BOOK II ON THE THEORY OF WAR（3）

　　CHAPTER5CRITICISM

　　THEinfluenceoftheoreticalprinciplesuponreallifeisproducedmorethroughcriticismthanthroughdoctrine,forascriticismisanapplicationofabstracttruthtorealevents,thereforeitnotonly

　　ingstruthofthisdescriptionnearertolife,butalsoaccustomstheunderstandingmoretosuchtruthsbytheconstantrepetitionoftheirapplication.Wethereforethinkitnecessarytofixthepointofviewforcriticismnexttothatfortheory.

　　Fromthesimplenarrationofanhistoricaloccurrencewhichplaceseventsinchronologicalorder,oratmostonlytouchesontheirmoreimmediatecauses,weseparatetheCRITICAL.

　　InthisCRITICALthreedifferentoperationsofthemindmaybeobserved.

　　First,thehistoricalinvestigationanddeterminingofdoubtfulfacts.Thisisproperlyhistoricalresearch,andhasnothingincommonwiththeory.

　　Secondly,thetracingofeffectstocauses.ThisistheREALCRITICALINQUIRY;itisindispensabletotheory,foreverythingwhichintheoryistobeestablished,supported,orevenmerelyexplained,byexperiencecanonlybesettledinthisway.

　　Thirdly,thetestingofthemeansemployed.Thisiscriticism,properlyspeaking,inwhichpraiseandcensureiscontained.Thisiswheretheoryhelpshistory,orrather,theteachingtobederivedfromit.

　　Inthesetwolaststrictlycriticalpartsofhistoricalstudy,alldependsontracingthingstotheirprimaryelements,thatistosay,uptoundoubtedtruths,andnot,asissooftendone,restinghalf-way,thatis,onsomearbitraryassumptionorsupposition.

　　Asrespectsthetracingofeffecttocause,thatisoftenattendedwiththeinsuperabledifficultythattherealcausesarenotknown.InnoneoftherelationsoflifedoesthissofrequentlyhappenasinWar,whereeventsareseldomfullyknown,andstilllessmotives,asthelatterhavebeen,perhapspurposely,concealedbythechiefactor,orhavebeenofsuchatransientandaccidentalcharacterthattheyhavebeenlostforhistory.Forthisreasoncriticalnarrationmustgenerallyproceedhandinhandwithhistoricalinvestigation,andstillsuchawantofconnectionbetweencauseandeffectwilloftenpresentitself,thatitdoesnotseemjustifiabletoconsidereffectsasthenecessaryresultsofknowncauses.Here,thereforemustoccur,thatis,historicalresultswhichcannotbemadeuseofforteaching.Allthattheorycandemandisthattheinvestigationshouldberigidlyconducteduptothatpoint,andthereleaveoffwithoutdrawingconclusions.Arealevilspringsuponlyiftheknownismadeperforcetosufficeasanexplanationofeffects,andthusafalseimportanceisascribedtoit.

　　Besidesthisdifficulty,criticalinquiryalsomeetswithanothergreatandintrinsicone,whichisthattheprogressofeventsinWarseldomproceedsfromonesimplecause,butfromseveralincommon,andthatitthereforeisnotsufficienttofollowupaseriesofeventstotheirorigininacandidandimpartialspirit,butthatitisthenalsonecessarytoapportiontoeachcontributingcauseitsdueweight.Thisleads,therefore,toacloserinvestigationoftheirnature,andthusacriticalinvestigationmayleadintowhatistheproperfieldoftheory.

　　ThecriticalCONSIDERATION,thatis,thetestingofthemeans,leadstothequestion,Whicharetheeffectspeculiartothemeansapplied,andwhethertheseeffectswerecomprehendedintheplansofthepersondirecting?

　　Theeffectspeculiartothemeansleadtotheinvestigationoftheirnature,andthusagainintothefieldoftheory.

　　Wehavealreadyseenthatincriticismalldependsuponattainingtopositivetruth;therefore,thatwemustnotstopatarbitrarypropositionswhicharenotallowedbyothers,andtowhichotherperhapsequallyarbitraryassertionsmayagainbeopposed,sothatthereisnoendtoprosandcons;thewholeiswithoutresult,andthereforewithoutinstruction.

　　Wehaveseenthatboththesearchforcausesandtheexaminationofmeansleadintothefieldoftheory;thatis,intothefieldofuniversaltruth,whichdoesnotproceedsolelyfromthecaseimmediatelyunderexamination.Ifthereisatheorywhichcanbeused,thenthecriticalconsiderationwillappealtotheproofsthereafforded,andtheexaminationmaytherestop.Butwherenosuchtheoreticaltruthistobefound,theinquirymustbepusheduptotheoriginalelements.Ifthisnecessityoccursoften,itmustleadthehistorian(accordingtoacommonexpression)intoalabyrinthofdetails.Hethenhashishandsfull,anditisimpossibleforhimtostoptogivetherequisiteattentioneverywhere;theconsequenceis,thatinordertosetboundstohisinvestigation,headoptssomearbitraryassumptionswhich,iftheydonotappearsotohim,dosotoothers,astheyarenotevidentinthemselvesorcapableofproof.

　　Asoundtheoryisthereforeanessentialfoundationforcriticism,anditisimpossibleforit,withouttheassistanceofasensibletheory,toattaintothatpointatwhichitcommenceschieflytobeinstructive,thatis,whereitbecomesdemonstration,bothconvincingandsansre'plique.

　　Butitwouldbeavisionaryhopetobelieveinthepossibilityofatheoryapplicabletoeveryabstracttruth,leavingnothingforcriticismtodobuttoplacethecaseunderitsappropriatelaw:itwouldberidiculouspedantrytolaydownasaruleforcriticismthatitmustalwayshaltandturnroundonreachingtheboundariesofsacredtheory.Thesamespiritofanalyticalinquirywhichistheoriginoftheorymustalsoguidethecriticinhiswork;anditcanandmustthereforehappenthathestraysbeyondtheboundariesoftheprovinceoftheoryandelucidatesthosepointswithwhichheismoreparticularlyconcerned.Itismorelikely,onthecontrary,thatcriticismwouldcompletelyfailinitsobjectifitdegeneratedintoamechanicalapplicationoftheory.Allpositiveresultsoftheoreticalinquiry,allprinciples,rules,andmethods,arethemorewantingingeneralityandpositivetruththemoretheybecomepositivedoctrine.Theyexisttoofferthemselvesforuseasrequired,anditmustalwaysbeleftforjudgmenttodecidewhethertheyaresuitableornot.Suchresultsoftheorymustneverbeusedincriticismasrulesornormsforastandard,butinthesamewayasthepersonactingshouldusethem,thatis,merelyasaidstojudgment.Ifitisanacknowledgedprincipleintacticsthatintheusualorderofbattlecavalryshouldbeplacedbehindinfantry,notinlinewithit,stillitwouldbefollyonthisaccounttocondemneverydeviationfromthisprinciple.Criticismmustinvestigatethegroundsofthedeviation,anditisonlyincasetheseareinsufficientthatithasarighttoappealtoprincipleslaiddownintheory.Ifitisfurtherestablishedintheorythatadividedattackdiminishestheprobabilityofsuccess,stillitwouldbejustasunreasonable,wheneverthereisadividedattackandanunsuccessfulissue,toregardthelatterastheresultoftheformer,withoutfurtherinvestigationintotheconnectionbetweenthetwo,aswhereadividedattackissuccessfultoinferfromitthefallacyofthattheoreticalprinciple.Thespiritofinvestigationwhichbelongstocriticismcannotalloweither.Criticismthereforesupportsitselfchieflyontheresultsoftheanalyticalinvestigationoftheory;whathasbeenmadeoutanddeterminedbytheorydoesnotrequiretobedemonstratedoveragainbycriticism,anditissodeterminedbytheorythatcriticismmayfinditreadydemonstrated.

