INthelastchapterweshowedthedestructionoftheenemyasthetrueobjectofthecombat,andwehavesoughttoprovebyaspecialconsiderationofthepoint,thatthisistrueinthemajorityofcases,andinrespecttothemostimportantbattles,becausethedestructionoftheenemy'sArmyisalwaysthepreponderatingobjectinWar.Theotherobjectswhichmaybemixedupwiththisdestructionoftheenemy'sforce,andmayhavemoreorlessinfluence,weshalldescribegenerallyinthenextchapter,andbecomebetteracquaintedwithbydegreesafterwards;herewedivestthecombatofthementirely,andlookuponthedestructionoftheenemyasthecompleteandsufficientobjectofanycombat.wWW.ΧìǔΜЬ.CǒΜ
Whatarewenowtounderstandbydestructionoftheenemy'sArmy?Adiminutionofitrelativelygreaterthanthatonourownside.Ifwehaveagreatsuperiorityinnumbersovertheenemy,thennaturallythesameabsoluteamountoflossonbothsidesisforusasmalleronethanforhim,andconsequentlymayberegardedinitselfasanadvantage.Aswearehereconsideringthecombatasdivestedofall(other)objects,wemustalsoexcludefromourconsiderationthecaseinwhichthecombatisusedonlyindirectlyforagreaterdestructionoftheenemy'sforce;consequentlyalso,onlythatdirectgainwhichhasbeenmadeinthemutualprocessofdestruction,istoberegardedastheobject,forthisisanabsolutegain,whichrunsthroughthewholecampaign,andattheendofitwillalwaysappearaspureprofit.Buteveryotherkindofvictoryoverouropponentwilleitherhaveitsmotiveinotherobjects,whichwehavecompletelyexcludedhere,oritwillonlyyieldatemporaryrelativeadvantage.Anexamplewillmakethisplain.
Ifbyaskilfuldispositionwehavereducedouropponenttosuchadilemma,thathecannotcontinuethecombatwithoutdanger,andaftersomeresistanceheretires,thenwemaysay,thatwehaveconqueredhimatthatpoint;butifinthisvictorywehaveexpendedjustasmanyforcesastheenemy,theninclosingtheaccountofthecampaign,thereisnogainremainingfromthisvictory,ifsucharesultcanbecalledavictory.Thereforetheovercomingtheenemy,thatis,placinghiminsuchapositionthathemustgiveupthefight,countsfornothinginitself,andforthatreasoncannotcomeunderthedefinitionofobject.Thereremains,therefore,aswehavesaid,nothingoverexceptthedirectgainwhichwehavemadeintheprocessofdestruction;buttothisbelongnotonlythelosseswhichhavetakenplaceinthecourseofthecombat,butalsothosewhich,afterthewithdrawaloftheconqueredpart,takeplaceasdirectconsequencesofthesame.
Nowitisknownbyexperience,thatthelossesinphysicalforcesinthecourseofabattleseldompresentagreatdifferencebetweenvictorandvanquishedrespectively,oftennoneatall,sometimesevenonebearinganinverserelationtotheresult,andthatthemostdecisivelossesonthesideofthevanquishedonlycommencewiththeretreat,thatis,thosewhichtheconquerordoesnotsharewithhim.Theweakremainsofbattalionsalreadyindisorderarecutdownbycavalry,exhaustedmenstrewtheground,disabledgunsand
okencaissonsareabandoned,othersinthebadstateoftheroadscannotberemovedquicklyenough,andarecapturedbytheenemy'stroops,duringthenightnumberslosetheirway,andfalldefencelessintotheenemy'shands,andthusthevictorymostlygainsbodilysubstanceafteritisalreadydecided.Herewouldbeaparadox,ifitdidnotsolveitselfinthefollowingmanner.
