ANCHESOFTHEARTOFWAR
WARinitsliteralmeaningisfighting,forfightingaloneistheefficientprincipleinthemanifoldactivitywhichinawidesenseiscalledWar.Butfightingisatrialofstrengthofthemoralandphysicalforcesbymeansofthelatter.Thatthemoralcannotbeomittedisevidentofitself,fortheconditionofthemindhasalwaysthemostdecisiveinfluenceontheforcesemployedinWar.
Thenecessityoffightingverysoonledmentospecialinventionstoturntheadvantageinitintheirownfavour:inconsequenceofthesethemodeoffightinghasundergonegreatalterations;butinwhateverwayitisconducteditsconceptionremainsunaltered,andfightingisthatwhichconstitutesWar.
Theinventionshavebeenfromthefirstweaponsandequipmentsfortheindividualcombatants.ThesehavetobeprovidedandtheuseofthemlearntbeforetheWarbegins.Theyaremadesuitabletothenatureofthefighting,consequentlyareruledbyit;butplainlytheactivityengagedintheseappliancesisadifferentthingfromthefightitself;itisonlythepreparationforthecombat,nottheconductofthesame.Thatarmingandequippingarenotessentialtotheconceptionoffightingisplain,becausemerewrestlingisalsofighting.
Fightinghasdeterminedeverythingappertainingtoarmsandequipment,andtheseinturnmodifythemodeoffighting;thereis,therefore,areciprocityofactionbetweenthetwo.
Nevertheless,thefightitselfremainsstillanentirelyspecialactivity,moreparticularlybecauseitmovesinanentirelyspecialelement,namely,intheelementofdanger.
If,then,thereisanywhereanecessityfordrawingalinebetweentwodifferentactivities,itishere;andinordertoseeclearlytheimportanceofthisidea,weneedonlyjusttocalltomindhowofteneminentpersonalfitnessinonefieldhasturnedoutnothingbutthemostuselesspedantryintheother.
Itisalsoinnowaydifficulttoseparateinideatheoneactivityfromtheother,ifwelookatthecombatantforcesfullyarmedandequippedasagivenmeans,theprofitableuseofwhichrequiresnothingmorethanaknowledgeoftheirgeneralresults.
TheArtofWaristherefore,initspropersense,theartofmakinguseofthegivenmeansinfighting,andwecannotgiveitabetternamethanthe"ConductofWar."Ontheotherhand,inawidersenseallactivitieswhichhavetheirexistenceonaccountofWar,thereforethewholecreationoftroops,thatislevyingthem,arming,equipping,andexercisingthem,belongtotheArtofWar.
Tomakeasoundtheoryitismostessentialtoseparatethesetwoactivities,foritiseasytoseethatifeveryactofWaristobeginwiththepreparationofmilitaryforces,andtopresupposeforcessoorganisedasaprimaryconditionforconductingWar,thattheorywillonlybeapplicableinthefewcasestowhichtheforceavailablehappenstobeexactlysuited.If,ontheotherhand,wewishtohaveatheorywhichshallsuitmostcases,andwillnotbewhollyuselessinanycase,itmustbefoundedonthosemeanswhichareinmostgeneraluse,andinrespecttotheseonlyontheactualresultsspringingfromthem.
TheconductofWaris,therefore,theformationandconductofthefighting.Ifthisfightingwasasingleact,therewouldbenonecessityforanyfurthersubdivision,butthefightiscomposedofagreaterorlessnumberofsingleacts,completeinthemselves,whichwecallcombats,aswehaveshowninthefirstchapterofthefirstbook,andwhichformnewunits.Fromthisarisesthetotallydifferentactivities,thatoftheFORMATIONandCONDUCTofthesesinglecombatsinthemselves,andtheCOMBINATIONofthemwithoneanother,withaviewtotheultimateobjectoftheWar.ThefirstiscalledTACTICS,theotherSTRATEGY.琇書蛧
Thisdivisionintotacticsandstrategyisnowinalmostgeneraluse,andeveryoneknowstolerablywellunderwhichheadtoplaceanysinglefact,withoutknowingverydistinctlythegroundsonwhichtheclassificationisfounded.Butwhensuchdivisionsareblindlyadheredtoinpractice,theymusthavesomedeeproot.Wehavesearchedforthisroot,andwemightsaythatitisjusttheusageofthemajoritywhichhas
oughtustoit.Ontheotherhand,welookuponthearbitrary,unnaturaldefinitionsoftheseconceptionssoughttobeestablishedbysomewritersasnotinaccordancewiththegeneralusageoftheterms.