　　Thisofficeofcriticism,ofexaminingtheeffectproducedbycertaincauses,andwhetherameansappliedhasanswereditsobject,willbeeasyenoughifcauseandeffect,meansandend,areallneartogether.

　　IfanArmyissurprised,andthereforecannotmakearegularandintelligentuseofitspowersandresources,thentheeffectofthesurpriseisnotdoubtful.—Iftheoryhasdeterminedthatinabattletheconvergentformofattackiscalculatedtoproducegreaterbutlesscertainresults,thenthequestioniswhetherhewhoemploysthatconvergentformhadinviewchieflythatgreatnessofresultashisobject;ifso,thepropermeanswerechosen.Butifbythisformheintendedtomaketheresultmorecertain,andthatexpectationwasfoundednotonsomeexceptionalcircumstances(inthiscase),butonthegeneralnatureoftheconvergentform,ashashappenedahundredtimes,thenhemistookthenatureofthemeansandcommittedanerror.

　　Heretheworkofmilitaryinvestigationandcriticismiseasy,anditwillalwaysbesowhenconfinedtotheimmediateeffectsandobjects.Thiscanbedonequiteatoption,ifweabstracttheconnectionofthepartswiththewhole,andonlylookatthingsinthatrelation.

　　ButinWar,asgenerallyintheworld,thereisaconnectionbetweeneverythingwhichbelongstoawhole;andtherefore,howeversmallacausemaybeinitself,itseffectsreachtotheendoftheactofwarfare,andmodifyorinfluencethefinalresultinsomedegree,letthatdegreebeeversosmall.Inthesamemannereverymeansmustbefeltuptotheultimateobject.

　　Wecanthereforetracetheeffectsofacauseaslongaseventsareworthnoticing,andinthesamewaywemustnotstopatthetestingofameansfortheimmediateobject,buttestalsothisobjectasameanstoahigherone,andthusascendtheseriesoffactsinsuccession,untilwecometoonesoabsolutelynecessaryinitsnatureastorequirenoexaminationorproof.Inmanycases,particularlyinwhatconcernsgreatanddecisivemeasures,theinvestigationmustbecarriedtothefinalaim,tothatwhichleadsimmediatelytopeace.

　　Itisevidentthatinthusascending,ateverynewstationwhichwereachanewpointofviewforthejudgmentisattained,sothatthesamemeanswhichappearedadvisableatonestation,whenlookedatfromthenextaboveitmayhavetoberejected.

　　Thesearchforthecausesofeventsandthecomparisonofmeanswithendsmustalwaysgohandinhandinthecriticalreviewofanact,fortheinvestigationofcausesleadsusfirsttothediscoveryofthosethingswhichareworthexamining.

　　Thisfollowingoftheclueupanddownisattendedwithconsiderabledifficulty,forthefartherfromaneventthecauselieswhichwearelookingfor,thegreatermustbethenumberofothercauseswhichmustatthesametimebekeptinviewandallowedforinreferencetothesharewhichtheyhaveinthecourseofevents,andtheneliminated,becausethehighertheimportanceofafactthegreaterwillbethenumberofseparateforcesandcircumstancesbywhichitisconditioned.Ifwehaveunravelledthecausesofabattlebeinglost,wehavecertainlyalsoascertainedapartofthecausesoftheconsequenceswhichthisdefeathasuponthewholeWar,butonlyapart,becausetheeffectsofothercauses,moreorlessaccordingtocircumstances,willflowintothefinalresult.

　　Thesamemultiplicityofcircumstancesispresentedalsointheexaminationofthemeansthehigherourpointofview,forthehighertheobjectissituated,thegreatermustbethenumberofmeansemployedtoreachit.TheultimateobjectoftheWaristheobjectaimedatbyalltheArmiessimultaneously,anditisthereforenecessarythattheconsiderationshouldem

　　aceallthateachhasdoneorcouldhavedone.

　　Itisobviousthatthismaysometimesleadtoawidefieldofinquiry,inwhichitiseasytowanderandlosetheway,andinwhichthisdifficultyprevails—thatanumberofassumptionsorsuppositionsmustbemadeaboutavarietyofthingswhichdonotactuallyappear,butwhichinallprobabilitydidtakeplace,andthereforecannotpossiblybeleftoutofconsideration.

　　WhenBuonaparte,in1797,attheheadoftheArmyofItaly,advancedfromtheTagliamentoagainsttheArchdukeCharles,hedidsowithaviewtoforcethatGeneraltoadecisiveactionbeforethereinforcementsexpectedfromtheRhinehadreachedhim.Ifwelook,onlyattheimmediateobject,themeanswerewellchosenandjustifiedbytheresult,fortheArchdukewassoinferiorinnumbersthatheonlymadeashowofresistanceontheTagliamento,andwhenhesawhisadversarysostrongandresolute,yieldedground,andleftopenthepassages,oftheNoricanAlps.NowtowhatusecouldBuonaparteturnthisfortunateevent?TopenetrateintotheheartoftheAustrianempireitself,tofacilitatetheadvanceoftheRhineArmiesunderMoreauandHoche,andopencommunicationwiththem?ThiswastheviewtakenbyBuonaparte,andfromthispointofviewhewasright.Butnow,ifcriticismplacesitselfatahigherpointofview—namely,thatoftheFrenchDirectory,whichbodycouldseeandknowthattheArmiesontheRhinecouldnotcommencethecampaignforsixweeks,thentheadvanceofBuonaparteovertheNoricanAlpscanonlyberegardedasanextremelyhazardousmeasure;foriftheAustrianshaddrawnlargelyontheirRhineArmiestoreinforcetheirArmyinStyria,soastoenabletheArchduketofallupontheArmyofItaly,notonlywouldthatArmyhavebeenrouted,butthewholecampaignlost.Thisconsideration,whichattractedtheseriousattentionofBuonaparteatVillach,nodoubtinducedhimtosignthearmisticeofLeobenwithsomuchreadiness.