Thelossinphysicalforceisnottheonlyonewhichthetwosidessufferinthecourseofthecombat;themoralforcesalsoareshaken,
oken,andgotoruin.Itisnotonlythelossinmen,horsesandguns,butinorder,courage,confidence,cohesionandplan,whichcomeintoconsiderationwhenitisaquestionwhetherthefightcanbestillcontinuedornot.Itisprincipallythemoralforceswhichdecidehere,andinallcasesinwhichtheconquerorhaslostasheavilyastheconquered,itisthesealone.
Thecomparativerelationofthephysicallossesisdifficulttoestimateinabattle,butnotsotherelationofthemoralones.Twothingsprincipallymakeitknown.Theoneisthelossofthegroundonwhichthefighthastakenplace,theotherthesuperiorityoftheenemy's.Themoreourreserveshavediminishedascomparedwiththoseoftheenemy,themoreforcewehaveusedtomaintaintheequili
ium;inthisatonce,anevidentproofofthemoralsuperiorityoftheenemyisgivenwhichseldomfailstostirupinthesouloftheCommanderacertainbitternessoffeeling,andasortofcontemptforhisowntroops.Buttheprincipalthingis,thatmenwhohavebeenengagedforalongcontinuanceoftimearemoreorlesslikeburnt-outcinders;theirammunitionisconsumed;theyhavemeltedawaytoacertainextent;physicalandmoralenergiesareexhausted,perhapstheircourageis
okenaswell.Suchaforce,irrespectiveofthediminutioninitsnumber,ifviewedasanorganicwhole,isverydifferentfromwhatitwasbeforethecombat;andthusitisthatthelossofmoralforcemaybemeasuredbythereservesthathavebeenusedasifitwereonafoot-rule.
Lostgroundandwantoffreshreserves,are,therefore,usuallytheprincipalcauseswhichdeterminearetreat;butatthesametimewebynomeansexcludeordesiretothrowintheshadeotherreasons,whichmaylieintheinterdependenceofpartsoftheArmy,inthegeneralplan,&c.
Everycombatisthereforethebloodyanddestructivemeasuringofthestrengthofforces,physicalandmoral;whoeverattheclosehasthegreatestamountofbothleftistheconqueror.
Inthecombatthelossofmoralforceisthechiefcauseofthedecision;afterthatisgiven,thislosscontinuestoincreaseuntilitreachesitsculminatingpointatthecloseofthewholeact.Thisthenistheopportunitythevictorshouldseizetoreaphisharvestbytheutmostpossiblerestrictionsofhisenemy'sforces,therealobjectofengaginginthecombat.Onthebeatenside,thelossofallorderandcontroloftenmakestheprolongationofresistancebyindividualunits,bythefurtherpunishmenttheyarecertaintosuffer,moreinjuriousthanusefultothewhole.Thespiritofthemassis
oken;theoriginalexcitementaboutlosingorwinning,throughwhichdangerwasforgotten,isspent,andtothemajoritydangernowappearsnolongeranappealtotheircourage,butrathertheenduranceofacruelpunishment.Thustheinstrumentinthefirstmomentoftheenemy'svictoryisweakenedandblunted,andthereforenolongerfittorepaydangerbydanger.
Thisperiod,however,passes;themoralforcesoftheconqueredwillrecoverbydegrees,orderwillberestored,couragewillrevive,andinthemajorityofcasesthereremainsonlyasmallpartofthesuperiorityobtained,oftennoneatall.Insomecases,even,althoughrarely,thespiritofrevengeandintensifiedhostilitymay
ingaboutanoppositeresult.Ontheotherhand,whateverisgainedinkilled,wounded,prisoners,andgunscapturedcanneverdisappearfromtheaccount.
Thelossesinabattleconsistmoreinkilledandwounded;thoseafterthebattle,moreinartillerytakenandprisoners.Thefirsttheconquerorshareswiththeconquered,moreorless,butthesecondnot;andforthatreasontheyusuallyonlytakeplaceononesideoftheconflict,atleast,theyareconsiderablyinexcessononeside.