Accordingtoourclassification,therefore,tacticsISTHETHEORYOFTHEUSEOFMILITARYFORCESINCOMBAT.StrategyISTHETHEORYOFTHEUSEOFCOMBATSFORTHEOBJECTOFTHEWAR.
Thewayinwhichtheconceptionofasingle,orindependentcombat,ismorecloselydetermined,theconditionstowhichthisunitisattached,weshallonlybeabletoexplainclearlywhenweconsiderthecombat;wemustcontentourselvesforthepresentwithsayingthatinrelationtospace,thereforeincombatstakingplaceatthesametime,theunitreachesjustasfarasPERSONALCOMMANDreaches;butinregardtotime,andthereforeinrelationtocombatswhichfolloweachotherinclosesuccession,itreachestothemomentwhenthecrisiswhichtakesplaceineverycombatisentirelypassed.
Thatdoubtfulcasesmayoccur,cases,forinstance,inwhichseveralcombatsmayperhapsberegardedalsoasasingleone,willnotoverthrowthegroundofdistinctionwehaveadopted,forthesameisthecasewithallgroundsofdistinctionofrealthingswhicharedifferentiatedbyagraduallydiminishingscale.Theremay,therefore,certainlybeactsofactivityinWarwhich,withoutanyalterationinthepointofview,mayjustaswellbecountedstrategicastactical;forexample,veryextendedpositionsresemblingachainofposts,thepreparationsforthepassageofariveratseveralpoints,&c.
OurclassificationreachesandcoversonlytheUSEOFTHEMILITARYFORCE.ButnowthereareinWaranumberofactivitieswhicharesubservienttoit,andstillarequitedifferentfromit;sometimescloselyallied,sometimeslessnearintheiraffinity.AlltheseactivitiesrelatetotheMAINTENANCEOFTHEMILITARYFORCE.Inthesamewayasitscreationandtrainingprecedeitsuse,soitsmaintenanceisalwaysanecessarycondition.But,strictlyviewed,allactivitiesthusconnectedwithitarealwaystoberegardedonlyaspreparationsforfighting;theyarecertainlynothingmorethanactivitieswhichareveryclosetotheaction,sothattheyrunthroughthehostileactalternateinimportancewiththeuseoftheforces.WehavethereforearighttoexcludethemaswellastheotherpreparatoryactivitiesfromtheArtofWarinitsrestrictedsense,fromtheconductofWarproperlysocalled;andweareobligedtodosoifwewouldcomplywiththefirstprincipleofalltheory,theeliminationofallheterogeneouselements.Whowouldincludeinthereal"conductofWar"thewholelitanyofsubsistenceandadministration,becauseitisadmittedtostandinconstantreciprocalactionwiththeuseofthetroops,butissomethingessentiallydifferentfromit?
Wehavesaid,inthethirdchapterofourfirstbook,thatasthefightorcombatistheonlydirectlyeffectiveactivity,thereforethethreadsofallothers,astheyendinit,areincludedinit.Bythiswemeanttosaythattoallothersanobjectwastherebyappointedwhich,inaccordancewiththelawspeculiartothemselves,theymustseektoattain.Herewemustgoalittlecloserintothissubject.
Thesubjectswhichconstitutetheactivitiesoutsideofthecombatareofvariouskinds.