　　Ifcriticismtakesastillhigherposition,andifitknowsthattheAustrianshadnoreservesbetweentheArmyoftheArchdukeCharlesandVienna,thenweseethatViennabecamethreatenedbytheadvanceoftheArmyofItaly.

　　SupposingthatBuonaparteknewthatthecapitalwasthusuncovered,andknewthathestillretainedthesamesuperiorityinnumbersovertheArchdukeashehadinStyria,thenhisadvanceagainsttheheartoftheAustrianStateswasnolongerwithoutpurpose,anditsvaluedependedonthevaluewhichtheAustriansmightplaceonpreservingtheircapital.Ifthatwassogreatthat,ratherthanloseit,theywouldaccepttheconditionsofpeacewhichBuonapartewasreadytoofferthem,itbecameanobjectofthefirstimportancetothreatenVienna.IfBuonapartehadanyreasontoknowthis,thencriticismmaystopthere,butifthispointwasonlyproblematical,thencriticismmusttakeastillhigherposition,andaskwhatwouldhavefollowediftheAustrianshadresolvedtoabandonViennaandretirefartherintothevastdominionsstilllefttothem.Butitiseasytoseethatthisquestioncannotbeansweredwithout

　　ingingintotheconsiderationtheprobablemovementsoftheRhineArmiesonbothsides.ThroughthedecidedsuperiorityofnumbersonthesideoftheFrench—130,000to80,000—therecouldbelittledoubtoftheresult;butthennextarisesthequestion,WhatusewouldtheDirectorymakeofavictory;whethertheywouldfollowuptheirsuccesstotheoppositefrontiersoftheAustrianmonarchy,thereforetothecomplete

　　eakinguporoverthrowofthatpower,orwhethertheywouldbesatisfiedwiththeconquestofaconsiderableportiontoserveasasecurityforpeace?Theprobableresultineachcasemustbeestimated,inordertocometoaconclusionastotheprobabledeterminationoftheDirectory.SupposingtheresultoftheseconsiderationstobethattheFrenchforcesweremuchtooweakforthecompletesubjugationoftheAustrianmonarchy,sothattheattemptmightcompletelyreversetherespectivepositionsofthecontendingArmies,andthateventheconquestandoccupationofaconsiderabledistrictofcountrywouldplacetheFrenchArmyinstrategicrelationstowhichtheywerenotequal,thenthatresultmustnaturallyinfluencetheestimateofthepositionoftheArmyofItaly,andcompelittoloweritsexpectations.Andthis,itwasnodoubtwhichinfluencedBuonaparte,althoughfullyawareofthehelplessconditionoftheArchduke,stilltosignthepeaceofCampoFormio,whichimposednogreatersacrificesontheAustriansthanthelossofprovinceswhich,evenifthecampaigntookthemostfavourableturnforthem,theycouldnothavereconquered.ButtheFrenchcouldnothavereckonedoneventhemoderatetreatyofCampoFormio,andthereforeitcouldnothavebeentheirobjectinmakingtheirboldadvanceiftwoconsiderationshadnotpresentedthemselvestotheirview,thefirstofwhichconsistedinthequestion,whatdegreeofvaluetheAustrianswouldattachtoeachoftheabove-mentionedresults;whether,notwithstandingtheprobabilityofasatisfactoryresultineitherofthesecases,woulditbeworthwhiletomakethesacrificesinseparablefromacontinuanceoftheWar,whentheycouldbesparedthosesacrificesbyapeaceontermsnottoohumiliating?ThesecondconsiderationisthequestionwhethertheAustrianGovernment,insteadofseriouslyweighingthepossibleresultsofaresistancepushedtoextremities,wouldnotprovecompletelydisheartenedbytheimpressionoftheirpresentreverses.

　　Theconsiderationwhichformsthesubjectofthefirstisnoidlepieceofsubtleargument,butaconsiderationofsuchdecidedlypracticalimportancethatitcomesupwhenevertheplanofpushingWartotheutmostextremityismooted,andbyitsweightinmostcasesrestrainstheexecutionofsuchplans.

　　Thesecondconsiderationisofequalimportance,forwedonotmakeWarwithanabstractionbutwithareality,whichwemustalwayskeepinview,andwemaybesurethatitwasnotoverlookedbytheboldBuonaparte—thatis,thathewaskeenlyalivetotheterrorwhichtheappearanceofhisswordinspired.ItwasrelianceonthatwhichledhimtoMoscow.Thereitledhimintoascrape.Theterrorofhimhadbeenweakenedbythegiganticstrugglesinwhichhehadbeenengaged;intheyear1797itwasstillfresh,andthesecretofaresistancepushedtoextremitieshadnotbeendiscovered;neverthelessevenin1797hisboldnessmighthaveledtoanegativeresultif,asalreadysaid,hehadnotwithasortofpresentimentavoideditbysigningthemoderatepeaceofCampoFormio.

　　Wemustnow

　　ingtheseconsiderationstoaclose—theywillsufficetoshowthewidesphere,thediversityandembarrassingnatureofthesubjectsem

　　acedinacriticalexaminationcarriedtothefullestextent,thatis,tothosemeasuresofagreatanddecisiveclasswhichmustnecessarilybeincluded.Itfollowsfromthemthatbesidesatheoreticalacquaintancewiththesubject,naturaltalentmustalsohaveagreatinfluenceonthevalueofcriticalexaminations,foritrestschieflywiththelattertothrowtherequisitelightontheinterrelationsofthings,andtodistinguishfromamongsttheendlessconnectionsofeventsthosewhicharereallyessential.

　　Buttalentisalsocalledintorequisitioninanotherway.Criticalexaminationisnotmerelytheappreciationofthosemeanswhichhavebeenactuallyemployed,butalsoofallpossiblemeans,whichthereforemustbesuggestedinthefirstplace—thatis,mustbediscovered;andtheuseofanyparticularmeansisnotfairlyopentocensureuntilabetterispointedout.Now,howeversmallthenumberofpossiblecombinationsmaybeinmostcases,stillitmustbeadmittedthattopointoutthosewhichhavenotbeenusedisnotamereanalysisofactualthings,butaspontaneouscreationwhichcannotbeprescribed,anddependsonthefertilityofgenius.