Artilleryandprisonersarethereforeatalltimesregardedasthetruetrophiesofvictory,aswellasitsmeasure,becausethroughthesethingsitsextentisdeclaredbeyondadoubt.Eventhedegreeofmoralsuperioritymaybebetterjudgedofbythemthanbyanyotherrelation,especiallyifthenumberofkilledandwoundediscomparedtherewith;andherearisesanewpowerincreasingthemoraleffects.
Wehavesaidthatthemoralforces,beatentothegroundinthebattleandintheimmediatelysucceedingmovements,recoverthemselvesgradually,andoftenbearnotracesofinjury;thisisthecasewithsmalldivisionsofthewhole,lessfrequentlywithlargedivisions;itmay,however,alsobethecasewiththemainArmy,butseldomorneverintheStateorGovernmenttowhichtheArmybelongs.Theseestimatethesituationmoreimpartially,andfromamoreelevatedpointofview,andrecogniseinthenumberoftrophiestakenbytheenemy,andtheirrelationtothenumberofkilledandwounded,onlytooeasilyandwell,themeasureoftheirownweaknessandinefficiency.
Inpointoffact,thelostbalanceofmoralpowermustnotbetreatedlightlybecauseithasnoabsolutevalue,andbecauseitdoesnotofnecessityappearinallcasesintheamountoftheresultsatthefinalclose;itmaybecomeofsuchexcessiveweightasto
ingdowneverythingwithanirresistibleforce.Onthataccountitmayoftenbecomeagreataimoftheoperationsofwhichweshallspeakelsewhere.Herewehavestilltoexaminesomeofitsfundamentalrelations.
Themoraleffectofavictoryincreases,notmerelyinproportiontotheextentoftheforcesengaged,butinaprogressiveratio—thatistosay,notonlyinextent,butalsoinitsintensity.Inabeatendetachmentorderiseasilyrestored.Asasinglefrozenlimbiseasilyrevivedbytherestofthebody,sothecourageofadefeateddetachmentiseasilyraisedagainbythecourageoftherestoftheArmyassoonasitrejoinsit.If,therefore,theeffectsofasmallvictoryarenotcompletelydoneawaywith,stilltheyarepartlylosttotheenemy.ThisisnotthecaseiftheArmyitselfsustainsagreatdefeat;thenonewiththeotherfalltogether.Agreatfireattainsquiteadifferentheatfromseveralsmallones.
Anotherrelationwhichdeterminesthemoralvalueofavictoryisthenumericalrelationoftheforceswhichhavebeeninconflictwitheachother.Tobeatmanywithfewisnotonlyadoublesuccess,butshowsalsoagreater,especiallyamoregeneralsuperiority,whichtheconqueredmustalwaysbefearfulofencounteringagain.Atthesametimethisinfluenceisinrealityhardlyobservableinsuchacase.Inthemomentofrealaction,thenotionsoftheactualstrengthoftheenemyaregenerallysouncertain,theestimateofourowncommonlysoincorrect,thatthepartysuperiorinnumberseitherdoesnotadmitthedisproportion,orisveryfarfromadmittingthefulltruth,owingtowhich,heevadesalmostentirelythemoraldisadvantageswhichwouldspringfromit.Itisonlyhereafterinhistorythatthetruth,longsuppressedthroughignorance,vanity,orawisediscretion,makesitsappearance,andthenitcertainlycastsalustreontheArmyanditsLeader,butitcanthendonothingmorebyitsmoralinfluenceforeventslongpast.
Ifprisonersandcapturedgunsarethosethingsbywhichthevictoryprincipallygainssubstance,itstruecrystallisations,thentheplanofthebattleshouldhavethosethingsspeciallyinview;thedestructionoftheenemybydeathandwoundsappearsheremerelyasameanstoanend.
HowfarthismayinfluencethedispositionsinthebattleisnotanaffairofStrategy,butthedecisiontofightthebattleisinintimateconnectionwithit,asisshownbythedirectiongiventoourforces,andtheirgeneralgrouping,whetherwethreatentheenemy'sflankorrear,orhethreatensours.Onthispoint,thenumberofprisonersandcapturedgunsdependsverymuch,anditisapointwhich,inmanycases,tacticsalonecannotsatisfy,particularlyifthestrategicrelationsaretoomuchinoppositiontoit.