Theonepartbelongs,inonerespect,tothecombatitself,isidenticalwithit,whilstitservesinanotherrespectforthemaintenanceofthemilitaryforce.Theotherpartbelongspurelytothesubsistence,andhasonly,inconsequenceofthereciprocalaction,alimitedinfluenceonthecombatsbyitsresults.ThesubjectswhichinonerespectbelongtothefightingitselfareMARCHES,CAMPS,andCANTONMENTS,fortheysupposesomanydifferentsituationsoftroops,andwheretroopsaresupposedtheretheideaofthecombatmustalwaysbepresent.
Theothersubjects,whichonlybelongtothemaintenance,areSUBSISTENCE,CAREOFTHESICK,theSUPPLYANDREPAIROFARMSANDEQUIPMENT.
Marchesarequiteidenticalwiththeuseofthetroops.Theactofmarchinginthecombat,generallycalledmanoeuvring,certainlydoesnotnecessarilyincludetheuseofweapons,butitissocompletelyandnecessarilycombinedwithitthatitformsanintegralpartofthatwhichwecallacombat.Butthemarchoutsidethecombatisnothingbuttheexecutionofastrategicmeasure.BythestrategicplanissettledWHEN,WHERE,andWITHWHATFORCESabattleistobedelivered—andtocarrythatintoexecutionthemarchistheonlymeans.
Themarchoutsideofthecombatisthereforeaninstrumentofstrategy,butnotonthataccountexclusivelyasubjectofstrategy,forasthearmedforcewhichexecutesitmaybeinvolvedinapossiblecombatatanymoment,thereforeitsexecutionstandsalsoundertacticalaswellasstrategicrules.Ifweprescribetoacolumnitsrouteonaparticularsideofariverorofa
anchofamountain,thenthatisastrategicmeasure,foritcontainstheintentionoffightingonthatparticularsideofthehillorriverinpreferencetotheother,incaseacombatshouldbenecessaryduringthemarch.
Butifacolumn,insteadoffollowingtheroadthroughavalley,marchesalongtheparallelridgeofheights,orfortheconvenienceofmarchingdividesitselfintoseveralcolumns,thenthesearetacticalarrangements,fortheyrelatetothemannerinwhichweshallusethetroopsintheanticipatedcombat.
Theparticularorderofmarchisinconstantrelationwithreadinessforcombat,isthereforetacticalinitsnature,foritisnothingmorethanthefirstorpreliminarydispositionforthebattlewhichmaypossiblytakeplace.
Asthemarchistheinstrumentbywhichstrategyapportionsitsactiveelements,thecombats,buttheselastoftenonlyappearbytheirresultsandnotinthedetailsoftheirrealcourse,itcouldnotfailtohappenthatintheorytheinstrumenthasoftenbeensubstitutedfortheefficientprinciple.Thuswehearofadecisiveskilfulmarch,allusionbeingtherebymadetothosecombat-combinationstowhichthesemarchesled.Thissubstitutionofideasistoonaturalandconcisenessofexpressiontoodesirabletocallforalteration,butstillitisonlyacondensedchainofideasinregardtowhichwemustneveromittobearinmindthefullmeaning,ifwewouldavoidfallingintoerror.
Wefallintoanerrorofthisdescriptionifweattributetostrategicalcombinationsapowerindependentoftacticalresults.Wereadofmarchesandmanoeuvrescombined,theobjectattained,andatthesametimenotawordaboutcombat,fromwhichtheconclusionisdrawnthattherearemeansinWarofconqueringanenemywithoutfighting.Theprolificnatureofthiserrorwecannotshowuntilhereafter.
Butalthoughamarchcanberegardedabsolutelyasanintegralpartofthecombat,stillthereareinitcertainrelationswhichdonotbelongtothecombat,andthereforeareneithertacticalnorstrategic.Tothesebelongallarrangementswhichconcernonlytheaccommodationofthetroops,theconstructionof
idges,roads,&c.Theseareonlyconditions;undermanycircumstancestheyareinverycloseconnection,andmayalmostidentifythemselveswiththetroops,asinbuildinga
idgeinpresenceoftheenemy;butinthemselvestheyarealwaysactivities,thetheoryofwhichdoesnotformpartofthetheoryoftheconductofWar.