　　Wearefarfromseeingafieldforgreatgeniusinacasewhichadmitsonlyoftheapplicationofafewsimplecombinations,andwethinkitexceedinglyridiculoustoholdup,asisoftendone,theturningofapositionasaninventionshowingthehighestgenius;stillneverthelessthiscreativeself-activityonthepartofthecriticisnecessary,anditisoneofthepointswhichessentiallydeterminethevalueofcriticalexamination.

　　WhenBuonaparteon30thJuly,1796,determinedtoraisethesiegeofMantua,inordertomarchwithhiswholeforceagainsttheenemy,advancinginseparatecolumnstothereliefoftheplace,andtobeatthemindetail,thisappearedthesurestwaytotheattainmentof

　　illiantvictories.Thesevictoriesactuallyfollowed,andwereafterwardsagainrepeatedonastillmore

　　illiantscaleontheattempttorelievethefortressbeingagainrenewed.Wehearonlyoneopinionontheseachievements,thatofunmixedadmiration.

　　Atthesametime,Buonapartecouldnothaveadoptedthiscourseonthe30thJulywithoutquitegivinguptheideaofthesiegeofMantua,becauseitwasimpossibletosavethesiegetrain,anditcouldnotbereplacedbyanotherinthiscampaign.Infact,thesiegewasconvertedintoablockade,andthetown,whichifthesiegehadcontinuedmusthaveveryshortlyfallen,heldoutforsixmonthsinspiteofBuonaparte'svictoriesintheopenfield.

　　Criticismhasgenerallyregardedthisasanevilthatwasunavoidable,becausecriticshavenotbeenabletosuggestanybettercourse.ResistancetoarelievingArmywithinlinesofcircumvallationhadfallenintosuchdisreputeandcontemptthatitappearstohaveentirelyescapedconsiderationasameans.AndyetinthereignofLouisXIV.thatmeasurewassooftenusedwithsuccessthatwecanonlyattributetotheforceoffashionthefactthatahundredyearslateritneveroccurredtoanyoneeventoproposesuchameasure.Ifthepracticabilityofsuchaplanhadeverbeenentertainedforamoment,acloserconsiderationofcircumstanceswouldhaveshownthat40,000ofthebestinfantryintheworldunderBuonaparte,behindstronglinesofcircumvallationroundMantua,hadsolittletofearfromthe50,000mencomingtothereliefunderWurmser,thatitwasveryunlikelythatanyattemptevenwouldbemadeupontheirlines.Weshallnotseekheretoestablishthispoint,butwebelieveenoughhasbeensaidtoshowthatthismeanswasonewhichhadarighttoashareofconsideration.WhetherBuonapartehimselfeverthoughtofsuchaplanweleaveundecided;neitherinhismemoirsnorinothersourcesisthereanytracetobefoundofhishavingdoneso;innocriticalworkshasitbeentouchedupon,themeasurebeingonewhichthemindhadlostsightof.Themeritofresuscitatingtheideaofthismeansisnotgreat,foritsuggestsitselfatoncetoanyonewho

　　eaksloosefromthetrammelsoffashion.Stillitisnecessarythatitshouldsuggestitselfforusto

　　ingitintoconsiderationandcompareitwiththemeanswhichBuonaparteemployed.Whatevermaybetheresultofthecomparison,itisonewhichshouldnotbeomittedbycriticism.

　　WhenBuonaparte,inFe

　　uary,1814,aftergainingthebattlesatEtoges,Champ-Aubert,andMontmirail,leftBluecher'sArmy,andturninguponSchwartzenberg,beathistroopsatMontereauandMormant,everyonewasfilledwithadmiration,becauseBuonaparte,bythusthrowinghisconcentratedforcefirstupononeopponent,thenuponanother,madea

　　illiantuseofthemistakeswhichhisadversarieshadcommittedindividingtheirforces.Ifthese

　　illiantstrokesindifferentdirectionsfailedtosavehim,itwasgenerallyconsideredtobenofaultofhis,atleast.Noonehasyetaskedthequestion,Whatwouldhavebeentheresultif,insteadofturningfromBluecheruponSchwartzenberg,hehadtriedanotherblowatBluecher,andpursuedhimtotheRhine?Weareconvincedthatitwouldhavecompletelychangedthecourseofthecampaign,andthattheArmyoftheAllies,insteadofmarchingtoParis,wouldhaveretiredbehindtheRhine.Wedonotaskotherstoshareourconviction,butnoonewhounderstandsthethingwilldoubt,atthemerementionofthisalternativecourse,thatitisonewhichshouldnotbeoverlookedincriticism.

　　Inthiscasethemeansofcomparisonliemuchmoreonthesurfacethanintheforegoing,buttheyhavebeenequallyoverlooked,becauseone-sidedviewshaveprevailed,andtherehasbeennofreedomofjudgment.

　　Fromthenecessityofpointingoutabettermeanswhichmighthavebeenusedinplaceofthosewhicharecondemnedhasarisentheformofcriticismalmostexclusivelyinuse,whichcontentsitselfwithpointingoutthebettermeanswithoutdemonstratinginwhatthesuperiorityconsists.Theconsequenceisthatsomearenotconvinced,thatothersstartupanddothesamething,andthatthusdiscussionariseswhichiswithoutanyfixedbasisfortheargument.Militaryliteratureaboundswithmatterofthissort.

　　Thedemonstrationwerequireisalwaysnecessarywhenthesuperiorityofthemeanspropoundedisnotsoevidentastoleavenoroomfordoubt,anditconsistsintheexaminationofeachofthemeansonitsownmerits,andthenofitscomparisonwiththeobjectdesired.Whenoncethethingistracedbacktoasimpletruth,controversymustcease,oratalleventsanewresultisobtained,whilstbytheotherplantheprosandconsgoonforeverconsumingeachother.

　　Shouldwe,forexample,notrestcontentwithassertioninthecasebeforementioned,andwishtoprovethatthepersistentpursuitofBluecherwouldhavebeenmoreadvantageousthantheturningonSchwartzenberg,weshouldsupporttheargumentsonthefollowingsimpletruths:

　　1.Ingeneralitismoreadvantageoustocontinueourblowsinoneandthesamedirection,becausethereisalossoftimeinstrikingindifferentdirections;andatapointwherethemoralpowerisalreadyshakenbyconsiderablelossesthereisthemorereasontoexpectfreshsuccesses,thereforeinthatwaynopartofthepreponderancealreadygainedisleftidle.

　　2.BecauseBluecher,althoughweakerthanSchwartzenberg,was,onaccountofhisenterprisingspirit,themoreimportantadversary;inhim,therefore,laythecentreofattractionwhichdrewtheothersalonginthesamedirection.

　　3.BecausethelosseswhichBluecherhadsustainedalmostamountedtoadefeat,whichgaveBuonapartesuchapreponderanceoverhimastomakehisretreattotheRhinealmostcertain,andatthesametimenoreservesofanyconsequenceawaitedhimthere.