Theriskofhavingtofightontwosides,andthestillmoredangerouspositionofhavingnolineofretreatleftopen,paralysethemovementsandthepowerofresistance;further,incaseofdefeat,theyincreasetheloss,oftenraisingittoitsextremepoint,thatis,todestruction.Therefore,therearbeingendangeredmakesdefeatmoreprobable,and,atthesametime,moredecisive.
Fromthisarises,inthewholeconductoftheWar,especiallyingreatandsmallcombats,aperfectinstincttosecureourownlineofretreatandtoseizethatoftheenemy;thisfollowsfromtheconceptionofvictory,which,aswehaveseen,issomethingbeyondmereslaughter.
Inthiseffortwesee,therefore,thefirstimmediatepurposeinthecombat,andonewhichisquiteuniversal.Nocombatisimaginableinwhichthiseffort,eitherinitsdoubleorsingleform,doesnotgohandinhandwiththeplainandsimplestrokeofforce.Eventhesmallesttroopwillnotthrowitselfuponitsenemywithoutthinkingofitslineofretreat,and,inmostcases,itwillhaveaneyeuponthatoftheenemyalso.
Weshouldhavetodigresstoshowhowoftenthisinstinctispreventedfromgoingthedirectroad,howoftenitmustyieldtothedifficultiesarisingfrommoreimportantconsiderations:weshall,therefore,restcontentedwithaffirmingittobeageneralnaturallawofthecombat.
Itis,therefore,active;presseseverywherewithitsnaturalweight,andsobecomesthepivotonwhichalmostalltacticalandstrategicmanoeuvresturn.
Ifwenowtakealookattheconceptionofvictoryasawhole,wefindinitthreeelements:—
1.Thegreaterlossoftheenemyinphysicalpower.
2.Inmoralpower.
3.Hisopenavowalofthisbytherelinquishmentofhisintentions.
Thereturnsmadeuponeachsideoflossesinkilledandwounded,areneverexact,seldomtruthful,andinmostcases,fullofintentionalmisrepresentations.Eventhestatementofthenumberoftrophiesisseldomtobequitedependedon;consequently,whenitisnotconsiderableitmayalsocastadoubtevenontherealityofthevictory.Ofthelossinmoralforcesthereisnoreliablemeasure,exceptinthetrophies:therefore,inmanycases,thegivingupthecontestistheonlyrealevidenceofthevictory.Itis,therefore,toberegardedasaconfessionofinferiority—astheloweringoftheflag,bywhich,inthisparticularinstance,rightandsuperiorityareconcededtotheenemy,andthisdegreeofhumiliationanddisgrace,which,however,mustbedistinguishedfromalltheothermoralconsequencesofthelossofequili
ium,isanessentialpartofthevictory.ItisthispartalonewhichactsuponthepublicopinionoutsidetheArmy,uponthepeopleandtheGovernmentinbothbelligerentStates,anduponallothersinanywayconcerned.
Butrenouncementofthegeneralobjectisnotquiteidenticalwithquittingthefieldofbattle,evenwhenthebattlehasbeenveryobstinateandlongkeptup;noonesaysofadvancedposts,whentheyretireafteranobstinatecombat,thattheyhavegivenuptheirobject;evenincombatsaimedatthedestructionoftheenemy'sArmy,theretreatfromthebattlefieldisnotalwaystoberegardedasarelinquishmentofthisaim,asforinstance,inretreatsplannedbeforehand,inwhichthegroundisdisputedfootbyfoot;allthisbelongstothatpartofoursubjectwhereweshallspeakoftheseparateobjectofthecombat;hereweonlywishtodrawattentiontothefactthatinmostcasesthegivingupoftheobjectisverydifficulttodistinguishfromtheretirementfromthebattlefield,andthattheimpressionproducedbythelatter,bothinandoutoftheArmy,isnottobetreatedlightly.