Camps,bywhichwemeaneverydispositionoftroopsinconcentrated,thereforeinbattleorder,incontradistinctiontocantonmentsorquarters,areastateofrest,thereforeofrestoration;buttheyareatthesametimealsothestrategicappointmentofabattleonthespot,chosen;andbythemannerinwhichtheyaretakenuptheycontainthefundamentallinesofthebattle,aconditionfromwhicheverydefensivebattlestarts;theyarethereforeessentialpartsofbothstrategyandtactics.
Cantonmentstaketheplaceofcampsforthebetterrefreshmentofthetroops.Theyaretherefore,likecamps,strategicsubjectsasregardspositionandextent;tacticalsubjectsasregardsinternalorganisation,withaviewtoreadinesstofight.
Theoccupationofcampsandcantonmentsnodoubtusuallycombineswiththerecuperationofthetroopsanotherobjectalso,forexample,thecoveringadistrictofcountry,theholdingaposition;butitcanverywellbeonlythefirst.Weremindourreadersthatstrategymayfollowagreatdiversityofobjects,foreverythingwhichappearsanadvantagemaybetheobjectofacombat,andthepreservationoftheinstrumentwithwhichWarismademustnecessarilyveryoftenbecometheobjectofitspartialcombinations.
If,therefore,insuchacasestrategyministersonlytothemaintenanceofthetroops,wearenotonthataccountoutofthefieldofstrategy,forwearestillengagedwiththeuseofthemilitaryforce,becauseeverydispositionofthatforceuponanypointWhateverofthetheatreofWarissuchause.
Butifthemaintenanceofthetroopsincamporquarterscallsforthactivitieswhicharenoemploymentofthearmedforce,suchastheconstructionofhuts,pitchingoftents,subsistenceandsanitaryservicesincampsorquarters,thensuchbelongneithertostrategynortactics.
Evenentrenchments,thesiteandpreparationofwhichareplainlypartoftheorderofbattle,thereforetacticalsubjects,donotbelongtothetheoryoftheconductofWarsofarasrespectstheexecutionoftheirconstructiontheknowledgeandskillrequiredforsuchworkbeing,inpointoffact,qualitiesinherentinthenatureofanorganisedArmy;thetheoryofthecombattakesthemforgranted.
Amongstthesubjectswhichbelongtothemerekeepingupofanarmedforce,becausenoneofthepartsareidentifiedwiththecombat,thevictuallingofthetroopsthemselvescomesfirst,asitmustbedonealmostdailyandforeachindividual.Thusitisthatitcompletelypermeatesmilitaryactioninthepartsconstitutingstrategy—wesaypartsconstitutingstrategy,becauseduringabattlethesubsistenceoftroopswillrarelyhaveanyinfluenceinmodifyingtheplan,althoughthethingisconceivableenough.Thecareforthesubsistenceofthetroopscomesthereforeintoreciprocalactionchieflywithstrategy,andthereisnothingmorecommonthanfortheleadingstrategicfeaturesofacampaignandWartobetracedoutinconnectionwithaviewtothissupply.Buthoweverfrequentandhoweverimportanttheseviewsofsupplymaybe,thesubsistenceofthetroopsalwaysremainsacompletelydifferentactivityfromtheuseofthetroops,andtheformerhasonlyaninfluenceonthelatterbyitsresults.
Theother
anchesofadministrativeactivitywhichwehavementionedstandmuchfartherapartfromtheuseofthetroops.Thecareofsickandwounded,highlyimportantasitisforthegoodofanArmy,directlyaffectsitonlyinasmallportionoftheindividualscomposingit,andthereforehasonlyaweakandindirectinfluenceupontheuseoftherest.Thecompletingandreplacingarticlesofarmsandequipment,exceptsofarasbytheorganismoftheforcesitconstitutesacontinuousactivityinherentinthem—takesplaceonlyperiodically,andthereforeseldomaffectsstrategicplans.