　　4.Becausetherewasnootherresultwhichwouldbesoterrificinitsaspects,wouldappeartotheimaginationinsuchgiganticproportions,animmenseadvantageindealingwithaStaffsoweakandirresoluteasthatofSchwartzenbergnotoriouslywasatthistime.WhathadhappenedtotheCrownPrinceofWartembergatMontereau,andtoCountWittgensteinatMormant,PrinceSchwartzenbergmusthaveknownwellenough;butalltheuntowardeventsonBluecher'sdistantandseparatelinefromtheMarnetotheRhinewouldonlyreachhimbytheavalancheofrumour.ThedesperatemovementswhichBuonapartemadeuponVitryattheendofMarch,toseewhattheAllieswoulddoifhethreatenedtoturnthemstrategically,wereevidentlydoneontheprincipleofworkingontheirfears;butitwasdoneunderfardifferentcircumstances,inconsequenceofhisdefeatatLaonandArcis,andbecauseBluecher,with100,000men,wasthenincommunicationwithSchwartzenberg.ωωω.χΙυΜЬ.Ｃǒm

　　Therearepeople,nodoubt,whowillnotbeconvincedonthesearguments,butatalleventstheycannotretortbysaying,that"whilstBuonapartethreatenedSchwartzenberg'sbasebyadvancingtotheRhine,SchwartzenbergatthesametimethreatenedBuonaparte'scommunicationswithParis,"becausewehaveshownbythereasonsabovegiventhatSchwartzenbergwouldneverhavethoughtofmarchingonParis.

　　Withrespecttotheexamplequotedbyusfromthecampaignof1796,weshouldsay:BuonapartelookedupontheplanheadoptedasthesurestmeansofbeatingtheAustrians;butadmittingthatitwasso,stilltheobjecttobeattainedwasonlyanemptyvictory,whichcouldhavehardlyanysensibleinfluenceonthefallofMantua.Thewaywhichweshouldhavechosenwould,inouropinion,havebeenmuchmorecertaintopreventthereliefofMantua;butevenifweplaceourselvesinthepositionoftheFrenchGeneralandassumethatitwasnotso,andlookuponthecertaintyofsuccesstohavebeenless,thequestionthenamountstoachoicebetweenamorecertainbutlessuseful,andthereforelessimportant,victoryontheonehand,andasomewhatlessprobablebutfarmoredecisiveandimportantvictory,ontheotherhand.Presentedinthisform,boldnessmusthavedeclaredforthesecondsolution,whichisthereverseofwhattookplace,whenthethingwasonlysuperficiallyviewed.Buonapartecertainlywasanythingbutdeficientinboldness,andwemaybesurethathedidnotseethewholecaseanditsconsequencesasfullyandclearlyaswecanatthepresenttime.

　　Naturallythecritic,intreatingofthemeans,mustoftenappealtomilitaryhistory,asexperienceisofmorevalueintheArtofWarthanallphilosophicaltruth.Butthisexemplificationfromhistoryissubjecttocertainconditions,ofwhichweshalltreatinaspecialchapterandunfortunatelytheseconditionsaresoseldomregardedthatreferencetohistorygenerallyonlyservestoincreasetheconfusionofideas.

　　Wehavestillamostimportantsubjecttoconsider,whichis,Howfarcriticisminpassingjudgmentsonparticulareventsispermitted,orindutybound,tomakeuseofitswiderviewofthings,andthereforealsoofthatwhichisshownbyresults;orwhenandwhereitshouldleaveoutofsightthesethingsinordertoplaceitself,asfaraspossible,intheexactpositionofthechiefactor?

　　Ifcriticismdispensespraiseorcensure,itshouldseektoplaceitselfasnearlyaspossibleatthesamepointofviewasthepersonacting,thatistosay,tocollectallheknewandallthemotivesonwhichheacted,and,ontheotherhand,toleaveoutoftheconsiderationallthatthepersonactingcouldnotordidnotknow,andaboveall,theresult.Butthisisonlyanobjecttoaimat,whichcanneverbereachedbecausethestateofcircumstancesfromwhichaneventproceededcanneverbeplacedbeforetheeyeofthecriticexactlyasitlaybeforetheeyeofthepersonacting.Anumberofinferiorcircumstances,whichmusthaveinfluencedtheresult,arecompletelylosttosight,andmanyasubjectivemotivehasnevercometolight.

　　Thelattercanonlybelearntfromthememoirsofthechiefactor,orfromhisintimatefriends;andinsuchthingsofthiskindareoftentreatedofinaverydesultorymanner,orpurposelymisrepresented.Criticismmust,therefore,alwaysforegomuchwhichwaspresentinthemindsofthosewhoseactsarecriticised.

　　Ontheotherhand,itismuchmoredifficulttoleaveoutofsightthatwhichcriticismknowsinexcess.Thisisonlyeasyasregardsaccidentalcircumstances,thatis,circumstanceswhichhavebeenmixedup,butareinnowaynecessarilyrelated.Butitisverydifficult,and,infact,canneverbecompletelydonewithregardtothingsreallyessential.

　　Letustakefirst,theresult.Ifithasnotproceededfromaccidentalcircumstances,itisalmostimpossiblethattheknowledgeofitshouldnothaveaneffectonthejudgmentpassedoneventswhichhaveprecededit,forweseethesethingsinthelightofthisresult,anditistoacertainextentbyitthatwefirstbecomeacquaintedwiththemandappreciatethem.Militaryhistory,withallitsevents,isasourceofinstructionforcriticismitself,anditisonlynaturalthatcriticismshouldthrowthatlightonthingswhichithasitselfobtainedfromtheconsiderationofthewhole.Ifthereforeitmightwishinsomecasestoleavetheresultoutoftheconsideration,itwouldbeimpossibletodosocompletely.

　　Butitisnotonlyinrelationtotheresult,thatis,withwhattakesplaceatthelast,thatthisembarrassmentarises;thesameoccursinrelationtoprecedingevents,thereforewiththedatawhichfurnishedthemotivestoaction.Criticismhasbeforeit,inmostcases,moreinformationonthispointthantheprincipalinthetransaction.Nowitmayseemeasytodismissfromtheconsiderationeverythingofthisnature,butitisnotsoeasyaswemaythink.Theknowledgeofprecedingandconcurrenteventsisfoundednotonlyoncertaininformation,butonanumberofconjecturesandsuppositions;indeed,thereishardlyanyoftheinformationrespectingthingsnotpurelyaccidentalwhichhasnotbeenprecededbysuppositionsorconjecturesdestinedtotaketheplaceofcertaininformationincasesuchshouldneverbesupplied.Nowisitconceivablethatcriticisminaftertimes,whichhasbeforeitasfactsalltheprecedingandconcurrentcircumstances,shouldnotallowitselftobetherebyinfluencedwhenitasksitselfthequestion,Whatportionofthecircumstances,whichatthemomentofactionwereunknown,wouldithaveheldtobeprobable?Wemaintainthatinthiscase,asinthecaseoftheresults,andforthesamereason,itisimpossibletodisregardallthesethingscompletely.