ForGeneralsandArmieswhosereputationisnotmade,thisisinitselfoneofthedifficultiesinmanyoperations,justifiedbycircumstanceswhenasuccessionofcombats,eachendinginretreat,mayappearasasuccessionofdefeats,withoutbeingsoinreality,andwhenthatappearancemayexerciseaverydepressinginfluence.ItisimpossiblefortheretreatingGeneralbymakingknownhisrealintentionstopreventthemoraleffectspreadingtothepublicandhistroops,fortodothatwitheffecthemustdisclosehisplanscompletely,whichofcoursewouldruncountertohisprincipalintereststotoogreatadegree.
InordertodrawattentiontothespecialimportanceofthisconceptionofvictoryweshallonlyrefertothebattleofSoor,thetrophiesfromwhichwerenotimportant(afewthousandprisonersandtwentyguns),andwhereFrederickproclaimedhisvictorybyremainingforfivedaysafteronthefieldofbattle,althoughhisretreatintoSilesiahadbeenpreviouslydeterminedon,andwasameasurenaturaltohiswholesituation.Accordingtohisownaccount,hethoughthewouldhastenapeacebythemoraleffectofhisvictory.Nowalthoughacoupleofothersuccesseswerelikewiserequired,namely,thebattleatKatholischHennersdorf,inLusatia,andthebattleofKesseldorf,beforethispeacetookplace,stillwecannotsaythatthemoraleffectofthebattleofSoorwasnil.
Ifitischieflythemoralforcewhichisshakenbydefeat,andifthenumberoftrophiesreapedbytheenemymountsuptoanunusualheight,thenthelostcombatbecomesarout,butthisisnotthenecessaryconsequenceofeveryvictory.Aroutonlysetsinwhenthemoralforceofthedefeatedisveryseverelyshakenthenthereoftenensuesacompleteincapabilityoffurtherresistance,andthewholeactionconsistsofgivingway,thatisofflight.
JenaandBelleAlliancewererouts,butnotsoBorodino.
Althoughwithoutpedantrywecanheregivenosinglelineofseparation,becausethedifferencebetweenthethingsisoneofdegrees,yetstilltheretentionoftheconceptionisessentialasacentralpointtogiveclearnesstoourtheoreticalideasanditisawantinourterminologythatforavictoryovertheenemytantamounttoarout,andaconquestoftheenemyonlytantamounttoasimplevictory,thereisonlyoneandthesamewordtouse.
CHAPTER5ONTHESIGNIFICATIONOFTHECOMBAT
HAVINGintheprecedingchapterexaminedthecombatinitsabsoluteform,astheminiaturepictureofthewholeWar,wenowturntotherelationswhichitbearstotheotherpartsofthegreatwhole.Firstweinquirewhatismorepreciselythesignificationofacombat.
AsWarisnothingelsebutamutualprocessofdestruction,thenthemostnaturalanswerinconception,andperhapsalsoinreality,appearstobethatallthepowersofeachpartyuniteinonegreatvolumeandallresultsinonegreatshockofthesemasses.Thereiscertainlymuchtruthinthisidea,anditseemstobeveryadvisablethatweshouldadheretoitandshouldonthataccountlookuponsmallcombatsatfirstonlyasnecessaryloss,liketheshavingsfromacarpenter'splane.Still,however,thethingcannotbesettledsoeasily.
Thatamultiplicationofcombatsshouldarisefromafractioningofforcesisamatterofcourse,andthemoreimmediateobjectsofseparatecombatswillthereforecomebeforeusinthesubjectofafractioningofforces;buttheseobjects,andtogetherwiththem,thewholemassofcombatsmayinageneralwaybe
oughtundercertainclasses,andtheknowledgeoftheseclasseswillcontributetomakeourobservationsmoreintelligible.