Wemust,however,hereguardourselvesagainstamistake.Incertaincasesthesesubjectsmaybereallyofdecisiveimportance.Thedistanceofhospitalsanddep?tsofmunitionsmayveryeasilybeimaginedasthesolecauseofveryimportantstrategicdecisions.Wedonotwisheithertocontestthatpointortothrowitintotheshade.Butweareatpresentoccupiednotwiththeparticularfactsofaconcretecase,butwithabstracttheory;andourassertionthereforeisthatsuchaninfluenceistooraretogivethetheoryofsanitarymeasuresandthesupplyofmunitionsandarmsanimportanceintheoryoftheconductofWarsuchastomakeitworthwhiletoincludeinthetheoryoftheconductofWartheconsiderationofthedifferentwaysandsystemswhichtheabovetheoriesmayfurnish,inthesamewayasiscertainlynecessaryinregardtovictuallingtroops.
Ifwehaveclearlyunderstoodtheresultsofourreflections,thentheactivitiesbelongingtoWardividethemselvesintotwoprincipalclasses,intosuchasareonly"preparationsforWar"andintothe"Waritself."Thisdivisionmustthereforealsobemadeintheory.
TheknowledgeandapplicationsofskillinthepreparationsforWarareengagedinthecreation,discipline,andmaintenanceofallthemilitaryforces;whatgeneralnamesshouldbegiventothemwedonotenterinto,butweseethatartillery,fortification,elementarytactics,astheyarecalled,thewholeorganisationandadministrationofthevariousarmedforces,andallsuchthingsareincluded.ButthetheoryofWaritselfoccupiesitselfwiththeuseofthesepreparedmeansfortheobjectofthewar.Itneedsofthefirstonlytheresults,thatis,theknowledgeoftheprincipalpropertiesofthemeanstakeninhandforuse.Thiswecall"TheArtofWar"inalimitedsense,or"TheoryoftheConductofWar,"or"TheoryoftheEmploymentofArmedForces,"allofthemdenotingforusthesamething.
Thepresenttheorywillthereforetreatthecombatastherealcontest,marches,camps,andcantonmentsascircumstanceswhicharemoreorlessidenticalwithit.ThesubsistenceofthetroopswillonlycomeintoconsiderationlikeOTHERGIVENCIRCUMSTANCESinrespectofitsresults,notasanactivitybelongingtothecombat.
TheArtofWarthusviewedinitslimitedsensedividesitselfagainintotacticsandstrategy.Theformeroccupiesitselfwiththeformoftheseparatecombat,thelatterwithitsuse.Bothconnectthemselveswiththecircumstancesofmarches,camps,cantonmentsonlythroughthecombat,andthesecircumstancesaretacticalorstrategicaccordingastheyrelatetotheformortothesignificationofthebattle.
Nodoubttherewillbemanyreaderswhowillconsidersuperfluousthiscarefulseparationoftwothingslyingsoclosetogetherastacticsandstrategy,becauseithasnodirecteffectontheconductitselfofWar.Weadmit,certainlythatitwouldbepedantrytolookfordirecteffectsonthefieldofbattlefromatheoreticaldistinction.
Butthefirstbusinessofeverytheoryistoclearupconceptionsandideaswhichhavebeenjumbledtogether,and,wemaysay,entangledandconfused;andonlywhenarightunderstandingisestablished,astonamesandconceptions,canwehopetoprogresswithclearnessandfacility,andbecertainthatauthorandreaderwillalwaysseethingsfromthesamepointofview.Tacticsandstrategyaretwoactivitiesmutuallypermeatingeachotherintimeandspace,atthesametimeessentiallydifferentactivities,theinnerlawsandmutualrelationsofwhichcannotbeintelligibleatalltotheminduntilaclearconceptionofthenatureofeachactivityisestablished.