　　Ifthereforethecriticwishestobestowpraiseorblameuponanysingleact,hecanonlysucceedtoacertaindegreeinplacinghimselfinthepositionofthepersonwhoseacthehasunderreview.Inmanycaseshecandososufficientlynearforanypracticalpurpose,butinmanyinstancesitistheveryreverse,andthisfactshouldneverbeoverlooked.

　　Butitisneithernecessarynordesirablethatcriticismshouldcompletelyidentifyitselfwiththepersonacting.InWar,asinallmattersofskill,thereisacertainnaturalaptituderequiredwhichiscalledtalent.Thismaybegreatorsmall.Inthefirstcaseitmayeasilybesuperiortothatofthecritic,forwhatcriticcanpretendtotheskillofaFrederickoraBuonaparte?Therefore,ifcriticismisnottoabstainaltogetherfromofferinganopinionwhereeminenttalentisconcerned,itmustbeallowedtomakeuseoftheadvantagewhichitsenlargedhorizonaffords.Criticismmustnot,therefore,treatthesolutionofaproblembyagreatGenerallikeasuminarithmetic;itisonlythroughtheresultsandthroughtheexactcoincidencesofeventsthatitcanrecognisewithadmirationhowmuchisduetotheexerciseofgenius,andthatitfirstlearnstheessentialcombinationwhichtheglanceofthatgeniusdevised.

　　Butforevery,eventhesmallest,actofgeniusitisnecessarythatcriticismshouldtakeahigherpointofview,sothat,havingatcommandmanyobjectivegroundsofdecision,itmaybeaslittlesubjectiveaspossible,andthatthecriticmaynottakethelimitedscopeofhisownmindasastandard.

　　Thiselevatedpositionofcriticism,itspraiseandblamepronouncedwithafullknowledgeofallthecircumstances,hasinitselfnothingwhichhurtsourfeelings;itonlydoessoifthecriticpusheshimselfforward,andspeaksinatoneasifallthewisdomwhichhehasobtainedbyanexhaustiveexaminationoftheeventunderconsiderationwerereallyhisowntalent.Palpableasisthisdeception,itisonewhichpeoplemayeasilyfallintothroughvanity,andonewhichisnaturallydistastefultoothers.Itveryoftenhappensthatalthoughthecritichasnosucharrogantpretensions,theyareimputedtohimbythereaderbecausehehasnotexpresslydisclaimedthem,andthenfollowsimmediatelyachargeofawantofthepowerofcriticaljudgment.

　　IfthereforeacriticpointsoutanerrormadebyaFrederickoraBuonaparte,thatdoesnotmeanthathewhomakesthecriticismwouldnothavecommittedthesameerror;hemayevenbereadytograntthathadhebeenintheplaceofthesegreatGeneralshemighthavemademuchgreatermistakes;hemerelyseesthiserrorfromthechainofevents,andhethinksthatitshouldnothaveescapedthesagacityoftheGeneral.

　　Thisis,therefore,anopinionformedthroughtheconnectionofevents,andthereforethroughtheRESULT.Butthereisanotherquitedifferenteffectoftheresultitselfuponthejudgment,thatisifitisusedquitealoneasanexamplefororagainstthesoundnessofameasure.ThismaybecalledJUDGMENTACCORDINGTOTHERESULT.Suchajudgmentappearsatfirstsightinadmissible,andyetitisnot.

　　WhenBuonapartemarchedtoMoscowin1812,alldependeduponwhetherthetakingofthecapital,andtheeventswhichprecededthecapture,wouldforcetheEmperorAlexandertomakepeace,ashehadbeencompelledtodoafterthebattleofFriedlandin1807,andtheEmperorFrancisin1805and1809afterAusterlitzandWagram;forifBuonapartedidnotobtainapeaceatMoscow,therewasnoalternativebuttoreturn—thatis,therewasnothingforhimbutastrategicdefeat.WeshallleaveoutofthequestionwhathedidtogettoMoscow,andwhetherinhisadvancehedidnotmissmanyopportunitiesof

　　ingingtheEmperorAlexandertopeace;weshallalsoexcludeallconsiderationofthedisastrouscircumstanceswhichattendedhisretreat,andwhichperhapshadtheirorigininthegeneralconductofthecampaign.Stillthequestionremainsthesame,forhowevermuchmore

　　illiantthecourseofthecampaignuptoMoscowmighthavebeen,stilltherewasalwaysanuncertaintywhethertheEmperorAlexanderwouldbeintimidatedintomakingpeace;andthen,evenifaretreatdidnotcontaininitselftheseedsofsuchdisastersasdidinfactoccur,stillitcouldneverbeanythingelsethanagreatstrategicdefeat.IftheEmperorAlexanderagreedtoapeacewhichwasdisadvantageoustohim,thecampaignof1812wouldhaverankedwiththoseofAusterlitz,Friedland,andWagram.Butthesecampaignsalso,iftheyhadnotledtopeace,wouldinallprobabilityhaveendedinsimilarcatastrophes.Whatever,therefore,ofgenius,skill,andenergytheConqueroroftheWorldappliedtothetask,thislastquestionaddressedtofateremainedalwaysthesame.Shallwethendiscardthecampaignsof1805,1807,1809,andsayonaccountofthecampaignof1812thattheywereactsofimprudence;thattheresultswereagainstthenatureofthings,andthatin1812strategicjusticeatlastfoundventforitselfinoppositiontoblindchance?Thatwouldbeanunwarrantableconclusion,amostarbitraryjudgment,acaseonlyhalfproved,becausenohuman,eyecantracethethreadofthenecessaryconnectionofeventsuptothedeterminationoftheconqueredPrinces.

　　Stilllesscanwesaythecampaignof1812meritedthesamesuccessastheothers,andthatthereasonwhyitturnedoutotherwiseliesinsomethingunnatural,forwecannotregardthefirmnessofAlexanderassomethingunpredictable.

　　Whatcanbemorenaturalthantosaythatintheyears1805,1807,1809,Buonapartejudgedhisopponentscorrectly,andthatin1812heerredinthatpoint?Ontheformeroccasions,therefore,hewasright,inthelatterwrong,andinbothcaseswejudgebytheRESULT.