Destructionoftheenemy'smilitaryforcesisinrealitytheobjectofallcombats;butotherobjectsmaybejoinedthereto,andtheseotherobjectsmaybeatthesametimepredominant;wemustthereforedrawadistinctionbetweenthoseinwhichthedestructionoftheenemy'sforcesistheprincipalobject,andthoseinwhichitismorethemeans.Thedestructionoftheenemy'sforce,thepossessionofaplaceorthepossessionofsomeobjectmaybethegeneralmotiveforacombat,anditmaybeeitheroneofthesealoneorseveraltogether,inwhichcasehoweverusuallyoneistheprincipalmotive.NowthetwoprincipalformsofWar,theoffensiveanddefensive,ofwhichweshallshortlyspeak,donotmodifythefirstofthesemotives,buttheycertainlydomodifytheothertwo,andthereforeifwearrangetheminaschemetheywouldappearthus:—
OFFENSIVE.
1.Destructionofenemy'sforce
2.Conquestofaplace.
3.Conquestofsomeobject.
DEFENSIVE.
1.Destructionofenemy'sforce.
2.Defenceofaplace.
3.Defenceofsomeobject.
Thesemotives,however,donotseemtoem
acecompletelythewholeofthesubject,ifwerecollectthattherearereconnaissancesanddemonstrations,inwhichplainlynoneofthesethreepointsistheobjectofthecombat.Inrealitywemust,therefore,onthisaccountbeallowedafourthclass.Strictlyspeaking,inreconnaissancesinwhichwewishtheenemytoshowhimself,inalarmsbywhichwewishtowearhimout,indemonstrationsbywhichwewishtopreventhisleavingsomepointortodrawhimofftoanother,theobjectsareallsuchascanonlybeattainedindirectlyandUNDERTHEPRETEXTOFONEOFTHETHREEOBJECTSSPECIFIEDINTHETABLE,usuallyofthesecond;fortheenemywhoseaimistoreconnoitremustdrawuphisforceasifhereallyintendedtoattackanddefeatus,ordriveusoff,&c.&c.Butthispretendedobjectisnottherealone,andourpresentquestionisonlyastothelatter;therefore,wemusttotheabovethreeobjectsoftheoffensivefurtheraddafourth,whichistoleadtheenemytomakeafalseconclusion.Thatoffensivemeansareconceivableinconnectionwiththisobject,liesinthenatureofthething.
Ontheotherhandwemustobservethatthedefenceofaplacemaybeoftwokinds,eitherabsolute,ifasageneralquestionthepointisnottobegivenup,orrelativeifitisonlyrequiredforacertaintime.Thelatterhappensperpetuallyinthecombatsofadvancedpostsandrearguards.
Thatthenatureofthesedifferentintentionsofacombatmusthaveanessentialinfluenceonthedispositionswhichareitspreliminaries,isathingclearinitself.Weactdifferentlyifourobjectismerelytodriveanenemy'spostoutofitsplacefromwhatweshouldifourobjectwastobeathimcompletely;differently,ifwemeantodefendaplacetothelastextremityfromwhatweshoulddoifourdesignisonlytodetaintheenemyforacertaintime.Inthefirstcasewetroubleourselveslittleaboutthelineofretreat,inthelatteritistheprincipalpoint,&c.
Butthesereflectionsbelongproperlytotactics,andareonlyintroducedherebywayofexampleforthesakeofgreaterclearness.WhatStrategyhastosayonthedifferentobjectsofthecombatwillappearinthechapterswhichtouchupontheseobjects.Herewehaveonlyafewgeneralobservationstomake,first,thattheimportanceoftheobjectdecreasesnearlyintheorderastheystandabove,therefore,thatthefirstoftheseobjectsmustalwayspredominateinthegreatbattle;lastly,thatthetwolastinadefensivebattleareinrealitysuchasyieldnofruit,theyare,thatistosay,purelynegative,andcan,therefore,onlybeserviceable,indirectly,byfacilitatingsomethingelsewhichispositive.ITIS,THEREFORE,ABADSIGNOFTHESTRATEGICSITUATIONIFBATTLESOFTHISKINDBECOMETOOFREQUENT. 蓝星,夏国。
肿瘤科病房,弥漫着医院独有的消毒水味道。病房是单人间,设施俱全,温馨舒适。
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可对于孑然一身的路遥来讲,却是无人问津的等死之地。
他是癌症晚期,靠着意志力撑到现在,但也只是多受几天罪罢了。
此刻,路遥躺在病床上,怔怔望着床头柜上的水杯,想喝口水。
可他拼尽全力却无法让身体离开病床。剧痛和衰弱,让这原本无比简单的事情成了奢望。
这时,一道幸灾乐祸的声音响起:“表哥~你真是狼狈呢。连喝口水都得指望别人施舍。”
一位英俊的年轻男子悠闲坐在病床前,翘着二郎腿,眼睛笑成一道缝。
“你求求我,我给你喝口水如何?”