Hetowhomallthisisnothing,musteitherrepudiatealltheoreticalconsideration,ORHISUNDERSTANDINGHASNOTASYETBEENPAINEDbytheconfusedandperplexingideasrestingonnofixedpointofview,leadingtonosatisfactoryresult,sometimesdull,sometimesfantastic,sometimesfloatinginvaguegeneralities,whichweareoftenobligedtohearandreadontheconductofWar,owingtothespiritofscientificinvestigationhavinghithertobeenlittledirectedtothesesubjects. 蓝星，夏国。
肿瘤科病房，弥漫着医院独有的消毒水味道。病房是单人间，设施俱全，温馨舒适。
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可对于孑然一身的路遥来讲，却是无人问津的等死之地。
他是癌症晚期，靠着意志力撑到现在，但也只是多受几天罪罢了。
此刻，路遥躺在病床上，怔怔望着床头柜上的水杯，想喝口水。
可他拼尽全力却无法让身体离开病床。剧痛和衰弱，让这原本无比简单的事情成了奢望。
这时，一道幸灾乐祸的声音响起：“表哥~你真是狼狈呢。连喝口水都得指望别人施舍。”
一位英俊的年轻男子悠闲坐在病床前，翘着二郎腿，眼睛笑成一道缝。
“你求求我，我给你喝口水如何？”
路遥面无表情，一言不发。自从失去了自理能力，一帮亲戚的嘴脸已经见多了，不差这一个。
男子起身，将水杯拿在手里递过来，“表哥别生气，我开玩笑的，你对我这么好，喂你口水还是能办到的。”
说完话，他将水杯里的水，缓缓倒在路遥苍白消瘦的脸上。
被呛到，路遥无力的咳嗽几声，好在少量的水流过嗓子，让他有了几丝说话的力气：
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“张鑫，为什么？我从未得罪过你。你去星盟国留学，还是我资助的！”
张鑫将水杯放下，不紧不慢的说：“谁让你这么古板呢，只是运点感冒药罢了，又不犯法，你非得千方百计的拦着。”
路遥脸上闪过一丝了然之色，道：“张鑫你这垃圾，狗改不了吃屎。将感冒药运到国外提炼毒品……咳咳……”
张鑫理了下领带，笑道：“你别血口喷人啊，我可是国际知名企业家。这次回国，‘省招商引资局’还打电话欢迎我呢~”
路遥叹了口气，现在的自己什么都做不了，索性闭上眼睛不再说话，安静等待死亡的到来。
但张鑫却不想让眼前饱受病痛折磨、即将离世的表兄走好。他附身靠近，悄悄说道：琇書蛧
“表哥啊~其实呢，我这次回国主要就是见你一面，告诉你一声——你的癌，是我弄出来的~”
路遥陡然挣开眼，“你说什么！”
张鑫笑眯眯的掏出个铅盒打开，里面是件古怪的三角形饰物，仅有巴掌大小，中间是只眼睛似的图案，一看就很有年代感。
“眼熟吧？这是我亲手送你的，货真价实的古董。我在里面掺了点放射性物质，长期接触就会变成你现在这副鬼样子。”
路遥马上认出来，这是自己很喜欢的一件古物，天天摆在书桌上，时不时的把玩，没想到却是要人命的东西！
他伸出枯枝似的手臂，死死的抓住眼前人的胳膊！“你……”
“别激动~表哥，我西装很贵的。”张鑫轻松拿掉路遥的手，小心的捏起铅盒，将放射性饰物塞进他怀里。
“我赶飞机，得先走一步。你好好留着这个当做纪念吧，有机会再去你的坟头蹦迪~”
说完话，张鑫从容起身离开。临走前，还回头俏皮的眨眨眼。他原本就男生女相，此时的神态动作居然有些娇媚。
保镖很有眼力劲，赶紧打开病房门。同时用无线耳麦联络同事，提前发动汽车。
~~~~~~~~
路遥只能无力的瘫在床上，浑身皆是钻心剜骨般的剧痛，还有无穷悔恨、不甘。
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但很快，剧痛渐渐消失，只剩麻木，路遥隐约听到过世的双亲在喊他。
就在路遥的身体越来越飘，即将失去意识时，胸口突然阵阵发烫，将他惊醒。
从怀中摸出那三角形饰物，发现这玩意变得滚烫无比，还在缓缓发光！
秀书网为你提供最快的战争论更新，BOOK II ON THE THEORY OF WAR免费阅读。https://www.xiumb9.com
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