　　AllactioninWar,aswehavealreadysaid,isdirectedonprobable,notoncertain,results.Whateveriswantingincertaintymustalwaysbelefttofate,orchance,callitwhichyouwill.Wemaydemandthatwhatissoleftshouldbeaslittleaspossible,butonlyinrelationtotheparticularcase—thatis,aslittleasispossibleinthisonecase,butnotthatthecaseinwhichtheleastislefttochanceisalwaystobepreferred.Thatwouldbeanenormouserror,asfollowsfromallourtheoreticalviews.Therearecasesinwhichthegreatestdaringisthegreatestwisdom.

　　Nowineverythingwhichislefttochancebythechiefactor,hispersonalmerit,andthereforehisresponsibilityaswell,seemstobecompletelysetaside;neverthelesswecannotsuppressaninwardfeelingofsatisfactionwheneverexpectationrealisesitself,andifitdisappointsusourmindisdissatisfied;andmorethanthisofrightandwrongshouldnotbemeantbythejudgmentwhichweformfromthemereresult,orratherthatwefindthere.

　　Nevertheless,itcannotbedeniedthatthesatisfactionwhichourmindexperiencesatsuccess,thepaincausedbyfailure,proceedfromasortofmysteriousfeeling;wesupposebetweenthatsuccessascribedtogoodfortuneandthegeniusofthechiefafineconnectingthread,invisibletothemind'seye,andthesuppositiongivespleasure.Whattendstoconfirmthisideaisthatoursympathyincreases,becomesmoredecided,ifthesuccessesanddefeatsoftheprincipalactorareoftenrepeated.ThusitbecomesintelligiblehowgoodluckinWarassumesamuchnoblernaturethangoodluckatplay.Ingeneral,whenafortunatewarriordoesnototherwiselessenourinterestinhisbehalf,wehaveapleasureinaccompanyinghiminhiscareer.

　　Criticism,therefore,afterhavingweighedallthatcomeswithinthesphereofhumanreasonandconviction,willlettheresultspeakforthatpartwherethedeepmysteriousrelationsarenotdisclosedinanyvisibleform,andwillprotectthissilentsentenceofahigherauthorityfromthenoiseofcrudeopinionsontheonehand,whileontheotheritpreventsthegrossabusewhichmightbemadeofthislasttribunal.

　　Thisverdictoftheresultmustthereforealways

　　ingforththatwhichhumansagacitycannotdiscover;anditwillbechieflyasregardstheintellectualpowersandoperationsthatitwillbecalledintorequisition,partlybecausetheycanbeestimatedwiththeleastcertainty,partlybecausetheircloseconnectionwiththewillisfavourabletotheirexercisingoveritanimportantinfluence.Whenfearor

　　averyprecipitatesthedecision,thereisnothingobjectiveinterveningbetweenthemforourconsideration,andconsequentlynothingbywhichsagacityandcalculationmighthavemettheprobableresult.

　　Wemustnowbeallowedtomakeafewobservationsontheinstrumentofcriticism,thatis,thelanguagewhichituses,becausethatistoacertainextentconnectedwiththeactioninWar;forthecriticalexaminationisnothingmorethanthedeliberationwhichshouldprecedeactioninWar.WethereforethinkitveryessentialthatthelanguageusedincriticismshouldhavethesamecharacterasthatwhichdeliberationinWarmusthave,forotherwiseitwouldceasetobepractical,andcriticismcouldgainnoadmittanceinactuallife.

　　WehavesaidinourobservationsonthetheoryoftheconductofWarthatitshouldeducatethemindoftheCommanderforWar,orthatitsteachingshouldguidehiseducation;alsothatitisnotintendedtofurnishhimwithpositivedoctrinesandsystemswhichhecanuselikementalappliances.Butiftheconstructionofscientificformulaeisneverrequired,orevenallowable,inWartoaidthedecisiononthecasepresented,iftruthdoesnotappearthereinasystematicshape,ifitisnotfoundinanindirectway,butdirectlybythenaturalperceptionofthemind,thenitmustbethesamealsoinacriticalreview.

　　Itistrueaswehaveseenthat,wherevercompletedemonstrationofthenatureofthingswouldbetootedious,criticismmustsupportitselfonthosetruthswhichtheoryhasestablishedonthepoint.But,justasinWartheactorobeysthesetheoreticaltruthsratherbecausehismindisimbuedwiththemthanbecauseheregardsthemasobjectiveinflexiblelaws,socriticismmustalsomakeuseofthem,notasanexternallaworanalge

　　aicformula,ofwhichfreshproofisnotrequiredeachtimetheyareapplied,butitmustalwaysthrowalightonthisproofitself,leavingonlytotheorythemoreminuteandcircumstantialproof.Thusitavoidsamysterious,unintelligiblephraseology,andmakesitsprogressinplainlanguage,thatis,withaclearandalwaysvisiblechainofideas.

　　Certainlythiscannotalwaysbecompletelyattained,butitmustalwaysbetheaimincriticalexpositions.Suchexpositionsmustusecomplicatedformsofscienceassparinglyaspossible,andneverresorttotheconstructionofscientificaidsasofatruthapparatusofitsown,butalwaysbeguidedbythenaturalandunbiassedimpressionsofthemind.

　　Butthispiousendeavour,ifwemayusetheexpression,hasunfortunatelyseldomhithertopresidedovercriticalexaminations:themostofthemhaveratherbeenemanationsofaspeciesofvanity—awishtomakeadisplayofideas.

　　Thefirstevilwhichweconstantlystumbleuponisalame,totallyinadmissibleapplicationofcertainone-sidedsystemsasofaformalcodeoflaws.Butitisneverdifficulttoshowtheone-sidednessofsuchsystems,andthisonlyrequirestobedoneoncetothrowdiscreditforeveroncriticaljudgmentswhicharebasedonthem.Wehaveheretodealwithadefinitesubject,andasthenumberofpossiblesystemsafterallcanbebutsmall,thereforealsotheyarethemselvesthelesserevil.

　　Muchgreateristheevilwhichliesinthepompousretinueoftechnicalterms—scientificexpressionsandmetaphors,whichthesesystemscarryintheirtrain,andwhichlikearabble-likethebaggageofanArmy

　　okenawayfromitsChief—hangaboutinalldirections.Anycriticwhohasnotadoptedasystem,eitherbecausehehasnotfoundonetopleasehim,orbecausehehasnotyetbeenabletomakehimselfmasterofone,willatleastoccasionallymakeuseofapieceofone,asonewouldusearuler,toshowtheblunderscommittedbyaGeneral.Themostofthemareincapableofreasoningwithoutusingasahelphereandtheresomeshredsofscientificmilitarytheory.Thesmallestofthesefragments,consistinginmerescientificwordsandmetaphors,areoftennothingmorethanornamentalflourishesofcriticalnarration.Nowitisinthenatureofthingsthatalltechnicalandscientificexpressionswhichbelongtoasystemlosetheirpropriety,iftheyeverhadany,assoonastheyaredistorted,andusedasgeneralaxioms,orassmallcrystallinetalismans,whichhavemorepowerofdemonstrationthansimplespeech.