路遥面无表情,一言不发。自从失去了自理能力,一帮亲戚的嘴脸已经见多了,不差这一个。
男子起身,将水杯拿在手里递过来,“表哥别生气,我开玩笑的,你对我这么好,喂你口水还是能办到的。”
说完话,他将水杯里的水,缓缓倒在路遥苍白消瘦的脸上。
被呛到,路遥无力的咳嗽几声,好在少量的水流过嗓子,让他有了几丝说话的力气:
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“张鑫,为什么?我从未得罪过你。你去星盟国留学,还是我资助的!”
张鑫将水杯放下,不紧不慢的说:“谁让你这么古板呢,只是运点感冒药罢了,又不犯法,你非得千方百计的拦着。”
路遥脸上闪过一丝了然之色,道:“张鑫你这垃圾,狗改不了吃屎。将感冒药运到国外提炼毒品……咳咳……”
张鑫理了下领带,笑道:“你别血口喷人啊,我可是国际知名企业家。这次回国,‘省招商引资局’还打电话欢迎我呢~”
路遥叹了口气,现在的自己什么都做不了,索性闭上眼睛不再说话,安静等待死亡的到来。
但张鑫却不想让眼前饱受病痛折磨、即将离世的表兄走好。他附身靠近,悄悄说道:琇書蛧
“表哥啊~其实呢,我这次回国主要就是见你一面,告诉你一声——你的癌,是我弄出来的~”
路遥陡然挣开眼,“你说什么!”
张鑫笑眯眯的掏出个铅盒打开,里面是件古怪的三角形饰物,仅有巴掌大小,中间是只眼睛似的图案,一看就很有年代感。
“眼熟吧?这是我亲手送你的,货真价实的古董。我在里面掺了点放射性物质,长期接触就会变成你现在这副鬼样子。”
路遥马上认出来,这是自己很喜欢的一件古物,天天摆在书桌上,时不时的把玩,没想到却是要人命的东西!
他伸出枯枝似的手臂,死死的抓住眼前人的胳膊!“你……”
“别激动~表哥,我西装很贵的。”张鑫轻松拿掉路遥的手,小心的捏起铅盒,将放射性饰物塞进他怀里。
“我赶飞机,得先走一步。你好好留着这个当做纪念吧,有机会再去你的坟头蹦迪~”
说完话,张鑫从容起身离开。临走前,还回头俏皮的眨眨眼。他原本就男生女相,此时的神态动作居然有些娇媚。
保镖很有眼力劲,赶紧打开病房门。同时用无线耳麦联络同事,提前发动汽车。
~~~~~~~~
路遥只能无力的瘫在床上,浑身皆是钻心剜骨般的剧痛,还有无穷悔恨、不甘。
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但很快,剧痛渐渐消失,只剩麻木,路遥隐约听到过世的双亲在喊他。
就在路遥的身体越来越飘,即将失去意识时,胸口突然阵阵发烫,将他惊醒。
从怀中摸出那三角形饰物,发现这玩意变得滚烫无比,还在缓缓发光!
秀书网为你提供最快的战争论更新,BOOK IV THE COMBAT(1)免费阅读。https://www.xiumb9.com
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