，这是自己很喜欢的一件古物，天天摆在书桌上，时不时的把玩，没想到却是要人命的东西！
他伸出枯枝似的手臂，死死的抓住眼前人的胳膊！“你……”
“别激动~表哥，我西装很贵的。”张鑫轻松拿掉路遥的手，小心的捏起铅盒，将放射性饰物塞进他怀里。
“我赶飞机，得先走一步。你好好留着这个当做纪念吧，有机会再去你的坟头蹦迪~”
说完话，张鑫从容起身离开。临走前，还回头俏皮的眨眨眼。他原本就男生女相，此时的神态动作居然有些娇媚。
保镖很有眼力劲，赶紧打开病房门。同时用无线耳麦联络同事，提前发动汽车。
~~~~~~~~
路遥只能无力的瘫在床上，浑身皆是钻心剜骨般的剧痛，还有无穷悔恨、不甘。
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但很快，剧痛渐渐消失，只剩麻木，路遥隐约听到过世的双亲在喊他。
就在路遥的身体越来越飘，即将失去意识时，胸口突然阵阵发烫，将他惊醒。
从怀中摸出那三角形饰物，发现这玩意变得滚烫无比，还在缓缓发光！
秀书网为你提供最快的战争论更新，BOOK III OF STRATEGY IN GENERAL（1）免费阅读。https://www.xiumb9.com
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