　　Thusithascometopassthatourtheoreticalandcriticalbooks,insteadofbeingstraightforward,intelligibledissertations,inwhichtheauthoralwaysknowsatleastwhathesaysandthereaderwhathereads,are

　　imfulofthesetechnicalterms,whichformdarkpointsofinterferencewhereauthorandreaderpartcompany.Butfrequentlytheyaresomethingworse,beingnothingbuthollowshellswithoutanykernel.Theauthorhimselfhasnoclearperceptionofwhathemeans,contentshimselfwithvagueideas,whichifexpressedinplainlanguagewouldbeunsatisfactoryeventohimself.

　　AthirdfaultincriticismistheMISUSEofHISTORICALEXAMPLES,andadisplayofgreatreadingorlearning.WhatthehistoryoftheArtofWariswehavealreadysaid,andweshallfurtherexplainourviewsonexamplesandonmilitaryhistoryingeneralinspecialchapters.Onefactmerelytoucheduponinaverycursorymannermaybeusedtosupportthemostoppositeviews,andthreeorfoursuchfactsofthemostheterogeneousdescription,

　　oughttogetheroutofthemostdistantlandsandremotetimesandheapedup,generallydistractandbewilderthejudgmentandunderstandingwithoutdemonstratinganything;forwhenexposedtothelighttheyturnouttobeonlytrumperyrubbish,madeuseoftoshowofftheauthor'slearning.

　　Butwhatcanbegainedforpracticallifebysuchobscure,partlyfalse,confusedarbitraryconceptions?Solittleisgainedthattheoryonaccountofthemhasalwaysbeenatrueantithesisofpractice,andfrequentlyasubjectofridiculetothosewhosesoldierlyqualitiesinthefieldareabovequestion.

　　Butitisimpossiblethatthiscouldhavebeenthecase,iftheoryinsimplelanguage,andbynaturaltreatmentofthosethingswhichconstitutetheArtofmakingWar,hadmerelysoughttoestablishjustsomuchasadmitsofbeingestablished;if,avoidingallfalsepretensionsandirrelevantdisplayofscientificformsandhistoricalparallels,ithadkeptclosetothesubject,andgonehandinhandwiththosewhomustconductaffairsinthefieldbytheirownnaturalgenius. 蓝星，夏国。

　　肿瘤科病房，弥漫着医院独有的消毒水味道。病房是单人间，设施俱全，温馨舒适。

　

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　可对于孑然一身的路遥来讲，却是无人问津的等死之地。

　　他是癌症晚期，靠着意志力撑到现在，但也只是多受几天罪罢了。

　　此刻，路遥躺在病床上，怔怔望着床头柜上的水杯，想喝口水。

　　可他拼尽全力却无法让身体离开病床。剧痛和衰弱，让这原本无比简单的事情成了奢望。

　　这时，一道幸灾乐祸的声音响起：“表哥~你真是狼狈呢。连喝口水都得指望别人施舍。”

　　一位英俊的年轻男子悠闲坐在病床前，翘着二郎腿，眼睛笑成一道缝。

　　“你求求我，我给你喝口水如何？”

　　路遥面无表情，一言不发。自从失去了自理能力，一帮亲戚的嘴脸已经见多了，不差这一个。

　　男子起身，将水杯拿在手里递过来，“表哥别生气，我开玩笑的，你对我这么好，喂你口水还是能办到的。”

　　说完话，他将水杯里的水，缓缓倒在路遥苍白消瘦的脸上。

　　被呛到，路遥无力的咳嗽几声，好在少量的水流过嗓子，让他有了几丝说话的力气：

　

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　“张鑫，为什么？我从未得罪过你。你去星盟国留学，还是我资助的！”

　　张鑫将水杯放下，不紧不慢的说：“谁让你这么古板呢，只是运点感冒药罢了，又不犯法，你非得千方百计的拦着。”

　　路遥脸上闪过一丝了然之色，道：“张鑫你这垃圾，狗改不了吃屎。将感冒药运到国外提炼毒品……咳咳……”

　　张鑫理了下领带，笑道：“你别血口喷人啊，我可是国际知名企业家。这次回国，‘省招商引资局’还打电话欢迎我呢~”

　　路遥叹了口气，现在的自己什么都做不了，索性闭上眼睛不再说话，安静等待死亡的到来。

　　但张鑫却不想让眼前饱受病痛折磨、即将离世的表兄走好。他附身靠近，悄悄说道：琇書蛧

　　“表哥啊~其实呢，我这次回国主要就是见你一面，告诉你一声——你的癌，是我弄出来的~”

　　路遥陡然挣开眼，“你说什么！”

　　张鑫笑眯眯的掏出个铅盒打开，里面是件古怪的三角形饰物，仅有巴掌大小，中间是只眼睛似的图案，一看就很有年代感。

　　“眼熟吧？这是我亲手送你的，货真价实的古董。我在里面掺了点放射性物质，长期接触就会变成你现在这副鬼样子。”

　　路遥马上认出来，这是自己很喜欢的一件古物，天天摆在书桌上，时不时的把玩，没想到却是要人命的东西！

　　他伸出枯枝似的手臂，死死的抓住眼前人的胳膊！“你……”

　　“别激动~表哥，我西装很贵的。”张鑫轻松拿掉路遥的手，小心的捏起铅盒，将放射性饰物塞进他怀里。

　　“我赶飞机，得先走一步。你好好留着这个当做纪念吧，有机会再去你的坟头蹦迪~”

　　说完话，张鑫从容起身离开。临走前，还回头俏皮的眨眨眼。他原本就男生女相，此时的神态动作居然有些娇媚。

　　保镖很有眼力劲，赶紧打开病房门。同时用无线耳麦联络同事，提前发动汽车。

　　~~~~~~~~

　　路遥只能无力的瘫在床上，浑身皆是钻心剜骨般的剧痛，还有无穷悔恨、不甘。

　

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　但很快，剧痛渐渐消失，只剩麻木，路遥隐约听到过世的双亲在喊他。

　　就在路遥的身体越来越飘，即将失去意识时，胸口突然阵阵发烫，将他惊醒。

　　从怀中摸出那三角形饰物，发现这玩意变得滚烫无比，还在缓缓发光！

秀书网为你提供最快的战争论更新，BOOK II ON THE THEORY OF WAR（3）免费阅读。https://www.xiumb9.com